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I.

INTRODUCTION

Law is an instrument for the attainment of economic objectives and
the economy is an object of legal control. The substance of that proposition is widely acknowledged and even more widely, if tacitly, followed.
Although economists are increasingly concerned with the legal framework of economic activity and lawyers have long been concerned with
the structure of economic organization and relations, no general model of
the interrelations between legal and economic (i.e., market) processes
has been developed which has found wide acceptance and application.
Actually, such a model would have to be developed in terms of an even
more general model of the fundamental social relations and forces in
terms of which and within which both legal and economic forces and
their interaction take place and accordingly may be understood. The
complexities of such an analysis, encompassing many if not all the problems of theories of social control and social change, and the difficulties of
specifying the social forces in both relatively neutral, yet meaningful,
and general yet precise terms, among other factors, have precluded the
generation of a widely acceptable and useful model.
This paper will present a systematic statement of the analysis of a
lawyer-economist, Robert Lee Hale (1884-1969), whose research and
writing over almost half a century specifically grappled with an understanding of the mutual impact of legal and economic processes and the
terms and concepts to be used in furthering such an understanding. It is
suggested that Hale's analysis, worked out painstakingly through many
writings, made a major contribution both to the theory of economic organization and to the analysis of the legal factors in economic society.
In Hale's writings may be found: (1) a paradigm of the economy as
a system of mutual coercion, predicated upon an understanding that
power is the critical variable for an adequate comprehension of the organization and structure of the economic system and for the interrelation
of legal and economic processes; (2) an approach to thinking about legal
or political and economic interrelations constituting both a "logic of
thought" and an approach to the interrelation of legal and economic
processes; and (3) a deeply penetrating thrust of basic questions concerning such points as the nature and place of legal-economic decision
making, the determination of rights of economic importance, the condi-
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tions of realization of economic interests, the meaning of liberty and
coercion, and ultimately certain central issues of policy, i.e., the structure
and diffusion of the distribution of power, the role of the state in determining and changing the structure of private economic power, and the
question, to which (or whose) interests should the state be responsive.
In the remainder of this section, I shall review the life, work and
place of Hale, present an introductory summary of Hale's analysis, and
briefly indicate certain of the sources of Hale's thought. In Part I, I shall
summarize Hale's basic paradigm of the economy as a system of mutual
coercion. In Part II, I shall summarize Hale's analysis of the legal bases
of private coercive power. In this section I will present the conclusions
of Hale's extensive analyses of common, statutory, administrative, and
constitutional law as amplifications of his main theme of the legal foundations of the structure of private mutual coercion. In Parts I and II the
discussion will primarily be of Hale's positive analysis. In Part III, I will
summarize Hale's own normative analysis and the welfare-economic
reasoning to which it is related. The separation of Hale's positive and
normative analyses is difficult, first, because of the almost inherent
tendency for his fundamental concepts and postulated and empirically
grounded relations to be normatively and non-neutrally interpreted, and
second, because of his own intertwining of positive and normative discussions. Thus, "coercion" is used by Hale as a completely neutral concept, but it is almost impossible for anyone to work with it totally
unemotionally, and his fundamental and essentially neutral propositions
about the economic role of law or the state are often conjoined with additional value premises, so as to result in presumptive mandates for affirmative government action. The separation can, however, be achieved, though
the reader is cautioned that it requires a careful adherence to the relatively impassive and limited use of terms and relations advanced by
Hale's positive analysis. My purposes throughout are to systematize
Hale's analysis so as to make his insight and paradigms available to both
economists and lawyers, to acknowledge and call attention to his contributions, and to stimulate further work on the conception of the economic system as a system of power and on the interrelation of legal and
economic processes.
A.

Career of Robert Lee Hale

Born on March 9, 1884 in Albany, Robert Hale received his precollege education in New York, Connecticut and Germany. From Harvard
he received his B.A. (1906), A.M. (1907), and LL.B. (1909). At
Harvard he majored in economics, eventually serving as an assistant to
Frank W. Taussig, the main pillar of orthodox economics in this country
during the early decades of this century. After several years with a
Chicago law firm and AT&T in New York City, Hale returned to school
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at Columbia, receiving his Ph.D. in economics in 1918. He taught in the
Economics Department at Columbia both before and after receiving his
doctorate. In 1919 he began teaching in the law school at the invitation
of the innovative Dean Harlan Fiske Stone. In 1922 he was officially
granted a joint appointment, and in 1928 he transferred completely to
the law school, from which he retired as professor emeritus in 1949,
though he continued to teach into the mid-1950's. Hale died August
31, 1969.1

Hale's research and teaching were concentrated in public utility
law and in his unique course, Legal Factors in Economic Society, though
he also taught labor and administrative law courses. His highly regarded2
course, Legal Factors, was introduced in 1934 (though given experimentally during the preceding decade) and was organized around a number of his articles dating to the early 1920's.
In the field of public utility law, Hale enjoyed an excellent reputation as a brilliant and powerful analyst. He was best known as a critic
of the fair-return-on-fair-value formula of Smyth v. Ames' and of the
concept of the public utility "category" as judicial rhetoric.4 He wrote
extensively on the economic and legal theory of rate base valuation, rate
structure, and rate level, often raising questions now treated in welfare
economics. His work was extremely well received in the courts, in part,
perhaps, through his friendship with Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo, Frankfurter, Hand, and Frank, among others. For example, Justices Black,
Douglas and Murphy cited and paraphrased approvingly two of Hale's
1. The biographical information in this and the following paragraph is based in part
on 4 J. DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION 160-63 (1959) [hereinafter cited as DORFMAN] and 5 id. at 588; A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA
UNIVERSITY 324-25, 361 (J. Goebel, Jr., ed. 1955); 11 LAW ALUMNI BULL. 39 (Winter 1969).
2. A HISTORY OF THE SCHOOL OF LAW, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 325 (J. Goebel, Jr., ed.
1955); E.L. BROWN, LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE 142 (1948) [hereinafter cited as BROWN]. Hale's course on Legal Factors was brilliantly complemented by
Julius Goebel, Jr.'s Development of Legal Institutions. See W.C. Warren, Julius Goebel, Jr.
-An Appreciation, 61 COLUm. L. REV. 1195 (1961). Hale would have agreed with Joseph
Dorfman's tribute to Goebel for "insisting that the development of modern legal institutions
rests in good part on the delicate interplay of law and economics in response to the requirements of a growing economy," which tribute applied equally to Hale himself. Dorfman,
Chancellor Kent and the Developing American Economy, 61 CoLuM. L. REV. 1290 (1961).
See text at note 13, infra.
3. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
4. Hale, The "Physical Value" Fallacy in Rate Cases, 30 YALE L.J. 710 (1921); Hale,
Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, 22 COLUm. L. REV. 209 (1922)
[hereinafter cited as Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept]; Note and
Comment, Pseudo-Protection of Property in Rate Cases, 24 MICH. L. REV. 166 (1925);
Hale, The Constitution and the Price System: Some Reflections on Nebbia v. New York, 34
COLUM. L. REV. 401 (1934); Hale, The New Supreme Court Test of Confiscatory Rates,
10 J. LAND & P.U. EcoN. 307 (1934); Hale, The "Fair Value" Merry-go-round, 1898-1938:
A Forty-Year Journey from Rates-Based-On-Value to Value-Based-On-Rates, 33 ILL. L.
REV. 517 (1939); Hale, Commissions, Rates, and Policies, .53 HARv. L. REV. 1103 (1940);
Hale, Does the Ghost of Smyth v. Ames Still Walk?, 55 HAiv. L. REV. 1116 (1942); Hale,
Utility Regulation in the Light of the Hope Natural Gas Case, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 488
(1944).
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articles on valuation in their concurring opinion in the classic FPC v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co.' His criticism of the rule of Smyth v. Ames
has been described by James C. Bonbright as "urged most vigorously,
and perhaps with the most telling ultimate effect on judicial thinking,"6
and Irston R. Barnes wrote that, "Professor Hale has presented the ultimate fallacy of the use of eminent domain principles in the regulation of
utility rates with a clarity and acumen that is not to be found elsewhere
in public utility literature."' The author of over a score of articles on
public utility regulation, Hale also published his dissertation, Valuation
and Rate-Making: The Conflicting Theories of the Wisconsin Railroad
Commission, 1905-1917,8 which became a classic. He also published
with Young B. Smith and Noel T. Dowling, Cases on the Law of Public
Utilities.9
Hale's writings of present importance consist of another score or
so of major articles examining primarily but not exclusively legal
materials, gradually evolving a theory of the economy as a system of
mutual coercion and of the legal bases thereof, culminating in his
Freedom Through Law,10 published after his retirement, but representing
three decades of research and analysis. In connection with his course
Legal Factors he also prepared an unpublished mimeographed collection
of cases, materials, and notes for the use of his students, running through
five editions, at its longest almost 800 pages."
Hale's work in the area of legal economics was acknowledged by
both economists and legal writers, including among the former his colleague Wesley C. Mitchell. 2 Hale's work was summarized as pioneering
legal economics by Joseph Dorfman in his monumental Economic Mind
5. 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
6. J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES Or PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 164 (1961). See also id at 33;
id. at 183.
7. I. BARES, Tim ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 402 (1942).
8. COLUM1BIA UNIVERSITY, STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW No. 80,

1918.
9. 1st ed. 1926; 2d ed. 1936.
10. (1952) [hereinafter cited as FREEDOM THROUGHi LAW].
11. R. HALE, LEGAL FACTORS IN ECONOMIC SOCIETY (1st ed. 1935, 2 vols.; 2d ed. 1937,
3 vols.; 3d ed. 1940, 2 vols.; 4th ed. 1946; 5th ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL
FACTORS]. References below are to the third edition, the longest edition in terms of pages
of which the subsequent editions are primarily condensations.
12. Mitchell, Commons on the Legal Foundations of Capitalism, 14 AM. ECON. REv.
240, 253 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Commons]; 2 TYPES OF ECONOMIC THEORY 736 (J.
Dorfman ed. 1969). At least one reviewer of FREEDOM THROUGH LAW favorably compared
it to John R. Commons' LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924). Emerson, Book
Review, 13 LAWYERS GUnD REv. 139, 140 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Emerson]. Commons
and Hale were not only familiar with each others' work but corresponded occasionally.
For example, Hale cites Commons' Legal Foundations of Capitalism and Economics,
34 YALE L.J. 371 (1925) in Economics and Law, THm SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THEIR INTERRELATION 131 n.1 (W.F. Ogburn and A. Goldenweiser eds. 1927) [hereinafter cited as
Economics and Law], and Commons cited two articles by Hale in his LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
OF CAPITALISM 91 n.1 (1924). See also Hale Papers, Folders 28, 29. Commons was, with
Thorstein Veblen and Mitchel, a leader of Institutional Economics.
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I

in American Civilization." Describing Hale's course, Legal Factors, one
legal writer remarked that "Itlhe most surprising feature of the course
is the large emphasis given to the question of individual rights within an
economic system that Professor Hale views as being shot through with
coercion." 4 The surprise evaporates when it is recognized (as will be
seen in detail below) that, in Hale's view, it is precisely through the
acquisition and exercise of individual or private rights that the system of
private mutual coercion operates in a market economy. Thus, in a review
of Hale's Freedom Through Law, Stanley D. Rose pointed out that " [i]n
his great work on jurisprudence, Julius Stone discussed the contentions
of the modern opponents of extended legal control who insist 'that society
should rely as much as possible on spontaneous forces and as little as
possible on coercion.' " To this argument [Stone] replied:
The issue is scarcely a clean cut one between legal intervention and non-intervention, for even at the height of laissez
faire the role of the law is not passive and colourless. The law,
even then, especially the law of property, crimes and contracts,
provides an essential framework of compulsion reinforcing the
economic bargaining power of the parties, and preventing intrusion contrary to law.
For this particular statement, Stone's sole reference is to an article by
Robert Hale.' Stone also maintained that, "[e]ven under a perfect
laissez faire economy the law, and particularly the law of contracts and
property, is intervening most powerfully to compel some men to fulfill
what others claim from them, and to respect the claims of others to be
free of intrusion."' 6 Here, too, Stone cited only Hale. An identical theme
is stated by Felix S. Cohen, who cites in support another article by Hale,
as well as a paper by his father, Morris R. Cohen.' Elliott Evans Cheatham cited Hale's Freedom Through Law to echo Cardozo's Paradoxes of
Legal Science on the legal paradoxes of "freedom and order, justice and
liberty." 8 Arthur S. Miller quoted Hale as an originator of the concept
of "private government,"' 9 a notion basic to Hale's analysis. Finally we
13. (1959). See note 1 supra.
14. BROWN, supra note 2, at 142. Brown continues: "Property owners use coercion,
but so do workers. All bargaining, in fact, is coercive." Id.
15. Rose, Book Review, 6 VAND. L. REv. 958 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Rose]. See
J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 780, 781 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
STON]. Jerome Frank, dissenting in M. Witmark & Sons v. Fred Fisher Music Co., 125
F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1942), cited several articles by Hale in support of his argument that
minimization of government interference was "not the actual practice, even when laissezfaire was in its zenith. . . ." Id. at 963. The case is discussed in note 32 on page 125 of
FREEDOM THROUGH LAW. See also letter from J.N. Frank to R.L. Hale, April 23, 1946, in
Hale Papers, Folder 13.
16. STONE, supra note 15, at 561.
17. F.S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 80 n.22 (1933).
18. E. CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 122, 124 (1963).

19. A.S. Miller, Private Governments and the Constitution, THE CORPORATION TAKEOVER 138-39 (A. Hacker ed. 1964)

[hereinafter cited as Miller].
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may note that in his classic, Social Control of Business,2 John M. Clark
adopted the basic analysis of Hale's Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-coercive State.2 1
B.

Aim and Thrust of Hale's Legal-Economic Analysis:
An Introductory Summary

As will be seen in detail below, Hale considered that the economic
(i.e., market) and legal systems were mutually interdependent, that such
mutual interdependence included the inescapable involvement of government in economic affairs, and, no less important and fundamental, that
such mutual interdependence could be and indeed had to be comprehended
and elucidated in terms of a structure and process of both liberty and
coercion. Since government was fundamentally involved in economic
processes, both economic and legal theory should be so developed as to
reveal the basic elements and relations of that involvement. Also, since
the basic character of the economy is its structure of liberty and coercion,
the elements of legal involvement would have to be specified in terms of
the economy seen as a system of mutual coercion, although not because
legal action was uniquely labeled "coercive." The very operation of the
market economy (in fact, all economies) was seen by Hale as coercive,
such that there was coercion generic to even a supposedly noncoercive
economic system. 22 Hale concentrated upon "the role played by government in controlling the exercise of conflicting economic liberties through
upholding or restricting the use of economic pressures,"3 whether considered "intervention" or not, so as to create "an understanding of the
effect of actual or possible legal arrangements on the various interests
promoted or retarded thereby. ' 24 "[T] he system of legal controls, whether
employed actively through imposing state obligations or more passively
through affording protection for private economic pressures, determines
the nature of the economic system, ' 25 specifically the structure of private
coercive power.
The two main thrusts of Hale's analysis are thus: (1) the conception
of the economy as a system of power, and his accompanying model of the
formation, distribution and operation of mutual coercion and (2) the inseparability of legal and economic processes, and his accompanying model
of the legal bases of economic power. His analysis is preoccupied with the
protection which the legal system, especially the courts, affords "to one
man's economic liberty against the coercive power of other individuals
20. J.M. CLARK, SocIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 111-12 & n.1 (2d ed. 1939). Clark also
cited Commons' LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924).
21. 38 POL. ScI. Q. 470 (1923) [hereinafter cited as Coercion and Distribution].
22. Id.
23. Emerson, supra note 12, at 139.
24. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 131.
25. Emerson, supra note 12, at 139.
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or of the government.... . 2 Since in Hale's view "every lawful economic
power becomes a type of political power, and every economic inequality
poses a question of political inequality,"2 7 a critical nexus becomes the
policy choices through which one interest is elevated against another
through the application of "the basic rules which determine the relation
of individual to individual, of individual to private power groups, and of
individuals to government." 28 As a lawyer, Hale concentrated on the
legal rules, but as a policy analyst he inevitably riveted his attention
upon the choices made in the legal process, which were seen as choices
of basic economic significance.
In effect, Hale argued, then, that one has to study the formation of
the distribution of economic power because the economy is a structure
of coercive power arrangements and relationships. Resource allocation
and income distribution are nominally a function of the market, but the
operation of the market-even under competitive conditions-is itself a
partial function of the distribution of power, which, further, is a partial
function of the operation of the legal system. Hale studied the legal bases
of the structure of private economic power, with the problem of economic
power-the different circumstances under which different individuals and
subgroups in the population enter into and participate in economic
activity-seen as an independent and distinct problem in its own right,
and thereby the legal bases of resource allocation and income distribution
through the legal determination of the structure of private participation.
C. Origins of Hale's Thought
It is exceedingly difficult and never really possible to establish conclusively the origins of a man's ideas. The substance and sequence of a
man's reading is largely unknown; even more uncertain is any attempt
to discern the dialectical reactions and play of his mind as he reads and
thinks; and there is the exercise of imagination as well. In addition,
certain readings teach or suggest new thoughts and ideas; some confirm
and/or provide additional evidence supporting ideas already held; and
still others articulate and give substance and specificity to what had been
latent, only felt and not seen, or undifferentiated. And there is more than
reading, of course; one's entire pattern of experience exercises an
influence upon one's thoughts, both in direction and substance. The
development of one's psyche must count for much. Notwithstanding the
difficulties which a biographer would encounter in constructing an intellectual history, it is possible to establish certain interesting origins of
Hale's analyses, several of which are particularly instructive.
26. FREEDOM: THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 37.

27. Cahn, Book Review, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1953, at 14, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as
Cahn].
28. Emerson, supra note 12, at 139. This formulation accords with Frank H. Knight's
understanding of the concept "theory of economic policy;" see his Theory of Economic
Policy and the History of Doctrine, 63 ETHICS 276, 282 (1953), and W. SAMvLS, THE
CLAssicAL THEORY OF ECONOmIC PoLIc

(1966)

[hereinafter cited as SAMUELS].
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First, Hale grew up intellectually under the influence of thinkers
in both economics and law who made strenuous and generally successful
efforts to treat fundamental issues, efforts which required them to delve
into subject matter often considered extraneous by narrow definitions of
the scope of their field. Hale seems to have been impressed by the possibility and attractiveness of getting to truly fundamental questions which
could be then treated both positively and normatively, but, above all,
explicitly. In this he was aided by the deep thrusts of such legal writers
and teachers as Joseph H. Beale and Roscoe Pound, and by Justices
Stone, Holmes, Cardozo and Brandeis, as well as Frankfurter. Perhaps
Hale was most especially influenced by the thrust of Wesley H. Hohfeld's
articulation of "fundamental legal conceptions." Hohfeld's work and its
insight for understanding Hale, as well as the insight which it accorded
Hale, will be examined a few paragraphs below.
Among economists, Hale was at Harvard during the time of Taussig
and Carver, economists whose penchant for and success at asking fundamental questions about economic organization as a system of power
accounted in no small degree for their eminence. Although both were
much more politically and economically conservative than Hale, he
appreciated the level and candor of their discourse, particularly that of
Taussig. From Taussig, as Hale made explicit, he learned that wage
and public utility rate setting by the state "involves settlement by public
authority of the distribution of wealth."29 From this it was easy to see
the action of the public authority, which Hale would later call "state
action,"3 0 behind all wealth and income distribution through the ordinary
determination and enforcement of property and contract rights-which
ordinary law the statutory regulation of wages and/or public utility rates
would suspend, set aside, or modify but which otherwise operated to
partially govern wealth and income distribution.3 He also acknowledged
29. FREEDoM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 460, 461.

30. Hale was one of the foremost exponents of the idea that enforcement of contract
and property rights could be seen as a delegation of state power to private individuals and
thus "state action," the germ of which Hale credited to Beale, FREEDom THROUGH LAW,
supra note 10, at 333, and which culminated in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
See also Hale Papers, Folder 95.
31. In notes dating back to the first world war, Hale wrote:
It has been customary to ignore the fact that the owner of property derives his
income from the government's interference with others ...
However we may explain the persistence of the notion that our existing system
of property rights implies no governmental interference with the distribution of
wealth, that notion has now begun to lose its hold.... The need of protecting the
public from the owner was first clearly seen in the case of the railroads, then of
other public utilities. . . . No longer are we able to delude ourselves with the
comfortable theory that private property is no special privilege. And no longer,
on the other hand, do we seek the panacea of abolishing all special privileges. Like
all special privileges of a pecuniary nature, we seek to allow income from ownership to the extent, and to the extent alone, that it conduces to some social purpose.
. . [W]e aim to measure the privilege by the end to which it is supposed to
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Taussig's emphasis on non-competing groups as one source of approaching the subject of limitations upon alternatives in the market going
beyond existential scarcity.82 From this it was possible to see the economy
as a system of mutual coercion with differentially important powers of
coercion acting as a function of inequality of position, including effective
legal position, i.e., a system of advantage and disadvantage partially
grounded in law. 8 In all these matters, Hale appreciated Taussig's
realism and candor. 4
conduce .... [and] to leave the owner so much income only as is thought socially
desirable.
Hale Papers, Folder 24.
This functional analysis (without, in the case of Taussig, the normative element supporting reform) has its analog in Taussig's functional treatment of the leisure class, 2 F.W.
TAussio, PRINCIPLES OF ECONomics 275-77 (3d ed. rev. 1929), and possibly one source,

and certainly support (acknowledged by Hale in Hale Papers, Folder 90-3 at 2) in R.T.
Ely's social theory of property in his Property and Contract in Their Relation to the
Distribution of Wealth (1914). In 1951, at the University of Chicago, Hale similarly argued
that public utility rate regulation
cannot be intelligently solved without passing judgment on the desirable economic
relationships between property owners in general and the rest of the community.
Once that judgment is made, the question at once arises why the government should
not readjust the relationships between the public and other property owners, not
utility owners alone, whenever the present relationships seem to call for readjustment ....

Hale Papers, Folder 59-1 at 6.
32. FREED m THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 32-33.
33. Hale was undoubtedly also influenced by Taussig's emphasis upon the importance
of an instinct of domination, which he felt extended throughout both political and economic
affairs, though Hale nowhere generalizes about psychology in relation to power and
coercion. See Samuels, Taussig on the Psychology of Economic Policy, 15 INDIAN ECON. J.
1 (1967).

34. Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 329, 330 (May 1923). Hale's Coercion
and Distribution, supra note 21 was a review of T.N. Carver's Principles of National Economy (1921). Although Carver wrote Hale that the latter's review failed to choose "a
representative case" (Letter from T.N. Carver to R.L. Hale, November 19, 1923, in Hale
Papers, Folder 1), Roscoe Pound wrote to Hale that his critique of Carver was "not only
characteristically acute, but seems to me entirely convincing" (Letter from R. Pound to
R.L. Hale, November 14, 1923, in Hale Papers, Folder 1), after earlier having written that
Hale's article, Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, 20 COLum. L. REv. 451 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Law Making by Unofficial Minorities], showed "an unusual power" in
looking "realities in the face, divesting them of their coverings of legal theory." Letter of
R. Pound to R.L. Hale, May 20, 1920, in Hale Papers, Folder 4. Hale's own depth of
reasoning, realism and candor were further praised by R.B. Gosh, for "showing up the
absurdities in the existing window dressing" of laws and institutions (Letter from R.B.
Gosh to R.L. Hale, May 2, 1922, in Hale Papers, Folder 6), and by J. Viner, writing like
Gosh in praise of Hale's Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, supra
note 4, that "[he] fully appreciate[d] its acuteness of reasoning, its grasp of economic and
. . . presum[ably] of legal principles, and its determined search for fundamental bases for
the guidance of governmental action. . . ." Letter from J. Viner to R.L. Hale, September 23,
1922, in Hale Papers, Folder 6. Of interest also in this regard is A. Lawrence Lowell's
reaction to Hale's Law Making by Unofficial Minorities. Then President of Harvard, Lowell
wrote Hale:
Surely we have discovered, to the great surprise of its early advocates, that democracy means, in large part, the rule of minorities. On the other hand, those who
have always claimed that minorities are usually right ought to rejoice; but the question arises, what minorities?
Letter from A. Lawrence Lowell to R.L. Hale, May 29, 1920 in Hale Papers, Folder 4.
Compare,' however, Douglas Maggs' reaction to Hale's Commissions, Rates, and Policies, 53

1973]

LEGAL ECONOMICS

Second, Hale's work in public utility regulation accorded him direct
opportunities to generate and test his ideas. He emphasized the fallacy
of fair-return-on-fair-value, namely, that rates of return cannot properly
be calculated independently of value, since value tends to be the capitalization of returns, and that protection of value determined independently
of regulation would disable the power of regulation to control rates by
assuring continuation of monopoly returns and the valuation based thereon
(i.e., the specific error of applying eminent domain principles to police
power cases). This also led Hale to appreciate that the economy is a
structure of advantage and disadvantage with respect to the capacity to
derive income and establish (protected) marketable value, and to seek
the legal bases thereof. 5 With respect to rate making in general, Hale
went beyond Taussig and perceived and argued that,
the search for a criterion of the reasonableness of rates leads
logically to a search for a criterion of the reasonableness of. the
yield of property outside of the regulated field, as well as within
it, and demands the formulation of the public economic policy
in regard to the distribution of wealth throughout the economy
and in regard to the desirability or undesirability of altering
that distribution in specific respects by price regulation or
corrective taxation3 6
Thus, Hale could generalize about the ubiquity of the courts' "passing
judgment on the question how far it is true that the income derived from
ownership is justifiable on grounds of public policy.""' Hale argued that
regulation of the level of wages, public utility rates, land values, etc.,
required reference to principles relating to the fact that law-even
independent of "regulation"-governed both the capacity to derive income and "the channels into which industry should flow; ms and that
what both ordinary law and "regulation" were doing was determining
stating that he would "succeed eventually in forcing out into
the open the hidden and therefore half-baked policy decisions which dictate results in this
field." Letter from D. Maggs to R.L. Hale, June 4, 1940, in Hale Papers, Folder 16, which
included the letter of a former student, Edward S. Godfrey:
I should like to tell you also how thoroughly I enjoyed your course-especially
the book, which I read in entirety. Though I still hold some doubts as to whether
or not it should be suppressed l It clears away vast stretches of underbrush, but
I think you are still groping yourself to find what to plant in its place. The great
Llewellyn can laugh at the fear of skepsis, but I think his critics have something
there. I'm thinking of less extraordinary people, less informed, and of that infernal
arbitrariness of choice that turns up after all your analysis. Truly I believe that if
every one in the country took Legal Factors we should have a civil war.
But I really enjoyed it tremendously.
Letter from E.S. Godfrey to R.L. Hale, undated, in Hale Papers, Folder 40.
35. FREEDOm THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 462; and see references given in note
4 supra.
36. FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at x. See text at note 29 supra.
37. Hale, Decisions on Valuation and Rate Making: Discussion, 14 Am. EcoN. Rlv.
264, 265 (1924).
38. Hale, Economic Theory and the Statesman, in'THE TREND OF EcoNoMICS 193 (R.G.
Tugwell ed. 1924) [hereinafter cited as Economic Theory and the Statesman].
HARv. L. REV. 1103 (1940),
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the structure of private mutual coercion governing resource allocation
and income distribution pro tanto through the market. Similarly, Hale
considered that the public utility category question-the question of
intensive regulation per se-led ultimately to the legal bases of the
capacity to exert monopoly prices via exclusion and withholding, and, by
inference, over all prices and all claims to income, including under
competitive conditions (see below).
Third, that Hale could readily pursue such lines of inquiry is understandable. He grew up in a very politically conscious family environment, and in a period in which fundamental questions of socioeconomic
and political policy were widely and openly discussed among both the
educated and not so educated. 39 He wrote to his older brother, Matthew
Hale, of his early concerns with and sensitivities to the distribution and
structure of freedom, coercion, and opportunity, of his antipathy toward
blind and unquestioning orthodoxy, and of his affection for pluralist
democracy.4 Early conflicts between organized labor and business, as
will be seen below, were interpreted in terms of legally based relative
coercive power. But it was probably the Georgian single-tax movement
which first cemented his notions about the relations between income,
property, coercive power, and law; his Papers amply document his vision
as a young man of legally based rights to land rent as a source of withholding capacity, thus of coercive power, and thereby as a claim to
income in the market.4' Income was a function of withholding or mutual
coercive power, which in turn was a function of law (i.e., the legal
apportionment of land or, by extension, of rights in general). This was
extended to property in general, as well as to non-property based sources
of coercive power, and echoes throughout almost all his writings-as will
be amply evident in the pages to follow.
Hale thus found highly agreeable the famous essays by Hobhouse,
Rashdall and Lindsay on the rights and duties of private property; in
particular, Hobhouse's distinction between property for use and property
for power gave structure and thrust to ideas which Hale had been developing for some time. 2 Similarly, Herbert Croly's ProgressiveDemocracy,
among other things a spirited defense of Rooseveltian versus Wilsonian
progressivism, supported Hale's growing belief in the desirability of
extending the fruits of private property in a system of industrial and
political democracy.4 3 But of particular present importance was the deep
level of an explicit, functional analysis of the institution of propertycoupled with a reformist approach, to be sure-found in both books. This
was the level of analysis on which Hale's own mind operated and the
direction it took.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See generally S. FINE, LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENFRAL-WELFARE STATE (1956).
Letter from R.L. Hale to M. Hale, July 29, 1913, in Hale Papers, not in folder.
Hale Papers, Folders 24, 62.
L. HoBHOUSE, PROPERTY: ITs DUTIEs AND RIGHTS 9-10 (1915).
43. H. CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DE OCRACY (1914).
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His style of inquiry was also abetted by the explicit consideration of
coercive power found in leading labor cases of the period. Indeed, Legal
Factorsbegan with excerpts from Pitney's opinion in Coppage v. Kansas,
including the following:
No doubt, wherever the right of private property exists, there
must and will be inequalities of fortune; and thus it naturally
happens that parties negotiating about a contract are not
equally unhampered by circumstances. This applies to all contracts, and not merely to that between employer and employee.
Indeed a little reflection will show that wherever the right of
private property and the right of free contract co-exist, each
party when contracting is inevitably more or less influenced by
the question whether he has much property, or little, or
none ....
And it was no accident that in Legal Factors Coppage was followed by
Hale's Coercionand Distribution.Hale was also impressed with certain of
Brandeis' arguments. One of them, Brandeis' dissent in Hitchman Coal
& Coke Co. v. Mitchell, contained the very germ of Hale's theory of mutual coercion:
It is also urged that defendants are seeking to "coerce"
plaintiff to "unionize" its mine. But coercion, in a legal sense, is
not exerted when a union merely endeavors to induce employees
to join a union with the intention thereafter to order a strike
unless the employer consents to unionize his shop. Such pressure
is not coercion in a legal sense. The employer is free either to
accept the agreement or the disadvantage. Indeed, the plaintiff's
whole case is rested upon agreements secured under similar
pressure of economic necessity or disadvantage. If it is coercion
to threaten to strike unless plaintiff consents to a closed shop,
it is coercion also to threaten not to give one employment unless
the applicant will consent to a closed non-union shop. The
employer may sign the union agreement for fear that labor may
not be otherwise obtainable; the workman may sign the individual agreement, for fear that employment may not be otherwise obtainable. But such fear does not imply coercion in a
legal sense.45
And there is Brandeis' dissent in Truax v. Corrigan,the thrust of which
is identical to Hobhouse's distinction between property for use and for
power, namely, that the purpose of employers in using the Sherman
Act against labor unions was
not ordinarily to prevent property from being injured nor to
protect the owner in its use, but to endow property with active,
44. 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915), quoted in LEOAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 1-2 and FREEDOM
THRouGH LAW, supra note 10, at 10.
45. 245 U.S. 229, 264 (1917). See Hale Papers, Folder 80-1.
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militant power, which would make it dominant over men. In
other words, that, under the guise of protecting property rights,

the employer was seeking sovereign power.4"

In Freedom Through Law, Truax v. Corriganwas one of a series of cases
which Hale used to argue the existence of state action behind private
coercive power.
Finally, of great value in understanding Hale's analysis and style
or logic of reasoning is the paradigm of legal conceptions created by
Hohfeld in his classic Yale Law Journal papers of 1913 and 1919.
Hohfeld attempted to identify and distinguish, in the words of one of
his interpreters, Arthur L. Corbin, "concepts that are 'fundamental'
because they express the vitally important legal relations of men with
each other in any judicial or governmental system."48 Hohfeld's model
of fundamental legal concepts, stated first in terms of pairs of jural
correlatives, is as follows:
RIGHT:

one's affirmative claim against another, one's
control over another's conduct
DUTY:
societal compulsion for, or obligation
to, the benefit of another
PRIVILEGE: absence of duty, i.e., exemption from another's
right (i.e., from the duty owed that right)
NO-RIGHT:
absence of one's right or claim on another (and of any correlative duty on
another's part)
POWER:
legal ability to alter legal relations
LIABILITY:
condition wherein one may have one's
legal relations or position altered by
another49
IMMUNITY: exemption from legal power, i.e., from another's
legal ability to alter one's legal relations or
position
DISABILITY:
conditions wherein one lacks the power
to alter another's legal relations or
position"0
The foregoing pairs are correlative in that each of the extended terms
denoting someone's condition or position is necessarily accompanied by
its corresponding indented term denoting another's condition or position
46. 257 U.S. 312, 368 (1921).
47. FREFDOSE THROUGH LAW, supra note 10,
48. A. Corbin, Foreword to W.N. HoHFELn,
(W.W. Cook ed. 1964).
49. Commons substituted the word exposure
supra note 12. Hale also occasionally used the

at 327-33 passim.
FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS at viii
for liability. See id. at xiii, and Commons,
word exposure to connote what Hohfeld

meant by liability. E.g., Hale Papers, Folder 39-14 at 2. Also see note 52 infra.
50. W.N. HO-FELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CoNcEPTIoNs, 5, 36, 69 (W.W. Cook ed. 1964).
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consequent to the position denoted by the extended term. These concepts
may be expressed as a scheme of jural opposites:
immunity
power
privilege
right
liabilityz'
disability
duty
no-right
Each pair is opposite in the sense that each lower term denotes a condition or relation representing the negative or absence, hence opposite, of
its corresponding upper term. Thus, with respect to the jural correlatives,
a right implies a duty, while the absence of a right-its opposite-is a
no-right. And while every power implies a correlative liability (or exposure), the opposite condition to a position of power is a condition
of disability. Finally, the no-right logically implies a correlative privilege;
and the disability logically implies a correlative immunity.
What is of present importance is not only that this paradigm expresses "vitally important legal relations of men with each other," to
again quote Corbin, but that it does so in a particular way. For its expression of relations is in terms of a structure of decision-making with
positions of advantage and disadvantage, of a structure of mutually
coercive capacity (or, generally, power-though not defined per Hohfeld;
see below). Thus, with respect to the opposites right and no-right, one
may have an affirmative claim over another, thereby controlling his conduct, or not, and with respect to the correlatives right and duty, one may
have such a claim and such control, and the other is under societal compulsion or obligation to the benefit of the former. However approached,
the individuals in question are not under symmetrical or equal bargaining conditions. With respect to privileges, duties and no-rights, one may
have a duty to another owing to the latter's correlative right, or one may
have an exemption from another's right, to wit, a privilege, such that
duty and privilege are jural opposites, and the correlative of which
privilege is the other's no-right-againwith asymmetry. Similarly, while
some may have the power to alter legal relations, which power subjects
others to a liability (or to which they are exposed), the power and the
liability being correlative, one may, in jural opposition to what is otherwise one's power, be disabled by virtue of another's immunity from the
one's legal ability to alter his legal relations or position, the disability
and immunity being correlative, and the positions once again being those
of advantage and disadvantage. In the case of every pair of jural opposites and jural correlatives there is an underlying or implicit structure
of advantage and disadvantage, of power and of exposure to power, with
a consequent structure of mutual coercive capacity depending upon who
has what right, what privilege, what power, and what immunity and,
therefore, who (else) has what duty, what no-right, what liability, and
what disability. Hale's conception of the economy as a system of mutual
coercion and his understanding of the legal bases thereof may be related
51. Id.
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directly52 to Holifeld's paradigm of fundamental legal relations, for those
relations, like the relations in Hale's paradigm, represent a structure of
legally grounded private economic power with asymmetrical elements and
with the legal system partially responsible for the asymmetry. For, differential coercive power is a partial function of the fact, in Hale's view,
that there is an unequal distribution of effective rights, privileges, powers,
immunities, duties, no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities. What is relevant
at this point, however, is that the system of mutual coercion embodied,
albeit latently or implicitly in Hohfeld's paradigm is also embodied, but
explicitly, in Hale's.
II.

THE ECONOMY AS A SYSTEM OF MUTUAL COERCION

In this part, I shall summarize Hale's basic paradigm of the economy
as a system of mutual coercion. Although Hale perceived that all
decision-making processes were coercive (as he understood the meaning
of coercion), the economy-and particularly the market economy of the
United States-was the only such process which he analyzed. Accordingly, I shall demonstrate the coercive character of the economy and,
by extension, all decision-making processes in general and the market
economy in particular, including the asymmetrical structure of economic
organization, all in terms of Hale's basic paradigm of freedom, coercion
and power.
A.

Freedom, Coercion and Power

Hale's approach to the interrelation of legal and economic processes
and to the ordinary operation of the economy considered independent of,
or abstracted from, the legal system requires strict adherence to his
analytical structure encompassing a small set of concepts. As in the
case of Hohfeld's attributions of meaning to terms, the meanings given
to terms by Hale must be understood and followed as restricted by him
in order to comprehend his general analysis. This is difficult; the terms
tend to resist particular specification because, first, they have been given
widely disparate and even contradictory meanings by a wide variety of
authors, and second, they have widely varying applications or identifications in connection with particular real-world experiences. For example,
what is coercion to one may be freedom to another, and so on, in the
first case by definition and in the second, by sentiment, feeling, or per52. Hale used and praised Hohfeld's analysis but he did not attempt to rigorously state
his own analysis in Hohfeldian terms, though he sometimes used or referred to Hohfeld's
terminology for clarity or strength. See Hale, Labor Law. Anglo-American, in 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 669 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Hale, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
SOCIAL SCIENcEs]; Hale Papers, Folders 1 (Letter from A.T. Hadley to R.L. Hale, Nov. 12,
1923, and Letter from R.L. Hale to A.T. Hadley, Nov. 24, 1923), 30-1, 30-2, 58-3, 58-5,
91-5; Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 214
& n.16.
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sonal identification. In this section, I shall first present the concepts
comprising the structure of Hale's paradigm and then, in sequence,
expand upon these and related concepts.
1.

THE GENERAL PARADIGM

The concepts comprising the structure of Hale's paradigm are as
follows:
Freedom: Voluntary:

complete autonomy with the absence
of constrained choice or limits to
choice or behavior; in effect, choice
governing the range of alternatives
between which one will choose.
Volitional:
circumstantially limited exercise of
choice between alternatives or behavior.
Coercion:
the impact of the behavior and choices of others
(individually and/or in the aggregate) which
limits one's freedom from voluntary to volitional;
the unconditional and/or conditional withholding
of alternatives.
Power:
the means or capacity to coerce (whose reciprocal
is exposure to others' coercive capacity), e.g.,
rights, wealth, position.
Government: those with the capacity to coerce (i.e., to affect
behavior of choice), or those with the concentrated capacity to coerce; or the total system of
mutual coercion.
Stated generally and very incompletely, an individual would have complete or voluntary freedom if, the physical constraints of nature being
equal, he were unconstrained by others in any form as to his behavior
and/or choices, but his freedom is lesser and only volitional because of
the impact of others' behavior and/or choices. This impact of the
behavior and/or choices of others is coercion, which may take many
forms and is generally a matter of degree, but always affects the range
and/or degree of possible realization and/or cost of alternatives. Power
connotes the capacity to coerce and may be concentrated or diffused,
and government connotes those with the capacity to coerce (i.e., to
impose or effectuate constraints on choice). Hale's favorite, simple yet
direct, illustrative example involves the hold-up man who says, "Give
me your money or your life." According to Hale's terminology when one
hands over one's money one is not acting voluntarily,but only volitionally,
for one is choosing between alternatives imposed by another, whereas
voluntary freedom would enable the individual to choose between alternatives of his own making, such as the added option of leaving or being

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

left unmolested. In this case, the hold-up man is coercing the victim
when he denies him the opportunity or alternative to leave unmolested;
the hold-up man has the power and for all practical purposes he is
governing the victim. A different example involves the consumer having
to surrender the price of the bread in order to purchase the loaf, and
the baker or retailer having to surrender the loaf in order to have income.
Both have alternatives but they are limited: the one may buy or not buy
and starve, and the other may sell or not sell and perhaps starve also.
Neither has voluntary freedom; both have volitional freedom because
both are limited by the coercive capacity of the other, namely, the
capacity to withhold the purchase price or loaf of bread, respectively.
Each coerces the other by restricting the alternatives open to the other;
each has the power to do so, and each is pro tanto governing the other.
Another example would be that of Robinson Crusoe who has-again
physical constraints on his options being equal-voluntary freedom in
the absence of others (ergo in the absence of constraints imposed by
others), save perhaps for the vestiges of habit and culture remaining
internalized in his behavior. With the arrival of Friday, each one's freedom becomes volitional, each necessarily limiting by virtue of their
interaction the alternatives open to the other. Each is therefore coercing the other through the mere presence and impact of his behavior
and/or choices. It is a system of mutual coercion. If an employeremployee, or landholder-tenant (or worker), relationship should emerge,
say, with still other comers to the island, then, as in our economy, the
structure of mutual coercive capacity would tend to be skewed either
toward the employers, as in a scarcity of employment opportunities, or
toward the employees, as in a scarcity of workers. In the former case, the
coercion upon the workers would tend to be more dominant and vice
versa, but in both cases there is a structure of mutual coercion. Further,
in any case where employment relations mean that the final product
belongs to the employers, one could infer that the general structure of
mutual coercion is skewed toward the employers, with the opposite case
being one in which workers would hire owners of plants and equipment,
with the final product belonging to the workers or their agents. Still
another example would be one in which either governmental grants or
private donations go to universities and students compete for positions,
vis-b-vis one in which monies go to students through scholarships and
the universities compete for students. In the former instance coercive
capacity is skewed toward the universities and in the latter toward the
students. In none of these examples and subcases is there voluntary
freedom, except in the case of Crusoe alone on the island (ceteris paribus
physical restrictions and his habits and culture); in each example involving more than one person, there is only volitional freedom, with the
difference between the hypothetical voluntary freedom and actual volitional freedom being the impact of the sum of others' choices or behavior,
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i.e., their coercion. In each case, those who coerce have power and in
effect govern, whatever their titles and whether officially or unofficially,
and, finally, the structure of coercive capacity is a variable, always involving mutual coercive relationships, with the net flow of impact going
one way or the other.
In Hale's view, then, man in society is subject to a vast system and
structure of governance, a system and structure in which power or the
capacity to exert impact on others exists more or less widely diffused or
concentrated, but where it is always more or less mutual, such that one's
actual freedom is limited by the total impact of others, and, therefore, is
volitional and not voluntary. In other words, the undefined freedom of
alpha is limited more or less by the undefined freedom of beta and vice
versa; the power of one is countered more or less by the power of the
other, and the structure of relations is therefore mutually coercive: each
limits the consequently volitional freedom of the other, more or less.
These concepts of Hale's will now be explored in some detail. In the
following major section I shall explore Hale's view of the economy as a
system of mutual coercion.
This is an appropriate point to note, however, that in Hale's analysis,
even so sketchily summarized, there are inherent two crucial points:
the ubiquity of volitional freedom and the ubiquity of coercion. Almost
all, indeed perhaps all, choice is constrained choice; each person is constrained by the coercive impact of the choices made by others, singly or
through collective choice in all of its forms (market and nonmarket, for
example). The problem which emerges, then, as the critical question of
policy is not one of freedom versus coercion but of the structure of
coercion (i.e., of mutual coercive capacity) and, therefore, of the structure of volitional freedom. The question is one as to which element of
voluntary freedom will be limited by and sacrificed to which coercive
element, and thereby changed to a volitional-freedom status, i.e., a problem of the pattern of volitional freedom and of its correlative pattern
of coercion; in effect, whose freedom and therefore whose capacity to
coerce. Since the total process is one of decision-making or choice, the
ultimate problem is, who chooses? The twin principles of the choice
character of all legal-economic questions, and specifically and ultimately
of the choice character of the structure of legal-economic decision-making
itself, comprise Hale's most fundamental point; that is, except for one
which is implicit in this concept of choice. As put by his appreciative
but concerned student, it is "that infernal arbitrariness of choice""3 that
is itself ubiquitous. Interestingly, Hale shared all of this with both
"sociological jurisprudence" and "legal realism," namely, as Edward
H. Levi put it, "the mechanism of legal reasoning should not be concealed by its pretense,"5 4 of inevitability or finality. And Hale's view on
53. Letter from E.S. Godfrey to R.L. Hale, undated, in Hale Papers, Folder 40.
54. E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 1 (1951).
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law on this point was identical to that of Commons on economics. It was
no accident that both were leaders in legal economics; nor was it an
accident that both were reformers and, in their reformism and legal-economic realism, they disturbed conservatives both in and out of their
professions; nor that both would have to confront the problem of balancing deliberative with nondeliberative choice-as will be discussed in the
final part.
2.

COERCION AND

VOLUNTARY-VOLITIONAL

FREEDOM

"Coercion" signified to Hale the impact upon one person or group
of the choice(s) or participation in a decision-making process of others,
the consequence of which is the transformation of what otherwise,
hypothetically, would be voluntary freedom into volitional freedom or,
more realistically, the transformation of one bundle of volitional freedoms into another. The impact itself is a function of "the relative power,
latent or active, of various individuals and groups.""
a.

Use of the Term "Coercion"

However, "coercion" tends to signify more than Hale intended it to.
Indeed, Hale long felt that "coercion" was an infelicitous term and sought
an alternative which would convey his limited and neutral intended
meaning and nothing more. He considered and at times used "compulsion," "pressure," "force," "influence," "duress" (though this he generally used in the legal sense only), and even "oppression" (though this
he generally used to refer to coercive impacts which were deemed intolerable by either the recipient or an independent observer). One of his
best known articles used the term "coercion" and another, both "force"
and "compulsion." 56
The basic difficulty is that "the word 'coercion' frequently seems
to carry with it the stigma of impropriety," to the effect "that the coercive
character of many innocent acts is so frequently denied." 5 It is this
"stigma of impropriety" which Hale's use would reject. In calling conduct coercive, he maintains, "there is no implication that . . . [it] is
improper, or that there is any feeling of hostility, or that one party has
a greater power than the other, or that the power is irresistible.""8
[C]oerciveness is not a ground for condemnation except when
used in the sense of influence under pain of doing a morally unjustified act. And obviously to pronounce the pressure unjustified because it is an unjustified pressure is to reason in a circle.
55. Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, supra note 34, at 455.
56. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21; Hale, Force and the State: A Comparison
of "Political" and "Economic" Compulsion, 35 COM. L. REv. 149 (1935)
cited as Force and the State].
57. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 471.
58. Hale Papers, Folder 91-5 at 17. See also id. 36-2.

[hereinafter
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Hence, it seems better, in using the word "coercion," to use it in
a sense which involves no moral judgment.59
iT]he word "coercive" as used here is intended only to imply
that conduct performed (or abstained from) as the outcome of
a bargain amounts to the foregoing of the exercise of one sort
of liberty, not because one wishes to forego it, but because it is
the only way to induce the other party to release a restraint on
some other sort of liberty. 0
"Coercion" in the sense Hale intends is neutral, necessary,"' ubiquitous,
and "not necessarily an evil," though there is a permanent necessity of
guarding against felt "abuses." 6 2 Hale agreed with C. Reinold Noyes as
to the preferability of "some colorless and general term,"' 3 but in the
absence of a word clearly superior, felt that "it would be better to
recognize that [the] word 'coercion' is neutral in its moral implications,
using 'unjustifiable coercion' to describe that part which one has other
grounds for condemning." 64 Condemnation as an intended inference,
then, requires an additional moral premise to the meaning given by Hale
to "coercion."
Moreover, "coercion" does not necessarily mean absolute or total
control, but rather that there is some degree of impact or control, some
degree of restriction upon alternatives."5 The fact that options or alternatives exist does not preclude the existence of compulsion. 6 The
existence of restriction is more important than either intent 7 or degree.68
Thus, Hale often quoted Holmes: "It always is for the interest of a party
under duress to choose the lesser of two evils. But the fact that a choice
was made according to interest does not exclude duress. It is the characteristic of duress properly so called.''"69 Hale's use of "coercion" generalized that point. And, while "coercion" may be used in connection
with interindividual cases, wherein one individual coerces another, it
may also be used, and indeed is generally and systematically used by
Hale, to refer to all cases wherein restrictions are visited upon the alter59. Coercion and Distribution,supra note 21, at 476.
60. Hale Papers, Folder 91-5 at 18.
61. "While we have abolished slavery in this country, we cannot abolish all the economic
pressures which compel men to work at tasks which may be uncongenial to them." FREEDOM
THaouGr LAW, supra note 10, at 5. As will be seen below, Hale was quite perceptive con-

cerning the role of institutionalized industrial discipline as part of the human use of the
human labor force. His forte was in searching out the legal bases of that discipline.
62. Hale Papers, Folder 80-1 at 3.
63. Letter from C.R. Noyes to R.L. Hale, Aug. 15, 1939, in Hale Papers, Folder 17.
64. Hale Papers, Folder 36-2 at 1.
65. Hale, Book Review, 59 CoLur. L. REV. 821, 828 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Hale,
Book Review).
66. Hale Papers, Folder 80-7 at II. 7-8.
67. Id. 39-2 at 1.
68. Id. 80-2.
69. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918); FREEDOM
THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 119; Hale, Book Review, supra note 65, at 827-28; Force
and the State, supra note 56, at 150.
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natives open to a person or group, including, that is to say, the case in
which the source of the coercion is impersonally generalized in the
relevant behavioral environment and cannot be specifically attributed
to a particular person(s)-as in the case of common law or statutory
rights and duties, market forces, etc. Coercion simply means that behavior and/or choice is controlled in some degree by another or others."
Coercion in the sense Hale used the term is truly ubiquitous: "Some
sort of coercive restriction of individuals, it is believed, is absolutely
unavoidable . . . 7 and the power on which it is based ". . . permeates
the entire economic system . . . ."I' Such coercion is present even if

unrecognized by law; 73 indeed, legal coercion itself is generally unrecognized in the status quo because it is unobtrusive and taken for granted.74
All economic systems "are in reality permeated with coercive restrictions
of individual freedom, ' 7' both legal and nonlegal. There is compulsion
or coercion, for example, "in every contract," but this "does not require
that all contracts can be avoided on the ground of duress." There are
necessarily the further questions as to the criterion by which any particular coercion (form or instance) is to be condemned as legal duress, and
its application to the particular case.76
If coercion (in Hale's sense) is ubiquitous, also ubiquitous is the
subjective tendency of people to perceive certain acts as coercive and
others as not, when in fact both sets are more or less equally coercive, or
at least coercive per se by Hale's meaning. What is involved is that whatever is perceived as improper is called coercion. That which is not seen
as improper is simply accepted, and may even be called liberty, which
is to say, those exercises of power with which we agree or to which we
do not object are seen as the unavoidable and perhaps even inalienable
exercises of liberty. Those which we find objectionable or improper or
evil are seen as exercises of coercion and deemed objects of avoidance
and alienation, fit objects of restraint. This tendency in the use of the
term coercion obviously requires the additional moral premise indicated
above as requisite to the process of reducing coercion in general (per
Hale) to acts deemed unjustifiable.
Thus, Hale emphasized the ubiquity of coercion, even though certain
manifestations or instances are seen as proper, and thus not as (unjustifiably) coercive, and even though certain aspects of a bargaining situation or transaction are seen as coercive and others not.77 This may be
expanded and articulated in several ways. Hale pointed out, quoting
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
(1943)
75.
76.
77.

Hale Papers, Folder 91-4 at 2.
Coercion and Distribution,supra note 21, at 1.
Force and the State, supra note 56, at 199.
Hale Papers, Folder 91-3, at 3-4.
Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 603, 626, 628
[hereinafter cited as Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty].
Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 470.
FREEDoM THROUGHr LAW, supra note 10, at 124-25 passim. See also id. at 306.
Id. at 310 passim.
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Veblen, that the "standardization and constraint" embodied in the system
of machine industry is not typically seen as coercive "in point of legal
reality." "It does not exist de jure, but only de facto.""8 Moreover, there
are certain methods of depriving persons of particular liberties or interests which are proscribed while "other methods no less effective in
depriving them of these same interests are frequently tolerated."79
Further, one might observe "only those aspects of liberty which are
struck down by the statute, remaining blind to those aspects of it which
are enlarged, ' 80 just as one might observe only the restriction of alpha's
liberty resulting from beta's action or only the exercise of beta's liberty
and not the coercive impact on alpha. Thus, Hale maintained that Pitney
was blind to the coercive action of employers in Coppage v. Kansas,81
seeing only that of the union. 2 Culture, as well as interest, promote the
perception of certain exercises of power as coercion and of certain other
exercises as freedom. Thus, Hale pointed to cases in which bargaining
power or its exercise is pronounced coercive and other cases in which the
restriction of bargaining power is called coercive and the bargaining
power itself is not." He stated:
When one party gives up a right in order to induce another
party to give up one of his rights (the exercise of which would
be most harmful to the first party), there are cases stating that
there is no coercion involved, and that any legislation designed
to prevent the first party from losing the right in question, is
unconstitutional.
On the other hand, there are cases in which the giving up
of a right in response to the pressure of bargaining has been
pronounced coercive, and the exercise of the pressure enjoined ....84
Interestingly, "coercion" or "power" is often sensed or perceived only
with respect to a change in relations,85 particularly a change in relations
which are perceived as normal or justified, the perception of "injury"
thereto being likewise subjective.8 6 But the distinction in all cases, as
between, for example, different techniques with which competitors en78. Hale Papers, Folder 91-3 at 4.
79. Freedom Through Law, supra note 10, at 254.

80. Hale, Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, 15 All. LAB.
REV. 155 (1925)

LEG.

[hereinafter cited as Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual

Liberty].
81. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
82. FREEDOm THRouGH LAW, supra note 10, at 72-73; Hale Papers, Folder 91-7 at 6.
83. Hale Papers, Folder 68-3 at 2 & 80-7 at 3-4.
84. Id. 57-2 at 1.

85. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 481.

86. Hale quoted from CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE (1928) the latter's

quotation from Hobhouse, that "[als experience of the social effects of action ripens and as
the social conscience is awakened, the conception of injury is widened and insight into its
causes is deepened." LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 618.
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deavor to withdraw patronage from each other,' 7 is a function of whatever is deemed by the courts (or whichever evaluator is acting) as
"objectionable," and evaluation and selection is what is involved at
bottom. "Popular judgment of social problems, therefore, is apt to be
distorted by the popular recognition or non-recognition of 'coercion.' ,,"8
The normative or interested-party evaluation of certain acts as proper
and others as improper (because "coercive") does not, says Hale, alter
the coercive character of both acts when both have restrictive impact
on someone's alternatives. In this latter sense, coercion is neutral and is
to be differentiated from the results of different persons' unequal perception and identification of (unjustifiable) coercion.
b. Voluntary Freedom
There is, thus, a ubiquitous tension and interplay, as coercive capacity is juxtaposed to coercive capacity, with the result being a changing
pattern of freedom and exposure to the freedom of others. The meaning
of "freedom" to Hale is expressed in his juxtaposition of voluntary to
volitional freedom, the difference between the two being a function of
the role assigned to (mutual) coercion in his paradigm.
The concept of voluntary freedom in Hale's analysis is not a norm
by which real-world restrictions on freedom are to be judged; real-world
restrictions are inevitable, and no such norm is either intended or possible in Hale's limited use. Rather, the idea is one which dialectically
throws into relief the meaning and ubiquity of volitional freedom and
enables real-world restrictions to be seen rather than judged. Voluntary
freedom, to Hale, would exist only in the absence of coerced choices in
the selection of alternatives; it connotes "the absence of any coercion
89
which keeps you from doing the one or compels you to do the other.')
In the broadest sense, it appears to mean that one would have the capacity to determine without restriction the alternatives-and their respective
trade-offs or relative prices-between which he will further choose. That
is its affirmative statement, slightly modified; negatively, voluntary
freedom is the absence of constraint or limitations upon choice. It suggests, in terms of an array of general practical situations, that one has
a large number of alternatives between which one can choose, or no limit
to the range of alternatives, or the absence of intolerable (i.e., high
priced) alternatives, or the absence of external pressure or compulsion
to keep from selecting one alternative or compelling selection of another,
i.e., being forced to act contrary to one's preference or wish, or the
absence of having to sacrifice one right, element of liberty, or interest,
etc., in order to secure another through, say, interpersonal exchange or a
87.
cited as
88.
89.

Hale, Value and Vested Rights, 27 CoLum. L. REV. 523, 526 (1927) [hereinafter
Value and Vested Rights].
Coercion and Distribution,supra note 21, at 475.
Letter from R.L. Hale to L.L. Fuller, Dec. 24, 1954, at 2, in Hale Papers, Folder 76.
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similar transaction. It is the "absence of impediment to acting as you
please;" it is "doing what you want."'90 In a word, it is complete and
perfect autonomy31
c. Volitional Freedom
As perfect autonomy, of course, voluntary freedom is purely hypothetical, an analytical construction or tool. The role of its use is to point
to the fact and ubiquity of actions that are at once "both compelled and
volitional. An act may be volitional without being voluntary."9 2 As Hale
interpreted and extended or generalized Holmes' dictum on duress,9" the
fact that a choice is made does not mean that it was made without
coercion or that the choosing person(s) had control over the terms of
choice. It is precisely the absence of one's complete control over choice,
that is, that one is limited to the exercise of choice between available
alternatives, however disagreeable, that Hale signifies by volitional freedom. "When one foregoes the exercise of liberty by obligating oneself
in a contract, one foregoes it under pressure, not voluntarily. The only
voluntary feature is in the choice between two (or more) alternatives .... )94 "This fact of choice, however, . . . does not exclude compulsion."9 , The choice of one alternative, and the restrictions inherent in it,
is the price of release from some other restriction(s) upon liberty within
the control of others inherent in some other alternative. 6 The magnitude
of the loss or injury is partially a function of the number of alternatives
available and their respective trade-offs, which is simply a matter of
relative mutual coercive capacity.97 The alternative chosen, with its
restrictions, is not "voluntary . . . , but . . . the price of escape from
damaging behavior of others."98 This damaging behavior may well take
the form of withholding, e.g., of goods or of employment, until conditions
are satisfied or agreed to. "The penalty ... in each case, may be light,
but it is sufficient to compel obedience: in the form of choosing one alternative over another rather than suffering the greater loss . . .'" which
means that the alternative chosen "is not in itself more unpleasant than
the consequences to be avoided."'0 0 The difference between what is
voluntary and the volitional character of such situations is to be found
in the fact that social processes (as well as individual and group action)
90. Hale Papers, Folder 68-4 at 1.
91. Id. 79-1 at 1.
92. Hale, Book Review, supra note 65, at 827; see FREEDom TuROUGH LAW, supra note
10, at 113-14.

93. See text at note 69 supra.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Hale Papers, Folder 91-5 at 18.
Id. 89-4 at 1.
Id. 91-5 at 17, 19.
LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 594.

98. Coercion and Distribution,supra note 21, 'at 474.
99. Id.
100. ld. at 472.
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"change the environment of people [i.e., their actual array of available
alternatives and their respective trade-offs] whose consent to the change
is not required."''
The thrust of the foregoing is particularly interesting in the light of
more recent developments in economic theory. First, Hale's analysis of
the difference between voluntary and volitional freedom may be interpreted as extending the more or less conventional definition of economics,
or at least microeconomics, namely, that economics is the study of the
allocation of scarce resources which have alternative uses among plural
ends. What Hale's analysis suggests is an even more fundamental
existential scarcity in the sense of our inability (or relative inability) to
satisfy competing values, rights, and interests to their utmost extent,
and a consequent necessity to allocate volitional freedom because of the
ubiquitous existence of coercion (or scarcity of voluntary freedom).
Second, Hale's analysis supports the notion of a ubiquity of externalities,
externalities having to do with costs and gains not accruing to the acting
or choosing party, but rather thrust or visited upon others without an
offer of escape from them. Every exercise of volitional freedom tends to
restrict or change the volitional freedom of others, through the coercive
impact on the alternatives open to others. This very important implication will be taken up again just below in our discussion of conditions and
later in our discussion of Hale's principle of the use of government.
Third, the logic of reasoning embodied in Hale's analysis is that of one
taking more or less maximum advantage of one's available alternatives,
given the pattern of relative coercive capacities with a consequent impact
upon the ongoing but changing structure of relative coercive capacities.
This may be juxtaposed to the logic of Pareto optimum reasoning, which
emphasizes the voluntary agreement element in the exchange transaction
between willing buyer and willing seller but which, contrary to Hale's
analysis, takes for granted the structure of coercive capacities. Whereas
Pareto optimum analysis abstracts from the structure of participation
in the economy and concentrates upon the voluntary exchange agreement,
with each party attempting to maximize within their available alternatives, Hale's analysis attempts, in effect, to join thereto an analysis of
the fundamentally related processes governing that very structure of
participation and the pattern of available alternatives. There is no unique
Pareto optimum solution in the real world; °2 it is a function of the array
of legal rights and moral norms at work in the society which, in general,
reenforces or restricts any one party's coercive capacity in the market
place. The voluntary agreement is only volitional and is the result of
the interplay of coercive market (and legal) forces. It is Hale's argument
that the total economic process should be, and can be, examined produc101. LEGAL
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supra note 11, at 39.

102. Mishan, Pareto Optimality and the Law, 19
[hereinafter cited as Mishan].
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tively in terms of mutual coercion, and thus both voluntary and (realistically) volitional freedom, and, furthermore, the legal bases of relative

coercive capacity. The reaching of (what is conventionally called voluntary but in Hale's terminology would be called volitional) agreements
in Pareto optimum analysis is, to Hale, but a small, however distinctive
and important, part of the relevant process of decision-making.
d. The Impact of Coercion upon Voluntary-Volitional Freedom
Hale further analyzed the process and mechanism through which
coercion transforms voluntary freedom into volitional freedom. In so
doing, he articulated types of restrictions upon choice, the role of
withholding capacity, and the nature of constrained choice in terms of
conditions. With respect to the types of restrictions on choice, Hale distinguished between those which unconditionally constrain the range of
alternatives, i.e., those over which the individual or subgroup whose
alternatives are thus constrained has no control, and those which conditionally constrain the choosing individual by affecting the structure
of alternatives and trade-offs. In the case of the latter, he analyzed relative withholding capacity as the model of forces governing the price
which must be paid (in one form or another) to secure the positive
achievement of an alternative, that is, as the price of releasing another's
withholding capacity; all of which may also be analyzed in terms of the
imposition of conditions whose sanction is withholding capacity. "Any
restriction," wrote Hale, "may be complete (effectively preventing exercise of liberty in a given direction) or conditional (permitting the
exercise, but under handicap, which may consist of a new restraint on
the exercise of liberty in some other direction). ' 03 In the first category
are what economists tend to include under the name of externalities,
namely, "burdens which some members of a community impose on
others unconditionally, without offering an opportunity to escape from
them." °4 Hale's examples have now become classic: smoke, noise and
congestion.' His point is that the enjoyment of certain benefits by some
-the result of their volitional freedom-"[is] subsidized by very appreciable sacrifices imposed on other people,"'0 6 that is to say, the visitation of coercion upon the volitional freedom of the latter. His examples
extend, however, to include a most heterodox one: the example of bank
credit in the hands of certain businessmen who use it to bid resources
away from consumers (including, especially but not only, fixed income
103. Hale Papers, Folder 83-5 at 1.
104. The man who conducted a business was supposed to be under a necessity to
pay everyone whose sacrifices contributed to the production of his goods. On the
other hand, the benefits which his production conferred on the community were
supposed to be measured by the money which his customers would pay for them.
Hale Papers, Folder 93-1 at 2-3.
105. Hale Papers, Folders 93-1 at 4 & 93-6 at 23 passim. See also id. 93-3.
106. Id. 93-1 at 5-6.
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people) and other businessmen, which, particularly at relatively full
employment, has a direct coercive impact on consumers' and other
businessmen's alternatives. This is not just the classic case of forced
saving through inflation, in which the coercion is patent, but rather the
more general case in which new money is made available to some and
not others with the result that the former have a relatively greater impact
on the allocation of resources (not to mention the distribution of income)
and the latter find their alternatives and trade-offs (including their
general consumer sovereignty, which is a form of volitional freedom)
relatively further constrained." 7 This is true also, in part, even at less
than full employment, because not all benefit from enhanced employment. In general, it amounts to coercion (in Hale's sense of the word)
in the allocation of resources under all conditions.
In the second category of restrictions are the coercive effects of
others' behavior and/or choices which are imposed conditionally, but
which may be avoided by agreeing to the conditions imposed. These may
take the form of compulsory requirements coupled with both volitional
compliance and some form of sanction (Hale recognized different types
of sanctions, each at least partially differentiated in terms of their degree
of penalty),"'8 or they may take the form of relative dependence upon
others for one's means of living, requiring the consent of others to work
or to invest capital (at some price, which is the relevant condition). In
terms of withholding, workers may withhold labor as a sanction to compel
desired wage payments; sellers of goods may withhold goods as a sanction to compel desired price payments, and, inter alia, employers may
withhold money (i.e., employment) as a sanction to compel labor to
cooperate or accept desired wages. 09 Thus, the owner of property can
stipulate the conditions under which he will allow others to use it. Since
use of said property without his consent is illegal, "[h]e can grant or
withhold the privilege of making lawful use of his property, and can
prescribe the conditions on which, alone, he will make that use lawful.""'
(On the relevance of competitive conditions to withholding and coercion
generally, see below).
The basic process through which coercive capacity is exercised is
withholding or the threat of withholding; accordingly, the pattern of
impact is a function of the structure of coercive capacity, which ultimately means the capacity to withhold in the market or other decisionmaking process. Relative withholding capacity-literally, to Hale, the
capacity to withhold as a sanction-is the main source of restriction upon
each person's or subgroup's alternatives. "Withholding of what another
wants" as the "penalty for non-compliance" is the essence of bargaining
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. 93-1 at 22 passim.
Id. 93-3 at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. 80-4 at 7. See also id. 80-16, at 4-5.
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power.111 Withholding capacity means the "power to confer or withhold"
and is the power to grant or agree conditionally." Each participant
attempts to exercise his withholding capacity to limit the voluntary
freedom of others to volitional freedom in his favor; this is the coercive
process. But it is more than an interindividual process: it is institutionalized and unobtrusive, but ubiquitous nevertheless. Withholding is the
mechanism of jockeying for position; the process of mutual coercion is
conducted through withholding; the pattern of effective (i.e., actual,
volitional) freedom is both a result and a cause of relative withholding
capacity. The capacity to withhold is a function of one's alternatives,
and one's success in withholding governs one's future array of alternatives. It, in turn, is a function of one's own past alternatives; hence,
coercion is a reciprocal or mutual process. Volitional freedom is not only
both cause and consequence, it is both a tool of offense to coerce and a
defense against coercion in a process of reciprocal reaction. He who has
tends to get more, because of the additional coercive power, i.e., withholding capacity, he has now acquired. Power tends to beget power, but
power must be seen as the means-largely through withholding and the
imposing of conditions-of both establishing one's own alternatives and
defending against the exposure which one has to others' freedom. That
is to say, one has volitional freedom through withholding from others,
including the market (the market itself being a function of the pattern
of coercive capacity to which it gives continuing effect). This will be
further discussed below, with respect to, first, liberty and power, and
second, the market economy as a system of mutual coercion.
It may be noted in passing that just as our language and our feelings
or sense of injustice may result in our considering a particular action as
unjustifiably coercive, so too may our sense of injustice lead us to consider a particular act of withholding or threatened withholding as legal
duress or extortion.1 13
Correlative to withholding are the conditions established which withholding operates to sanction, and which when met release withholding.
Where the individual has a choice, the choice is his own volitional act.
111. Id. 39-26 at 2. See also id. 58-5, at 6.
112. Id. 69-1.
113. There are statutes making extortion of money a crime. And there are doctrines that in a civil action, one may recover money paid under duress, or avoid a
contract made under duress. But all money is paid, and all contracts are made, to
avert some kinds of threats. What are the peculiar earmarks which characterize
some types of threat as "extortion" or "duress" in contradistinction to other types
which the law regards as innocent?
Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 612-13.
The question came before the Court of Criminal Appeal in 1926, in Rex v. Denver,
which held the attempted collection [of a fine imposed by a trade association on a
member firm] to be a felony. "A person has no right," said the court, "to demand
money . . . as a price of abstaining from inflicting consequences upon a man."
Such a rule, of course, would make any sale of property, or any acceptance of a
salary or wage, a felony. It is demanded as a price of abstaining from inflicting the
unpleasant consequences of doing without the property or services.
Id. at 613. See also FREEDOm TnRouGH LAW, supra note 10, at 312, passim.
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But the individual must thereby volitionally accept conditions not voluntarily created because they are imposed by another or others. The
imposition of that condition is the impact of coercion, however indirect,
commonplace, or structured: "[A] n offer to pay is identical with a threat
to withhold.""' 4 It is only the fact that one takes "as a matter of course"
the more-or-less enforced exclusion from access to resources or alternatives controlled by others (individually or on terms imposed through
the market or directly or indirectly by law) "that creates the illusion that
acceptance of a conditional offer of them is voluntary.""' 5
Everyone who does anything for money [for example] is subjected to a greater or less degree of coercion to do the thing in
question. He may have a constitutional right not to do it, in the
loose sense of a right not to have the government impose on him
a legal duty to do it. But this constitutional right he has to
'relinquish' in order to obtain the money. Generally, his constitutional right does not prevail to prevent this kind of compulsory "relinquishment." For he has no constitutional right
to receive money either from the government or from other
individuals, if they do not wish to pay it to him." 6
And they will pay it to him only if he submits to their (even market
regulated) conditions. Moreover, "[t]he power to impose these conditions varies with the importance to the non-owner of the things which
the owner owns. 11 7 The conditional withholding "would not be effective
had the inducing party not possessed some degree of control over the
[volitional] liberty of the other.""'
Many a person signs a contract or engages in other conduct
from which affirmative obligations flow in order to obtain money
which he needs and which would otherwise be withheld from
him. And as Justice Sutherland . . . remarked in Carter v.
CarterCoal Company, speaking of an exaction in the form of a
tax, "One who does a thing in order to avoid a monetary penalty
does not agree; he yields to compulsion precisely the same as
though he did so as to avoid a term in jail.""' 9
Meeting the terms or conditions of the other party(ies) is "the price
of release from some other restriction of liberty within the control of
those others."'"2 One chooses his preferred alternative and thereby accepts the restraints inherent in the conditions he will meet.
Hale's "logic of thought" is now almost complete. His basic paradigm
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

FRaxao THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 305.
Id. at 310.
LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 469.
Id. at 514.
Hale Papers, Folder 91-5 at 17.
Id. 93-6 at 43. On prices as private taxes, see below.
Id. 91-5 at 17.
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is primarily articulated in terms of voluntary freedom, volitional freedom,
coercion, withholding, and conditions. It involves economic choice in a
context of constrained alternatives which Hale considered the result of
the interplay of coercive capacities, through the "compulsions and
counter-compulsions"'' of relative withholding power and the reciprocal
imposition of conditions. The results do not take a completely "predetermined pattern from the coercive powers which condition it;"' 22
since "[e]ach individual is subject to compulsion, in that he must make
a choice between loss of one liberty or another,"'123 the results are also a
function of the acts of will or choice on the part of the individuals and
groups. Whatever the structure of coercive capacities, the process is at
least a partially open and not a closed one. As to economic models which
analyze constrained choice or maximization within a given power structure, or to those with repercussions on power structure not an explicit
variable or factor, Hale added constrained choice as a feature of the
power structure itself and a model of the developing power structure
with which economic choice, more narrowly conceived, interacts. The
logic of thought is one of choice in a context of mutual coercion, of
choice between constrained alternatives, with the constraint a function
of the (coercive) impact of others. The mechanism of withholding until
one's terms are met (however those terms are determined), as a sanction
to implement the imposition of those terms as conditions for (say)
contracting, is the exercise of coercion which limits voluntary to volitional
freedom. The converse of equilibrium prices (or simply the prices at
which any given consumer buys) signifying marginal utility is their
signification of marginal injury: "And the value of the goods (and preof
sumably of the service of producing them) is simply an expression
12 4
the harm the consumers would suffer if they were withheld.'
Hale's point is that decision-making must operate within coercive
restrictions, some of which are taken for granted and others not, while
some are seen as freedom and others as (impermissible) coercion, but
that, in reality, freedom is volitional and not voluntary, and coercion is
ubiquitous, however much certain constraints are psychologically internalized and identified with, and therefore accepted, and often not seen
at all. One may speculate that of all the students of society, lawyers and
economists are the most conscious of and sensitized to the existence of
constrained choice-and Hale was both an economist and a lawyer.
Perhaps this, too, was a factor in the genesis of his ideas.
Consequently, Hale's analysis provides for both personal subjective
assessments and identifications of freedom and coercion and for a neutral
objective basis of identification. It provides for subjective interpretations
121. Id. 93-1 at 29.

122. Id.
123. Id.
124. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 605 (emphasis of "harm" added).
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in its acknowledgment that a phenomenon may be seen as coercion by
one, as freedom by another, and evaluated neutrally by still another.
Also it provides for a neutral identification of coercion by establishing
coercive capacities and impacts as part of a general model of voluntary
vis-h-vis volitional freedom, without necessarily attaching the stigma
of impropriety to what is a fundamental, necessary and ubiquitous
phenomenon. Above all, it provides for the articulation of a model of
economic decision-making which specifies both the free and the coerced
elements in choice, to the potential (and actual' 2 5 ) dismay of ideologues
of all persuasions.
e. Liberty and Power
In Hale's view, freedom, or liberty, is complex and multifaceted,
not.only in that it has many sides, but also in that it is comprised of a
number of component alternatives or, more accurately, sets of alternatives, and, also, in that volitional freedom is a function of the power
base that underlies coercion, namely, the wherewithall to apply withholding as a sanction. The really critical characteristic of power, its asymmetrical distribution, will be examined below. But surely the following
is clear: no wherewithall, no withholding; no withholding, no sanction;
no sanction, no volitional freedom and no defense against others' coercive
capacity. There is no absolute "freedom" or "liberty," but rather a
pattern and a process of freedom and a pattern and process of coercion.
The structure of liberty or freedom is an analog to the structure of mutual
coercion. Freedom, like coercion, is relative, mutual and reciprocal, as is
power. Neither the right of (or to) property nor the right to work assures
that one will have either; both are subject to circumstantial limitations.' 2 6
(See below.) Freedom must be understood in terms of the tension
between voluntary and volitional elements, between individuals' volitional
elements, between coercion and countercoercion, between relative power
positions.
The theoretical logic of freedom is complex, and so also is the actual
substance. It is composed of many seemingly incongruous and mutually
exclusive elements. There is "freedom from" the restrictions imposed by
others and there is "freedom to" effectuate restrictions upon others, and
an inevitable tension. The property that is for use may also be for power
over others.' 27 Hale quoted Lincoln:
The world has never had a good definition of the word
liberty, and the American people, just now, are much in want
of one. We all declare for freedom; but in using the same word
we do not all mean the same thing. With some the word liberty
125. Ludwig von Mises, "Freedom is Slavery," 3 THE FREE AN 410 (March 9, 1953);
Hale Papers, Folder 76.
126. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 707 (Nov. 1922).
127. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 601.
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may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and
the product of his labor; while with others the same word may
mean for some men to do as they please with other men, and
the product of other men's labor. Here are two, not only different, but incompatible things, called by the same name,
liberty. And it follows that each of the things is, by the respective parties, called by two different and incompatible namesliberty and tyranny.
The shepherd drives the wolf from the sheep's throat for
which the sheep thanks the shepherd as his liberator, while
the wolf denounces him for the same act, as the destroyer of
liberty, especially as the sheep was a black one. Plainly, the
sheep and the wolf are not agreed upon a definition of the word
liberty ....

128

Thus, as will be seen in great detail, there is freedom from governmental
restraint and freedom from nongovernmental restraint, which may require the use of government so as to be protected from those restraints,
for "actual social conditions ...may condition a man's liberty irrespective of the law,"' 20 and the ineluctable tension between the two. But
government protection of one's freedom against another's imposition of
restraint is the equivalent of the restraint of the other's freedom: the
law which promotes the freedom and power of the one restricts the freedom and power of the other. The law of property will be seen below to
be Hale's classic example.
That government action may be, and is, both a restriction and expansion of freedom, that government activism may be, and is, the affirmative exercise of power from one view and the proscriptive check upon
power from another is a function, in Hale's analysis, of the nature of
freedom itself. For freedom to Hale is the result of an interplay and
tension between one's capacity to impose one's own conditions-willand sanctions upon others and one's own capacity to resist the same
imposed by others. 8 ' Economic and other liberties become the capacity
or right to use one's bargaining power, 1 ' and thus signify coercive
impact upon others, 82 but they are restricted by the requirements or
conditions laid down by others, especially by those with superior coercive
capacity,838 as such are others' liberties. "One man's liberty ...

depends

in large degree on his power to coerce other people,"'8 4 and since other
people's liberty is a function of their power to coerce, interindividualy
128. Id. at 24.

129. Hale Papers, Folder 58-3 at 1.
130. Anonymous, Book Review, The Economist 383 (Aug. 8, 1953). See also Hale
Papers, Folders 76, 91-7 at 10, and 93-1 at 34.
131. Rose, supra note 15, at 959.
132. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 24, 601; Letter from R.L. Hale to editor of THE
FREEMAN, April 20, 1953, in Hale Papers, Folder 76; Hale Papers, Folder 83-6 at 1.
133. Hale Papers, Folder 80-16 at 1.
134. Id. 93-1 at 34.
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freedom involves the play of coercive power against coercive power, such
that, with respect to a single individual, freedom has its basis in both
the power to impose on others and the power to resist others' impositions.
Hale includes among the coercive pressures the coercive restrictions
upon rights and liberties by the market and by the prices which must
be paid in the market: "Exaction of a price for any article restricts
freedom to consume it.' 1 35 That prices perform a rationing function is

precisely equivalent to what Hale is arguing. To ration by requiring
payment of the market price is to coercively restrain alternatives, most
dramatically so in the case of an asymmetrical or unequal distribution
of wealth, and thereby power, and it is the interplay of coercive forces,
market pricing included, that is the analog to the structure of freedom.
It is not surprising, then, that Mortimer Adler, in his systematization of types of freedom and classification of writers on freedom, considered Hale as an exponent of what Adler calls "circumstantial freedom
of self-realization," namely, of "a freedom which is possessed by any
individual who, under favorable circumstances, is able to act as he wishes
for his own good as he sees it."' 86 In other words, freedom is volitional
and not voluntary, being circumscribed in the interplay of coercive
pressures. 187
In discussing liberty (or freedom) and power it has been difficult to
proceed without entering into aspects to be taken up below, especially
considerations expanding upon the subject of power. One additional point,
however, which can be made clear at this stage is that if freedom is complex, reciprocal and circumstantial, it is also subjective. It has already
been pointed out that formal legal liberty and actual effective liberty
are not in Hale's view, the same thing; 88 just as de jure and de facto
coercion are not coextensive, 8 9 the liberty that the law allows and the
liberty that conditions permit may diverge, and diverge substantially,
and, of present relevance, be seen differently. If liberty is contemplated
only in terms of the one and not the other-in terms of only either de jure
or de facto contexts-one will subjectively not perceive aspects of liberty
135.

FREEDom

THiROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 294. See also Bargaining, Duress, and

Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 626; Hale, Book Review, supra note 65, at 826.
136. M. ADLER, 2 THE IDEA OF FREEDOm 5. See also 12, 50 passim (1961).
137. Interestingly, Adler also includes as exponents of this view such figures as Aquinas,
Bentham, Burke, Dewey, Hayek, Hume, Kelsen, Knight, Laski, Mill, Pareto, Russell, Spencer,
and Adam Smith; the list is interesting, in part, because it includes major figures on the
"left" and on the "right," and in part also because of Knight's critical review of Hale's
FREEDOM THROUGH LAW. Knight, Book Review, 39 VA. L. Rv. 871 (1953). The difference
between Hale and Knight lies not in their comprehension of the circumstantial character
of liberty, but in Hale's relative eagerness and Knight's relative caution against and indeed
general unwillingness to deliberately reform and to reform along egalitarian lines. In other
words, their positive analysis is not fundamentally far apart, though their normative analysis diverges considerably. See below, for a discussion of deliberative versus non-deliberative
social change in Hale's thought.
138. See text at note 129 supra.
139. See text at notes 77-88 supra.
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falling into the other category. Moreover, liberty may be secured against
one limitation at the expense of another limitation, only one of which
may be seen as a limitation. 40 Some restrictions may not be recognized
at all as sacrifices of liberty.' 4' Exercises of liberty stigmatized as criminal or coercive, or which are seen-however innocent in themselves-as
restricting another and more important liberty of someone else, are not
seen as liberty; conversely, certain liberties deemed worthwhile are protected and promoted, despite adverse consequences which their exercise
visits upon others, and which are not seen as such at all or not very
clearly. 4 2 Some exercises of liberty are therefore perceived as liberty
and others are perceived as license: "Those who insist on distinguishing
the two terms mean by license nothing else but the sort of liberty which,
in their opinion, ought to be curtailed."' 4 3 "This is an evasion because it
must be evident that the laws which these persons favor at least restrict
the liberty to commit what they call license. Like those who face the
issue, they really favor restricting some liberties and not others, only
they refuse to give the name liberty to those which they would restrict." 4 4
The most immediate exercise of choice is the determination or identification of an act as liberty or license; here again is that "infernal arbitrariness of choice." Liberty is basically subjective, its perception (as liberty
or license, as liberty or coercion) being a function of one's values'4 5 or
one's sense of the relative importance of competing liberties, rights, or
interests.46
3.

THE ECONOMY AS A SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE

Hale's understanding of the meaning and ubiquity of coercion enabled, and perhaps even led, him to formulate a further conception with
which his name has long been associated, namely, "private government."
The subtitle of Freedom Through Law-Public Control of Private Governing Power-points to that concept as central to the book, and Edmond
Cahn, in his review of Hale's book, reflected:
[T]hose who own economic goods exercise a kind of governmental power. Being entitled to retain their property or part
with it as they choose, the owners like petty sovereigns can
dictate terms and conditions their neighbors must perform in
order to have access to the property. In this sense every lawful
economic power becomes a type of political power, and every
economic inequality poses a question of political inequality.
Property so viewed is "private government."' 47
140. Hale Papers, Folder 93-5 at 8-9 & 57-9 at 8-9.
141. Id. 69-4.
142. Id. 57-9 at 4-5, 91-4 at 2, 93-5 at 4-5.
143. Id. 80-1 at 2 (notes).
144. Id. 93-5 at 4 & 57-9 at 4.
145. Id. 83-5 at 1.
146. Id. 93-5 at 6 & 57-9 at 6.

147. Cahn, supra note 27.
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Hale means by government the system of power and pressure which
has coercive impact on the resultant pattern of volitional freedom:
"There is government whenever one person or group can tell others what
they must do and when those others have to obey or suffer a penalty."14' 8
"Wherever we find some men compelling other men to obey them, there
we find government."' 49
One characteristic of governance is the unequal governing roles of
different people, a result, in part, of their unequal power (see below).
"Some . . . have a much greater degree of economic liberty and of
economic governing power than others."15 "In so far as people 'govern'
others by attaching conditions to or exacting payments for the rendering
1
of services, their governing power is of course greatly unequal.''
"[T] he power which one party to a transaction has over the other party
may greatly exceed the power which the latter has to resist-may so
greatly exceed it, in fact, as to justify us in referring to him who possesses
52
it as 'governing' the other.'
"Government," then, may be generalized to include all engaging in
mutual coercion, i.e., ubiquitous withholding as a sanction to compel
obedience or acceptance of conditions, regardless of source and regardless of degree, or it may be used to refer to those with concentrated
power and positions of dominance, also regardless of source. With respect
to the latter usage, these concentrations of power may be quite inconspicuous. Indeed,
[t]his invisible government is not a single, coherent unit. It is a
cluster of different groups and persons who hold sway in different fields .... But when we find the great balance of power
to preponderate in favor of one person or group in dealings with
others, it is not inappropriate to refer to them as rulers and subjects, respectively.' 5"
Notwithstanding this dichotomy of usage, the concept of governance
serves in Hale's analysis primarily, if not solely, to identify, to put into
perspective, and to underscore the existence of the phenomenon of private
government. In his view, the logical and substantive equivalent of the
"universality of private coercion and counter-coercion"' 54 -- the equivalent of the system in which we all have "some degree of control over
other people's liberty"' 5 --is the system of private government, comprising "the all-pervading role of privately instituted government in the
economic sphere."' 56 In a totalitarian society, power is conspicuously
148. Hale Papers, Folder 93-1 at 32.

149. Id. 79-1 at 2; cf. id. 58-5 at 2.
150. FaRw o TuROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at ix.
151.
152.
153.
154.

LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 592.
Hale Papers, Folder 80-16 at 7.
Id. at 2.
Id. 89-1 at 8.

155. Id. 91-7 at 10.
156. Id. 93-1 at 33.
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governmental; in a free society with a strong private sector, power is
pro tanto private (ideologized as liberty, it is power nevertheless), but,
said Hale, it is no less governmental in nature because it is private.
Indeed, "[u]nless we were to establish a rigid communism . . .private

governing power is an essential element in our social structure."'15 7 What
makes private government government is that it has the same effects on
volitional freedom as does public or official government; both the practical" 8 and the legal 59 effects are indistinguishable. In both cases, one's
array of alternatives are subject to the coercive impact of others: "Both
in the world of production and in that of consumption, . ..some have

much greater liberty than others, and some have much greater power to
control the conduct of others by compulsory methods. Those who wield
preponderant economic power over the liberty of others are, in every real
sense, governing, just as are public officials."' 160 "From the viewpoint of
the person deprived of liberty, does it make any difference from what
source the impairment of his liberty derives-political, economic or
religious?"''
Thus, whether government is seen as generalized throughout the
system of mutual coercion, or limited to those with concentrated power
or positions of dominance, in either case, though especially the latter, to
see as governing only those in official, public government positions may
be to neglect important sources of coercive capacity, with substantially
equivalent effect, located in the nominally private and nongovernmental
sector. By failing to perceive the common element we tend "to overlook
the existence of private government, which, unless restrained by law, is
as capable in some circumstances of destroying individual liberty as is
public government itself."'' 6 Thus, as Cahn put it, Hale "oppose[d] the
tyrannies of private government in the same spirit in which free men are
wont to resist official tyranny." 6
However, two principles, one positive and the other normative, must
be distinguished. Hale's central normative position, which will be further
elaborated below, is to promote a rough equality of power, coercion and
freedom. He thus argues that freedom, in the sense of a desirable pattern
of volitional freedom, requires public government to serve as a check
upon private government (and vice versa). But he also adopted the positive principle, the purely descriptive proposition, that volitional freedom
is as much a function of private mutual coercion-the juxtaposition of
private powers-as it is of private governmental versus public govern157. Id. 80-8 at 5. Thus, public government as a check on private government does
not mean the abolition, but only the limitation of, the power of the latter. See id. 80-7 at 6.

158. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 471.
159. Law Making by Unoficial Minorities, supra note 34, at 453;
supra note 11, at 555.
160. Hale Papers, Folder 80-16 at 8.
161. Id. 58-3 at 3.
162. FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at vii.
163. Cahn, supra note 27.
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mental power, that is to say, that one's volitional freedom is as much a
function of public government's check upon the power of other private
governments'" as of one's own countercoercive capacity. The critical
policy question becomes when is a particular concentration of private
governing power to be made subject to the countervailance of public
government, which is to say, who shall have the critical powers of governance. If power is "safe" only when diffused and checked by other
power, some of the diffusion and some of the checking capacity must
derive from public government. Thus the very title of Hale's Freedom
Through Law is at once both positive and normative: one's freedom is,
as a matter of fact, what it is because of the checks which government
puts upon others' freedom, and if one is to be free, government has to
and should place checks upon the powers of others." 5 The problem is
whose power is to be checked in who else's interest, including perhaps
the interest of the checker.
The perception of "government," then, is as subjective and unequal
as the perception of "coercion" and "freedom." Some restrictions on
liberty and some promotions of liberty are seen as "governmental" and
conothers are not. 66 Private government, even when it represents
16 7
centrated private power, is typically not seen as government:
We live . . . under two governments, "economic" and
"political." In many matters of everyday life our liberty is
restricted by requirements laid down by those who have superior
economic power. These stronger persons are not called rulers, or
164. In this regard, Hale's analysis generalizes not only all government "regulatory"
activity but all governmental determination of private rights as part of the system of
mutual coercion and the pattern of freedom. (This will be discussed further below.)
Public utility regulation was seen by Hale as a device to correct "the evil results of
unlimited property rights," Hale Papers, Folder 25-1 at 1, just as eminent domain was
developed as a check on the power of the private owner's withholding capacity. id. 93-6 at 19.
See note 31 supra.
The positive principle may be stated as follows: "[Wihen one unofficial group gets to
have what seems like too great a power to govern the lives of outsiders, we find attempts
to have the unofficial government subjected to limitations imposed by the official government." Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 107, 108 (Feb. 1923). "Indeed one of the
chief functions of government is to protect one individual against another." Hale Papers,
Folder 89-1 at 5-6. "[M]uch of what the government does is for the purpose of preventing
private individuals from harming other individuals or from threatening to harm them as a
means of coercing their conduct." Id. at 7. "The ordinary law of the state, as distinguished
from constitutional law, affords an individual protection against many adverse acts of other
individuals." Id. 93-6 at 1.
165. "[W]hile the state is capable of destroying our liberties it is also essential to their
very existence. We must rely on the state to restrain powerful private individuals from
unduly restricting the liberty of weaker ones." FREEDOM TmououH LAW, supra note 10, at 3.
"[T]he choice of the channels into which industry should be made to flow ought not to be
left to the whims of a comparatively few rich men to whom the government seems at present
to have delegated the power so to choose." Hale, The Concentration of Wealth: Discussion,
7 Am. ECON. REV. 174, 175 (1917) [hereinafter cited as The Concentration of Wealth].
166. Hale Papers, Folder 58-3 at 3.
167. Id. 69-2 at 3 & 80-3; Hale, Book Review, 45 THE SURWVY 514 (Jan. 1, 1921),
Folder 79.
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governors, nor are their dictates known as laws or ordinances,
however great the pressure which enforces obedience. The sway
of economic superiors is not thought to be "government" at all,
nor is "liberty" thought to be curtailed by it.' 68
"To the conventional eye, . . . governing power is invisible save when
exerted by public officials, wearing the authentic trappings of the political state."' 6 9 The perception of government is a function of our definition of reality, of what is customary, including our sense of values or
entitlement,' 70 of judicial social philosophy,17 ' and of our psychological
acceptance or rejection of certain rules or certain sources of rules and
not others.' 2
Whatever one's perception, private property and contract, 173 yield
governing power, which governs through the issuance of orders by employers, 174 through control (ability to exclude and withhold) over natural
resources, 175 and through the capacity to determine the legality of
another's use of one's property. 7 6 Indeed, Hale quoted John Stuart Mill
concerning how some developments in the law of property have been
historically a function of motives to maintain and/or change the structure of social power, social power functioning for all practical purposes
as government. 77 Moreover, private government may govern as effectively as public government: "Various private groups to which a man
belongs may govern him quite as effectively as do organs of the official
government.' 78 "Thus both in scope and in efficacy many exertions of
168. Hale Papers, Folder 80-16 at 1. Elliott Cheatham quoted to Hale an excerpt from
Hamilton (whom Cheatham called "the greatest secretary of the treasury before Mellon")
in The Federalist, No. 79 (first paragraph) that, "[a] power over a man's subsistence
amounts to a power over his will." Letter from E. Cheatham to R.L. Hale, April 14, 1932,
in Hale Papers, Folder 57. And Taussig, writing to compliment Hale on the latter's article

on the Nebbia case, The Constitution and the Price System: Some Reflections on Nebbia
v. New York, 34 CoLuM. L. Rv. 401 (1934), stated his "feeling as to the lack of significance
for economics in the distinction between public and private business." Letter from F.W.
Taussig to R.L. Hale, May 19, 1934, in Hale Papers, Folder 10. The distinction applies to
the question of a category affected with the public interest, as opposed to ordinary private
enterprise, and not to the distinction between public and private government; however, one
of the historical criteria for inclusion within the former "category" was concentration of
economic power, or strategic market position, which was often juxtaposed to another,
degree of consumer necessity, and to still another, the capacity to discriminate in price and
service.
169. Hale Papers, Folder 80-4 at 9.
170. Id. 89-1 at 9.

171. Hale, in

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES,

supra note 52, at 672.

172. Letter from R.L. Hale to M. Hale, July 29, 1913, at 1, in Hale Papers, not in folder.
173. FREEDom Tiouo LAW, supra note 10, at 366; LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11,
at 512A.
174. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 707 (Nov. 1922); Hale Papers, Folders
58-5 at 2, 6, 7 & 57-5.
175. Hale Papers, Folders 24-4 & 90-4 at 1.
176. Id. 59-1 at 2-3, 91-5 at 7, 91-1 at 1, 83-2 at 2; Coercion and Distribution, supra
note 21 at 472.
177. Hale Papers, Folder 58-7. See also Letter from W. Gardner to R.L. Hale, Dec. 31,
1935, in Hale Papers, Folder 68.
178. Hale Papers, Folder 56-1 at 17; see id. 80-1 at 8.
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what is called economic power are indistinguishable from many exertions
of what is recognized as political power.' 17 Furthermore, differences in
degree of governing power are not equivalent to differences between
unofficial and official governing power: "Differences in the degree of
governing power are significant, but the line between high and low degrees
of governing power does not coincide with the line between official and
unofficial exertions."' 8 ° There may be "high degrees of private governing
, Moreover, as will be seen further
"'I'
power as well as official power .
below, private governing power will tend to have its externalities just
like public governing power: "When a union succeeds in establishing a
closed shop in an entire trade it is governing not only its own members
but outsiders.'1 2 Just as laissez-faire may signify "government by business men, 18s 3 via both their private governance and business control
over public government, so too "[t]he union is8 4a miniature government
and its rule may at times become oppressive.'
Hale's analysis includes the recognition that, "[1]ike all government
power, that possessed by private individuals may at times be beneficial
to the governed."' Each private governing power "may serve to promote
a more needed liberty, by restraining a less vital one to interfere with
it."'8 8 But, however much "private governing power may serve a useful
purpose ....[t] here is no garanty... that it will always do so. Private,
as well as public, governing power may be abused, and stifle the more
. ..in order merely to gratify the whims of those who exert
essential
it.' 8 7 The conclusion is that "[t]he individual liberty of the governed
often demands some sort of protection against abuses of private governing power, analogous to the safeguards which our constitutional system
furnishes against the abuse of official government. Such safeguards only
the official government itself can furnish." 8 The argument that public
government does and must serve as a check upon private government
pervades Hale's writings, from his early articles to his Freedom Through
Law, of which it is the main theme, through countless papers, both published and unpublished in between: "the important point that freedom
from the power of the official government is no whit more precious than
freedom from the power of the various organizations ... [of private or
179. Id. 80-8 at 7.
180. Id. 58-5 at 7.
181. Id.
182. Hale, in ENCYCLOPEDIA oF ThE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 52, at 671.
183. Letter from R.L. Hale to G.J. Thompson, Nov. 4, 1944, in Hale Papers, Folder 40.
184. Hale, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 52, at 671. Hale quoted
Stone that a union under the Railway Labor Act "is clothed with power not unlike that of
a legislature which is subject to constitutional limitations on its power . . . ." FuE~a)om
THROUGH LAw, supra note 10, at 348. See also Hale Papers, 91-7 at 9-10. The case is Steele
v.L. & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1944).
185. Hale Papers, Folder 57-9 at 10.
186. Id. 80-4 at 18.
187. d.
188. d. 57-9 at 10. See also id. 59-1 at 7-8.
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unofficial government]. "189 "To preserve individual liberty, it is not
enough to keep the state from crushing it; it is equally essential to invoke
90
the power of the state to keep other individuals from crushing it."1
Yet much of this recognized political power is not different, in
kind or in degree, from much of the power that some individuals and private groups can lawfully exercise against other individuals. Those who wield this private power we have not
subjected to responsibility to those against whom it is exercised,
nor are they subjected to the same constitutional limitations
which surround public officials. 9 1
As already indicated, the role of private government is inherent in
Hale's general paradigm of coercion: if government signifies the capacity
to coerce or participation in coercion (in Hale's sense), then private participation in the economy is governmental in character. And if widespread
volitional freedom is what is meant by a free society, and if volitional
freedom emerges from the countervailence of power players, then such
freedom requires a diffusion of power such that power will serve as a
check on power. Each power has a dual significance: it is a power to be
checked and it is a power with which to check. This is true of all power,
private and public, and it is true of all government, official and unofficial.
His argument is more basic than simply arguing for more "regulation,"
because the argument for more "regulation" is reduced to the (further)
imposition of public government as a check on private government revising the extant pattern of checks, i.e., the public government is only
changing the interests which it is protecting, or the powers which it is
reenforcing, inasmuch as the status quo distribution of private rights and
powers is itself a function of past government action-but more on this
later.
One further point which recurs is that "infernal arbitrariness of
choice." Hale undoubtedly exaggerated (as many have) the position
of Adam Smith when he wrote that, "[a]ccording to the economics of
Adam Smith ... the person who wields power over the economic life of
others has no interest inconsistent with the interests of those others."
But Hale's main point, was that, "[u]nfortunately, modem study in
economics reveals many a discrepancy between the real interests of those
who exercise power and those who submit to it-whether that power is
189. Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 179 (March 1923). Thomas Reed
Powell thus wrote to Hale that, "what you are proving is that freedom against the state
does not leave you a free agent." Letter from T.R. Powell to R.L. Hale, June 24, 1939, at 2,
in Hale Papers, Folder 17. Hale wrote to Arthur S. Miller, in response to a manuscript of
Miller's, that "your main point is good, that someone should have power to limit private
governing power." Letter from R.L. Hale to A.S. Miller, Sept. 13, 1959, in Hale Papers,
Folder 72. Miller quoted Hale's FaRDox TEaouGH LAW, supra note 10, at 548, on the
importance of governmental control of private power. Miller, supra note 19, at 138-39, and
in The Constitutional Law of the "Security State," 10 STAN. L. Rav. 620, 653 (1958).
190. Hale Papers, Folder 91-4 at 2.

191. Force and the State, supra note 56, at 149.
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exercised by business men or by labor unions. 11 92 What Hale is again
getting to is the question of whose "real interests" the total system of
governance will promote, protect and effectuate. The presently important
point, however, is that there is a system of governance in the economy,
which includes private governments, and encompasses the entire system
of mutual coercion. 193
B.

The Market Economy as a System of Power

In the preceding section, I have spelled out Hale's general model of
coercion, freedom, power, and governance. Schematic of the structure
and process of interactional choice, and general enough to be applicable
to any decision-making process, the conception of a system of mutual
coercion (in Hale's sense of the term) was adopted and used by him to
render meaningful his understanding of the economy as a choosing process
and of the interrelation of legal and economic (i.e., market) processes.
In this section, I shall attempt to summarize Hale's view of the economy,
and the private market economy in particular, as a system of mutual
coercion. Necessarily, the central focus will be on power, the wherewithall to sanction conditions in the process of mutual coercion from
which is generated the pattern of volitional freedom, i.e., the wherewithall
to effectuate one's choice with a consequent coercive impact upon the
volitional freedom of others.
Hale's analysis, it should be pointed out, was by no means complete
and may be unsatisfying for that reason; it is not a complete theory of
power, even of power in economic affairs. One example of a line of
inquiry which he did not pursue, but which is both relevant and important, concerns nonpropertied bases of power, such as positions in organizations. Hale's response to this would likely be that ultimately even these
were ensconced in property rights, and that in any case the analysis
would be largely the same, though involving, perhaps, a greater analysis
of the law of business organization. As a lawyer he was disposed to look
to property rights, and during the decades when his basic ideas were
192. Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 179 (March 1923).

193. One further way in which Hale stressed the importance of considering the entire
system of governance, and therefore private government, was in his criticism of anarchism
as neglecting the threats to liberty coming from private power concentrations. He wrote
his brother that "certainly the anarchist ideal of freedom from restraint is a very high one,
the only difficulty being in the necessity of keeping you as free from the restraint of other
individuals as from that of the government." Letter from R.L. Hale to M. Hale, July 29,
1913, at 3, in Hale Papers, not in folder. Later he wrote: "It is only the anarchist who can
conceive of no possible curtailment of individual liberty except that imposed by the political
state." Hale Papers, Folder 58-5 at 3. See also id. 81-2 at 4-5, 93-5 at 1, 57-9 at 1. Immediately after making the point quoted in the text at note 189 supra, Hale wrote: "Perfect
freedom from restraint by the official government is attainable only under anarchy; and
under anarchy, we might be even less free than now from restraint imposed by nongovernmental groups and individuals." Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 179
(March 1923). The logic of mutual coercion or of governance is that the absence of coercion
from one source does not imply coercion from another source.
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developing, property rights were at the heart of public policy issues, and,
together with the fourteenth amendment's due process clause, occupied
the thoughts and theorizing of such legal-economic analysts as Commons,
Walton Hamilton and Hale. Of course, too, the institution of (private)
property was and is central to the American market economic system,
and the law of property was and is an important ancillary to the Constitution, though it is not the Constitution per se. Nonetheless, there is
more to the system of mutual coercion than formal property rights.
1. THE ECONOMY AS A SYSTEM OF POWER

What Hale was saying, of course, is that as much as the day-to-day
operation of an economy is characterized by "voluntary" (volitional,
to Hale) exchange transactions, and however great the analytical value
of studying such exchange activity (as leading, e.g., to Pareto optimal
solutions), all economies are systems of mutual coercion. As an analyst
of the market economy, Hale felt this was especially true of that system;
its conduct, too, had to be seen in terms of power and power play and
the visitation of coercive impact. Although he was not a deep student
of alternative economic systems,' 94 he was cognizant of the relevance
thereto of his paradigm of mutual coercion and volitional freedom. His
preoccupation with the American type economy (in part as an American,
in part as a common-law lawyer), coupled with his habit for time consuming meticulous work, and also with the astonished reactions of his
colleagues, students and readers to his identification of the supposedly
free economy as a coercive system-all led him to concentrate his attention on the market economy.
Fundamentally, said Hale, the economy, in many different but converging ways, is a system of power. It is a Machtoekonomie,19 5 "a network of coercive pressures and counter-pressures of varying strength,
each pressure consisting in the last analysis either of the power to lock
or to unlock the bars which the law erects against the non-owners of
each piece of property, or else of the power to withhold or not to withhold
labor."' 9 6 "The whole bargaining process, on which the price system and
the market depend, is a system of mutual coercion of the different
bargainers."' 97 "In most business transactions, private individuals exercise some degree of control over the activities of each other; ' '198 "each
party exerts a certain degree of coercion against the other. .,9
The
market economy is a system of contending groups,200 a system of private
194. Hale did apply his analysis to Webb's Constitution for the Socialist Common-

wealth of Great Britain in a short review. Hale, Book Review, 45
1, 1921).
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

THE

SURvEY 514 (Jan.

Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, supra note 34, at 455.
Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 138. See also Hale Papers, Folder 93-1 at 28.
Hale Papers, Folder 59-1 at 3.
Id. 91-4 at 2.
Id. 90-2 at 3.
200. LEoAL FACToRs, supra note 11, at 613.
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mutual coercion; 20 1 a structure of "coercion and counter-coercion, ' 121 of
"mutual control and submission, 20 1 of superior versus inferior economic
power.2 "4 It is permeated with coercion: free contract means that contract
making is a field for the exercise of mutual coercive capacity.0 5 To the
ubiquity of pressure generic to the industrial system is added the ubiquity
of pecuniary pressure generic to the market economy. 2 6 The utter
necessity of coercive restrictions upon individual liberty should not
obscure the fact that the system of "free" enterprise is "shot through
with restrictions of liberty.... 207 Moreover, the coercive structure and
consequences are quite diffused and complex: "The bargaining struggle,
in short, is frequently not a struggle against the employer alone but
against the consumer as well. The consumers include laboring men in
other industries."'2 8 Coercion based on power, in sum, is not only ubiquitous, it is the nature of the economic system. In the market system a
wide (or relatively wide) diffusion of power leads to the regulation of
private power by the market, but the market is also a vehicle through
which private power may be exercised. Indeed, the regulation of private
power is not really by the market but rather by the action of other power
players through the market. The market only effectuates the power inputs
which act or work through it. It is Hale's normative and positive proposition that a "free" economy requires a wide and relatively equal diffusion
of power.
Hale's analysis of the economy as a system of power-which must
be understood in terms of the paradigm developed earlier-will be elaborated upon as follows. I shall summarize first his view of private property as the most distinctive form of power in a market economy; second,
inequality of coercive capacity insofar as it is grounded in an asymmetrical distribution of private property (subsequently discussing inequality grounded in law) and third, several of the specific ways in
which it is meaningful, according to Hale, to speak of the economy as a
system of power (even under competitive conditions), in which regard
I shall develop some of the most powerful theorems deriving from his
analysis.
2. PRIVATE PROPERTY AS POWER
If coercion is the impact of the behavior and/or choices of others
and if power denotes the means or capacity to coerce, then it follows that,
201. Hale, Economic Considerations in the Restatement and Clarification of the Law,
10 PROCEEDINGS OF TirE ACADEMY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 50, 52-53 (1923)

[hereinafter cited

as Economic Considerations]. See also Hale Papers, Folders 91-1 at 2, 83-6 at 1, & 91-5 at 9.
202. Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 107, 108 (Feb. 1923).
203. Political and Economic Review, 10 A.B.A.J. 885 (Dec. 1924).
204. Hale Papers, Folder 80-16 at 1.
205. LEGAL FACTORs, supra note 11, at 555, 557; Hale Papers, Folders 91-3 at 3 & 91-5
at 4.
206. Hale Papers, Folder 91-3 at 3-4.
207. Id. at 2.
208. Hale, Book Review, 31 CoLuM. L. REV. 916 (1931).
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in an economic system in which the exercise of choice is grounded in and
structured by private property, private property becomes the distinctive
means whereby power is exercised and coercion visited. Hale's theory of
property is that the structure of mutual coercion (that is, an individual's
or subgroup's capacity to effectuate its own decisions and to defend
against the impact of choices made by others), and therefore the structure of volitional freedom, are both a function of the distribution of
private property. Property, said Hale, echoing Hobhouse, is not just for
use, as in consumption; it is also, and more importantly, for power. 0 9
Property is power, and its meaning is to be read in the complex structure
of coercion, freedom, withholding and governance with which it is
intimately connected. This was amplified and elaborated by Hale as
follows.
First, and most generally, private property rights are loci of decisionmaking, and their distribution structures the decision-making process. 210
The owner of property, whether in the form of money or otherwise, but
especially of industrial property, has, by virtue of his ownership, ".. .a
certain
amount of influence over the channels into which industry shall
flow."'211 Quite aside from the complicating factor of the separation of
ownership and control (i.e., assuming de facto control is the equivalent
of de jure ownership, or vice versa), to the extent that one has property
one is enabled to participate in the economic decision-making process.
Control over property, especially over capital goods,212 is power in the
economy.
Second, and more specifically, property provides the capacity to
exercise coercive impact upon others and the correlative ability to withstand the coercive capacity of others. This is true generally, and not just
with respect to the relations between specific individuals, inasmuch as
one's capacity to withhold, and thereby provide either a sanction for the
conditions one wishes to impose on others (even impersonally) or a
defense against the conditions which others are trying to impose, is a
function of one's staying power and that, most directly, is a function
of one's ownership of property. Property affords one a source of protection against the economic pressures of others, but it is also one source
of economic pressure upon or against others.21 3 The protection of one's
private property rights signifies an actual or potential imposition of
209. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 136-38.
210. Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 212, 214;
Value and Vested Rights, supra note 87, at 525; Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21,

at 488; Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, supra note 80.
211. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 490.

212. At one point Hale considered the argument that consumption is more equally
distributed than capital ownership or wealth and that great inequality in the latter is
unimportant in comparison. He questioned why, if that were true, vested industrial interests
so strongly defended their positions, and how irrelevant must be "any dispute as to the
title to any property." The Concentration of Wealth, supra note 165, at 175. See also text
at note 356 infra.
213. FREEDOM TnRouou LAW, supra note 10, at 196.
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restraint upon others. The distribution of such rights gives, pro tanto,
substance and structure to the distribution of volitional freedom.
Third, and even more specifically, Hale argued that the power of
property resides in the owner's capacity to determine whether any given
use of his property is lawful or unlawful, which capacity thus enables
him to impose terms on others as the price of rendering that use lawful.
Private property, that is to say, enables private government.2 14 The
theme that power resides in the owner's ability to withhold his consent
(and thereby make the use lawful) is one which pervades Hale's writings.
The argument is essentially as follows. Private property rights
nominally give the owner control over his property; these rights have
as their correlative the duties owed to the owner by others, i.e., by nonowners. The property may well be scarce and thus likely to command a
price, but the structure of ownership-of rights and duties-means that
the impact of scarcity varies as between owner and nonowner. "Moreover, since each person's liberty is restrained by legal duties which he
owes to others, those others have it in their power to release him from
these restraints, and because they have this power, they can induce him
to give up some other liberty in exchange for that which he gains by
release from these legal restraints.1 215 "If one will not stipulate to accept
the conditions imposed by a private owner, the state is prepared to deny
him freedom to make use of the property in question." 216 "The primary
interest promoted [by the property right] is the owner's bargaining
power. Because he can determine whether the law shall render the use
of his property by others lawful or unlawful, he is in a position to impose
terms for rendering that use lawful. ' 21 7 Since "the same act must be
permitted to the owner of the property and forbidden to others if property is to have any significance whatsoever, 2 1 8 what makes the same
act, otherwise unlawful, now lawful is the owner's consent, which consent
must be purchased. The power of private property is the power to withhold; and the imposition of conditions is the price of consent to release
withholding; it is "a power to release a pressure which the law of property exerts on the liberty of others."21 9 Property for use yields property
for power: the owner's consent is his participation in decision-making,
and its exercise is part of the interplay of volitional freedoms.
Finally, it is already clear that the effect of private property upon
freedom is both affirmative and negative. It is Hale's point that "property
rights are part of a legal arrangement whereby the law curtails the liberty
214. Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 214;
Value and Vested Rights, supra note 87, at 525.
215. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 23.
216. FREEDOM THROuGH LAW, supra note 10, at 303.
217. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 137.
218. FREEDOM THRouGH LAW, supra note 10, at 15.
219. Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 214.
Hale's analysis is conducted in Hohfeldian terms.
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of different individuals in different degrees .... ,,220 The volitional freedom of the owner is pro tanto expanded and that of the nonowner restricted. "If our own property is large, we have a relatively large field
of liberty, [it is] otherwise if our property is small." 21 He who has
small holdings, or none at all, is exposed to the decision-making power of
the large holder, even when exercised through the competitive market.
The rights of property are relative not only with respect to legal limitations thereon, 22 2 but also with respect to other property rights and to
circumstances. 2 2 One's freedom is accordingly extended or constrained
depending upon one's relative property holdings. In all cases, private
property signifies expansion of volitional freedom for some and restriction for others, especially the nonowners. In any particular controversy,
the issue is once again not freedom per se but whose freedom, i.e., whose
private property rights and whose exposure to or protection (immunity)
from those rights. Private property is power and functions to structure
the distribution of coercive capacity, and thereby volitional freedom;
this is true whether the institution of property or any particular right or
object of private property carries the stigma of impropriety or the badge
of propriety.
3.

THE SYSTEM OF COERCION AS ASYMMETRICAL:

INEQUALITY

PER SE

The particular form of power which Hale examined was private
property. Its distinguishing empirical characteristic is the inequality of
its distribution, which means that there is a basic asymmetry to the
structure of mutual coercion.
It will be seen shortly that power is relevant even under competitive
conditions. Let it be clear now that even if property were in some sense
equally distributed, it would still be possible and necessary to analyze the
structure and operation of mutual coercion. According to Hale, the
bundle of rights conferred on each person by law (or, if one prefers,
enjoyed by each person) is unique. "The privileges, rights, and duties
of each person differ from those of every other person." Even if each
individual's aggregation were in some sense to be rendered "equal," they
would never be identical. 2 4 Moreover, "[t]hese different rights and
restrictions . . . [would] by no means [be] equal in their human or

economic significance. 22 5 While each person would be roughly equal
in the aggregate of his rights, duties, etc., with respect to particulars
he would still have a pattern of volitional freedom that was relative
220. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 140.
221. Political and Economic Review, 10 A.B.A.J. 882, 885 (Dec. 1924).
222. LEoA FACTORS, supra note 11, at 35; FREEDOM TiROaUGH LAW, supra note 10, at
239.
223. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 489.

224. FREEDOM THROUcH LAW, supra note 10, at 15.
225. Id. at 17.
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to the volitional freedom of others, i.e., there would still be a pattern
of freedom and exposure, a pattern of mutual coercion in which one part
was here secure and there exposed, and vice versa.
Such equality is fictional and impossible (see below). But Hale was
not writing of a hypothetical world or model; it is Hale's basic relevant
point that in the real world people have, as a matter of empirical fact,
unequal positions in their respective particular and overall capacities to
exercise coercive impact. The structure of mutual coercion is asymmetrical and is so because power is unequally distributed, and in no
small degree because of the inequality in the distribution of property.
People do not have equal coercive power because their property holdings
are more or less unequal and because this inequality does not allow equal
withholding capacity. And unequal coercive impact means unequal volitional freedom.
One of the major thrusts of Hale's work was to establish that
economic inequalities "are embodied in unequal legal rights. 2 The
legal bases of economic inequality, as part of the legal bases of economic
coercion, will be developed in part II. The argument at this point is
limited to the essentially empirical fact that economic power per se,
largely in the form of private property ownership, is unequally distributed, with the result that, since people enter the market unequally
situated, the system of mutual coercion is asymmetrical in its structure
and, by inference, in the weighting assigned to components of resource
allocation. This proposition, it should be clear, is a neutral, positive
statement.
Hale acknowledged that "[t]hough our freedom to make use of
material goods is restricted by the property rights and by the coercive
bargaining of others, still, by virtue of our own property rights and our
own bargaining power, we each have a far wider range of economic
2 27
liberty than we would have in a regimented or totalitarian system.1
He immediately continued to argue that "[s]ome of us, however, have
a much greater degree of economic liberty and of economic governing
power than others.122 8 This is because

[t]he threats which can be made by some people are more
serious than those which can be made by others, and therefore,
in the results of the various transactions in which such threats
are employed we find great economic inequalities-inequalities
with respect to freedom from the necessity of doing disagreeable
work and freedom to enjoy the good things of life.229
The reason is that people have unequal means-unequal relative power
-with which to contest in the marketplace. Hale, then, accepted as a
226. Id. at 12.

227. Id. at ix.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 9-10.
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matter of fact 0 what Justice Pitney called "inequalities of fortune"
to which private negotiating and contracting parties "are not equally
unhampered by circumstances."2'
It is really unnecessary to elaborate. Suffice it to say that Hale
pointed out the major sources of inequality of private economic power.
These include unequal abilities-including unequal possession of faculties with which to render marketable services-unequal past achievements or luck, and unequal status with respect to the market value of
productive services under one's command. Running through much of this
is the unequal ownership of property, including land and opportunity for
inheritance, but there is also the heavy impact of class structure and of
noncompeting groups. Different individuals, therefore, have unequal withholding power, or unequal reservation demands, and, consequently, they
also have unequal bargaining power.
4.

POWER AND THE MARKET ECONOMY

The ideology of the market economy would have it that rights do
not conflict, that a tranquil harmony of interests reigns, and that power
is obviated by the market. It is the nature of ideology to rationalize.
Orthodox economic theory (microeconomics) expounds the view that
the market allocates resources and distributes income. It is the nature
of theory to narrowly and efficiently limit the scope of its operative
variables. It is however, Hale's point of view that rights and interests do
conflict. It is also his view that the market does not work in a vacuum,
but rather gives effect to whatever forces underlie demand and supply.
The market allocates resources and, through factor prices, distributes
income, but only within the existing distribution of wealth or power out
of which arise the very market forces which the market only composes
and gives effect to. One skewed distribution of property and power will
result in a very different allocation of resources and pattern of factor
prices from another skewed distribution, and both will be very different
from that consequent to a roughly equal distribution of property and
power. Even aside from the fact that the market is not perfectly competitive (it is essentially oligopolistic), Hale argued that it is simply
irrelevant that economic theory adopts a (tautological) definition of
competition in which the numbers of buyers and sellers are large enough
so that no one exerts any influence on price. Power, said Hale, is not
precluded or obviated by such a definition, even aside from its openended character, for even if such a definition applied, i.e., even if the
market were competitive (however difficult it is to determine when the
numbers are large enough), power would still act in and through the
230. Id. chs. 1-3; LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, ch. 7; Hale Papers, Folder 91-S at 3.
231. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 1; FREEDOm TnROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 10;
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915). On the "uneven distribution" of the "power to
coerce," see Hale Papers, Folder 80-1 at 2.
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market. The market may be interpreted antiseptically, but demand and
supply forces are generated out of the system of mutual coercion and,
therefore, from part of the network of power relations. Hale's penetrating
analysis of the power dimension of the market economy resulted in the
generation of theorems radically different from, but, because of the different scope of relevant variables entertained, not mutually exclusive of,
those of orthodox economics.
a. Resource Allocation and Income Distribution as a
Function of Mutual Coercion
Hale was cognizant of the fact that, as orthodox economic theory
maintains, prices trigger the allocation of resources and serve an incentive function in the process. But Hale was also aware that prices are
coefficients of economic choice, and that as such they emanate from and
register the structure and thrust of interactional choice and, ultimately,
power. This being the case, what Hale saw was that resource allocation
and income distribution, both of which are proximately and nominally
governed by the price structure, are less immediately, but more importantly, a function of the structure of mutual coercion. His first major
theorem on the functioning of the market is that prices and incomes are
a function of mutual coercion. Prices comprise the mechanism for the
allocation of resources and factor incomes, and they may be analyzed
through relative demand and supply functions of curves, but, it is Hale's
proposition, those relative demand and supply functions arise out of the
system of mutual coercion.
Price, then, connoted to Hale a payment with which to overcome
the pressure exercised through withholding or the threat to withhold
(not sell), and as such any particular market price registers relative
bargaining or withholding power brought to market: "Market values
themselves ... result from and register the mutual pressures exerted by
buyers and sellers. The amount of pressure which each can exert is very
unevenly distributed, with the result that some are economically strong,
others economically weak."2 2 Market prices, he stated, "reflect the relative force of the threats which buyers and sellers of goods or services
can make;'' 8 transactions are bargains, and "[t]heir terms depend on
the relative bargaining power of the parties. The market prices of goods
and services, on which the degree of each person's economic liberties
depends, register that relative bargaining power." 4 Thus, "[t]he economic value of a service merely expresses what the person who renders it
can induce others to pay him for doing so,"'235 and "the value of the
232. FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 131.

233. Id. at 9.
234. Id. at 8. See also id. at 17, 19, 31, 129.
235. Id. at 30.
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goods (and presumably of the service of producing them) is simply an
expression of the harm the consumers would suffer if they were withheld."" 6 Indeed, "the market price is nothing else [sic] than the statement of the conditions which restrict [the individual's] liberty to
consume. ' 23 7 In this respect it is not only the case that high or low prices
make for high or low economic power; it is also that "the payment of
the market price is not an equally practical matter for all ... ,,'8 since
some are economically powerful and others economically weak to begin
with. In Hale's version of a general economic equilibrium model, which
he offered as a complement to that of orthodox economic theory, power
is both cause and consequence; it is both an input and an output; the
dynamics are the dynamics of power and power play; and price is an
index of relative economic power.
Prices, then, are seen as a form of private tax, and incomes as the
consequence of a private taxing power residing in private property. Hale
pointed out that economic rent is dramatically a private tax2 3 9 and that,

in a somewhat different sense, "many of the rich and idle are in effect
". But his general argument in
taxing the rest of the community. . ."10
this connection is that all prices resemble taxes, inasmuch as they too
involve economic impediments and compulsion to pay, that is to say, as
both prices and taxes function identically to restrict voluntary freedom
to volitional freedom:
All prices, no matter for what services, are paid under the
same compulsion as are sales taxes. In both cases the payment
is made, if it is made at all, in order to avoid foregoing the thing
bought and for no other reason. The fact that the seller may be
the levy. It in no
rendering a quid pro quo goes only to justify
2 41
way proves that it is not compulsory.
The compulsion, it is to be remembered, is neutral in Hale's model. It
is true of all taxes that they are paid to avoid an unpleasant alternative,
such as jail in the case of the income tax, and it is true of all prices that
the alternative is either to forego the good or service, or to steal and risk
imprisonment. Prices are "private taxes on the use of things .... ,,242
Private property thus becomes the right to collect private taxes:
"The interest primarily promoted by the ownership of business property
236. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 605.
237. FREEDOm THROUG;H LAW, supra note 10, at 6. The text continues: "He may not
make free use of the goods in the market. His liberty to use them is not absolute. It is
conditioned on his payment of the going price. Id. See also Hale Papers, Folder 90-2 at 5;
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 606 passim.

238.

LEGAL FACTORS,

supra note 11, at 714.

239. Letter from R.L. Hale to W.L. Fisher, Aug. 15, 1918, at 3, in Hale Papers, Folder
65. See also Folder 79-1 at 2.
240. Hale Papers, Folder 90-1 at 1.
241. Id. 79-1 at 1-2. See also LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 436-37.
242. Hale Papers, Folder 93-1 at 9.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

is not the interest in personal unmolested use thereof, but in collecting
income from consumers by the threat to withhold from them the use or
'248
the fruits of it.
Not only prices, but incomes-through factor prices and against
an active background of unequal property ownership-are a function of
mutual coercion. "As I see it," wrote Hale, "all incomes are the result of
coercion held in check by counter-coercion." 24 4 In Coercion and Distribution his main theme, verbalized in the title, was that income distribution
was a function of coercion even in a supposedly noncoercive state. He
maintained therein that "the income of each person in the community
depends on the relative strength of his power of coercion, offensive and
defensive. 2 45 "The distribution of income, to repeat, depends on the
relative power of coercion which the different members of the community
can exert against one another. Income is the price paid for not using
one's coercive weapons."24' 6 One, of course, may need income, but that is
simply a factor in one's own coercive capacity. Thus, "[t]he gross incomes of property-owners are obtained by coercion of the customers;
their labor by coercion of the workers. The wages of the latter are obtained [from] the counter-coercion of the employers. 2 4 7 "The result is a
network of coercive pressures and counter-pressures of varying strengths
. . . . These pressures are what enable each person to obtain such share
as he can of the goods produced by the industrial system.""' Wealth is
also a function of relative power.2 4 9 As in the case of prices, income and
wealth are both independent and dependent variables in Hale's general
equilibrium system of mutual coercion based on relative (but changing)
power positions and relations.
However if income and wealth are a function of bargaining power,
"[t]he bargaining power under existing legal arrangements cannot be
justified by showing that it results in incomes proportionate to bargaining
power. ' 250 This would obviously be circular reasoning. By a similar
243. Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 107 (Feb. 1923). The text continues:
Other and more vital interests are promoted indirectly, in so far as the income
which the owner collects functions as an incentive to productive effort on his part.
On the other hand, the interests defeated by modern property rights are no longer
merely the less vital interests which were formerly defeated; they are the more
vital interests in working independently of others' control; for under a developed
system many people without property have to submit to control if they are to be
permitted by law to eat food, wear clothes or enjoy shelter.
Id. See also Hale Papers, Folders 90-4 at 1 & 93-1 at 10; Rate Making and the Revision oj
the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 214.
244. Hale Papers, Folder 62-1 at 7.
245. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 477.
246. Id. at 478.
247. Political and Economic Review, 10 A.B.A.J. 752 (Dec. 1922).
248. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 138; see also Rate Making and the Revision
of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 214.
249. Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, supra note 34, at 455.
290. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 138; Bargaining, Duress, and Economic
Liberty, supra note 74, at 625-26. The point is restated later in the same article: "[fln fact
the property rights are part of a legal arrangement whereby the law curtails the liberty of
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token, the only difference between the conventional charging of a price
and the repudiated and illegal extortion under duress is the attribution
of moral impropriety to certain acts of withholding and not to others. 51
In general, "[w] e rely on the bargaining process to serve the conflicting
interests of individuals in securing a share of the collective output of
society, and also to serve their common interest in the creation of that
collective output.

25 2

These bargains both originate in and lead to "vast

differences in the economic positions of different persons .... 7,253
But while there is no explicit legal requirement that one enter
into any particular transaction, one's freedom to do so is nevertheless circumscribed. One chooses to enter into any given transaction in order to avoid the threat of something worse-threats
which impinge with unequal weight on different members of
society. The fact that
he exercised a choice does not indicate
5 4
lack of compulsion.
Moreover,
[t] he fact that transactions do not deviate from normal market
values does not necessarily indicate that there is a fair relation
between the respective bargaining powers of the parties. The
market value of a property or a service is merely a measure of
the strength of the bargainingpower of the person who owns the
one or renders the other, under the particularlegal rights with
which the law endows him, and the legal restrictions which it
places on others. To hold unequal bargaining power economically
justified, merely because each party obtains the market value
of what he sells, no more and no less, is to beg the question.25 5
This brings us to the next two theorems of Hale, which explain the
relations between power and market productivity and between power
and competition. These theorems, particularly the latter, further establish the fundamental power basis of Hale's paradigm of the economy as
a system of mutual coercion.
b. Productivity and Mutual Coercion
One of the central thrusts of orthodox neo-classical economic analysis is that the demand for factors of production is primarily a function of
different individuals in different degrees, and the justifiability of the particular arrangements

depends on the justifiability of the economic results rather than the reverse." Id. at 140.
See also FREEDom THROUGa LAW, supra note 10, at 393, quoted in the text at note 365 infra;
Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21.
251. See text at footnote 133.
252. Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 605; on extortion,
see id. at 611. "The person who exercises the power gains access to a certain part of the
wealth produced by others. At the same time, he is himself compelled to contribute to the
production of wealth and thus add to the amount to which others can obtain access."
FREEDOM T ROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 31.

253. Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 605.
254. Id. at 606.
255. Id. at 625-26 (emphasis added).
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their respective marginal productivities. Some economists have gone
further and argued that productivity governs not only factor demand
but factor price, but while that is probably incomplete, and at least
controversial, it is true that "productivity" remains the major concept
in orthodox distribution theory.251 Hale, however, goes beyond productivity as the single and independent, and therefore critical, element in
factor pricing and factor income distribution.
According to Hale, productivity in the sense typically employed by
economists, namely, value productivity, emerges within the structure of
relative bargaining power or mutual coercion, such that productivity is
itself at least partially a function of power and, further, that factor prices
reflect the admixture of both relative power and relative efficiency.
No man said Hale "literally produces his fortune. He acquires it by
a complex set of bargaining transactions, in which he may or may not
have incidentally contributed much to the production of other goods,
2 57
from the proceeds of which he acquires the wealth which he enjoys.
Hale agreed that "there is something in the productivity theory..

.,,25s

namely, the combined effect of efficiency and consumer preference, but
he argues that what is typically called
the "productivity" of each factor means no more nor less than
... coercive

power. It is measured not by what one actually is

producing, which could not be determined in the case of joint
production, but by the extent to which production would fall off
if one left and if the marginal laborer were put in [one's] place
-by the extent, that is, to which the execution of his threat of
withdrawal would damage the employer. Not only does the distribution of income depend on this mutual coercion; so also
does the distribution of that power to exert further compulsion
which accompanies the management of an industry. 59
Value productivity measures the damage inflicted by withholding.
Hale accepted the inference from marginal productivity theory that
"raising the wage by compulsion to a point higher than each man's labor
is worth will necessarily diminish the demand for that class of labor and
cause unemployment ... ,"260 but it is his point that this is part of the total
256. For a critique

of productivity theory,

see M. BLAUG,

ECONOmiC

THEORY

IN

RETROSPECT 444-46 (rev. ed. 1968).
257. Hale Papers, Folders 93-1 at 34 & 93-6 at 54.
258. Letter from R.L. Hale to H. Rottschaefer, Nov. 5, 1925, at 3, in Hale Papers,
Folder 3. Rottschaefer had earlier written Hale that "a complete theory of distribution"
would have to account for both productivity and power factors. Letter from H. Rottschaefer
to R.L. Hale, Oct. 14, 1925, at 1, in Hale Papers, Folder 3. Hale responded that the
productivity theory "is not inconsistent with my theory that all incomes are derived by
some sort of pressure exerted by their recipients on the rest of the community. That pressure,
as I see it, sometimes depends for its effectiveness on how much the exerter of it can
'produce'; and is sometimes conditioned on his actually doing the producing." Letter from
R.L. Hale to H. Rottschaefer, Nov. 5, 1925, at 3, in Hale Papers, Folder 3.
259. Coercion and Distribution,supra note 21, at 477.
260. LEGAL FAcToRs, supra note 11, at 696.
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process of mutual coercion; the converse involves the pressure brought
by employers which tends to reduce wages below marginal productivity.
Factor prices do not result simply from productivity-based factor demands; they arise from bargaining and mutual coercion; productivity,
as meted out by money wages, is a function of power. Hale's is a bargaining power theory of distribution in which market prices of factors reflect
not only relative productive efficiency and relative consumer demand,
but also differential withholding capacity, which, in turn, is a function
of differential arrays of alternatives and their respective opportunity
costs. 261 Hale was so much aware that value productivity and actual
factor prices were partially functions of power relations that he suggested, in a letter to Learned Hand, that the aim of legal policy should
be to so adjust the laws of property "that a person could only collect in
business the value of any services rendered, 26 2 that is, benefit only from
productivity based upon one's efficiency and not one's withholding capacity, e.g., not through the ownership of land and natural resources or the
maintenance of positions of concentrated private power. This suggestion
presents the apparent difficulty of providing no independent determination of the value of services rendered, but Hale saw that price in the
market will always be a function of mutual coercion, even where power
is roughly equally distributed. It is clear that Hale understood the
market system to be so structured that one's value productivity, per se,
partially reflects relative market power, and that orthodox marginal
productivity functions must be seen as partially generated by power
relations. Hale's theorem, then, is that productivity in the market, as it
is conventionally understood, is a partial function of relative power and
arises out of mutual coercion."
c. Power and Competition
As already indicated, the traditional competitive assumption in economic theory is generally taken by economists and others to signify the
absence of market power: where by definition no one has an influence
upon market price, no one, then, has market power. Power is command
261. Id. at 592.
262. Letter from R.L. Hale to L. Hand, Oct. 27, 1912, in Hale Papers, Folder 62.
263. Hale appears to have never completely satisfied himself on the relation between
productivity theory and his coercion analysis. He is not alone in this, inasmuch as productivity theory remains in a wholly unsatisfactory state to this day, as does distribution theory
generally. In Hale's case it is partially explained by his preoccupation with legal materials
after his transfer to Columbia Law School. Hale was familiar with the work of Gustav A.
Kleene, who had a distribution theory which incorporated both traditional productivity and
time preference theories with power factors and which was basically a power theory of
distribution. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 139 n.1. Hale Papers, Folder 93-1 at
21ff; Kleene's analysis received sympathetic treatment (albeit reluctantly given) from
Taussig. See 3 DORrMAN, supra note 1, at 431-32. Hale also did not probably fully appreciate
that Carver was an advocate of revising the power structure within which productivity was
generated so as to result in a more equitable-but also efficient--distribution of income.
See Hale-Carver correspondence, in Hale Papers, Folder 1. See note 34 supra.
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over price in the market. Hale accepted this assumption but contended
that it does not go far enough in its perception of power and the field of
power. His argument is that power acts through the market even under
competition where no one has command over price. Obviously, his context
of relevant effects-the field of power-goes forward beyond price per se
to resource allocation and income distribution, and thus backward beyond
market structure to the structure of social power which profoundly conditions the operation of the market.
To begin with, Hale's analysis parallels orthodox analysis of noncompetitive conditions and the analysis of industrial concentration. 264
Price is commanded directly by power-it is an instrument of power play
-and the terms of adhesion or standardized contracts are imposed. 65
Hale stated:
We have seen that in all the many instances in which
competition fails to keep the value of the right to own property
...down to the level of the contribution made toward the production of the output by those who paid for the construction of
the equipment, some persons are empowered by their property
rights to exact from the rest of the community more money than
their contributions toward production are worth in the market.
The economic inequalities of the property rights do not conform
to inequalities in the value of services rendered.2 6
Imperfect competition means power active in the market. Oligopolists
are clearly power players.
The genius of a competitive marketplace, then, is that it does provide limitations upon property rights and the power underlying mutual
coercion. Competition may require private property, but competition
functions to check the power of property owners.2 67 Notice, however,
this means that market competition becomes a regulatory system through
which voluntary freedom is restricted to volitional freedom, or one pattern of volitional freedom is converted to another. "The person who pays
does so only because he will otherwise be deprived of the use of that
for which he pays."2 6 8 The "numerous alternatives" which competition
provides allow "for greater variety of choice, though [that] does not
refute the proposition that [one] is at last driven to sacrifice some
liberty in order to acquire .. .,269 the liberty to consume the product

thus acquired. The paradigm of freedom and coercion applies to competi264. See Hale Papers, Folders 91-2 at a & 90-1 at 9.
265. Hale's 1943 article on Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty was one of a
symposium of papers on "Compulsory Contracts in Theory and Practice," 43 COLItM. L.
Rav. 567 (July 1943).
266. FREEDOM TmHouaH LAW, supra note 10, at 26.
267. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 489; LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at
752; FREEDOM T1ROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 50; Hale Papers, Folders 91-5 at 12-14 &

82-2 at 5.
268. Hale Papers, Folder 58-5 at 2.
269. Id. at 30.
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tive conditions. Moreover, because of unequal circumstances, "[tihe
payment of the market price is not an equally practical matter for all,
any more than an equally practical burden is imposed on all when the
law in its majestic equality forbids rich and poor alike to sleep under the
bridge or on the park benches ....1"0 Thus, "[a] drop in the price of
a commodity may extend the freedom to use it to a group hitherto barred,
while a steep rise in price may annul such a freedom for all but a relatively [sic] few." 71 Competitive prices, far from being devoid of coercive
impact, serve directly as governors of volitional freedom. Moreover,
they are coercive in genesis as well. Not every one is in a market position
to be a seller or buyer to begin with: many a poor person would prefer
to be in a position to own a business regulated by competition. The price
"may be reasonable and the amount may be controlled by market conditions over which no single ... [seller] has any influence; but the fact
remains that, for whatever reason, . .. [the seller] is in a position to
collect"2'72 the price.
This brings us to the heart of Hale's argument. It is Hale's view
that "competition," as used in economic theory, applies only to the structure of the particular market within which buyers and sellers compete,
in which equilibrium price and quantity are regulated by demand and
supply. Competition thus has to do with market structure and demand
and supply and not, says Hale, with the power structure within which
the market, even when competitive, operates. For power, in Hale's view,
exists not only in noncompetitive markets, but also governs the relative
participation of buyers and sellers in all markets. A competitive product
market is not the same thing as a socioeconomic system in which power
is diffused; one can have the former without the latter, and the presence
of the former should not obscure the absence of the latter. The very
position of the seller qua seller and of buyer qua buyer is a function of
their status in the larger power structure. Competition is important in
taking the edge off market power, but it cannot overcome the structure
of advantage and disadvantage originating in class structure and noncompeting groups, and in the unequal distribution of property and wealth,
perhaps obscured by the corporate veil.2 Competition, where present,
deals only with one aspect of power; it does not get to the power structure on which the market rests. Indeed, argues Hale, power generated
by class structure, unequal property and wealth distribution operates
through the competitive market. No one may have command over price,
but the concentrated control of property and wealth has its impact on
the structure of demand and supply. Those with "contractual and property rights of great magnitude" are able to work through the market,
even unconcertedly, to more readily effectuate the conditions which they
270.
271.
272.
273.

Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 213.
Hale, Book Review, supra note 65, at 826.
Hale Papers, Folder 58-5 at 2.
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 608.
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prefer to impose upon others.27 Even though prices may be regulated by
demand and supply, such private power operating through the market
will have its effects upon the liberty and property of others. 75 There is
a difference, in other words, between a competitive market with one
pattern of unequal property ownership and one with another pattern,
and between both of these and a market with a pattern of substantial
equality of wealth and opportunity; the difference extending to the
allocation of resources and factor pricing (and therefore income distribution) arising under each. With resource allocation through the price
mechanism under strictly competitive conditions a function of dollar
"votes" in the market, unequal dollar vote holdings mean unequal impact
on resource allocation and income distribution, which means, in Hale's
model, that power in the form of wealth works through the competitive
market in effectuating its coercive impact. This is one of Hale's most
subtle and important theorems. Coercion is unobtrusively exercised
through the market; the market gives primary effect to the conditions
which those with power desire to impose. This is the case notwithstanding
the fact that in the real world the market is not fully competitive and concentrated power has even more opportunity to be exercised. Resource
allocation and income distribution are a function of mutual coercion
operating through the market, whether the market is competitive or not.
d. On the Organization and Use of the Human Labor Force
Bertrand de Jouvenel, in his classic study On Power, articulated a
powerful argument:
Whoever does not wish to render history incomprehensible
by departmentalizing it-political, economic, social-would perhaps take the view that it is in essence a battle of dominant
wills, fighting in every way they can for the material which is
common to everything they construct: the human labour force. 7
There is no evidence that Hale was familiar with de Jouvenel's analysis
-he would surely have quoted him if he had been 7 7 -and he likely
274. Hale Papers, Folder 91-7 at 11. See also id. 58-5 at 3.
275. Id. 91-2 at b.
276. B. DE JOUVENEL, ON POWER 177 (1948).

277. On a card of notes left in Hale's copy of Bernard Shaw's

TEE INTELLIGENT

WOMAN'S GUIDE TO SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM (1928), Hale listed a "quotable paragraph

on compulsory labor under capitalism," from pp. 357-58. Part of the paragraph is as follows:
What governments do at present is to reduce the mass of the people by armed
force to a condition in which they must work for the capitalists or starve, leaving
the capitalists free from any such obligation, so that capitalists can not only be
idle but produce artificial overpopulation by withdrawing labor from productive
industry and wasting it in coddling their idleness or ministering to their vanity.
This our Capitalist Governments call protecting property and maintaining personal
liberty; but Socialists believe that property, in that sense, is theft, and that allowable personal liberty no more includes the right to idle than the right to murder.
The thrust of the paragraph is much the same as that of de Jouvenel's. Hale does not
seem to have actually quoted the paragraph in any of his writings, published or unpublished.
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would not have agreed with some of his other central themes. Nevertheless, one of Hale's major theorems was this: that encompassed within the
system of mutual coercion was the development of institutions utilizing
coercive instruments to organize, discipline and use the human labor
force. In analyzing the logic and role of labor unions, for example, Hale
did not simply juxtapose collective to individual bargaining, but went
deeply into the wage system, which is the modern world's distinctive
mode of organizing and disciplining the industrial work force.
According to Hale, there is a system of labor discipline in all
economies, agricultural and industrial, feudal and capitalist, as well as
socialist, and in all types of modern economic systems whatever their
nomenclature. The fact of the system of pressure, he argued, is more
important for his analysis than the particular institutional methods of
organizing and disciplining labor." 8 But he was most interested in the
system of coercion manifest in the modern system of wage labor. In
the wage system, "[f] or the great majority the only way to acquire the
liberty to consume enough for a livelihood lies through obtaining pur'
chasing power from employers." 279
For the majority, however wide the
choice as to the type of occupation they can enter, since they have "no
independent income, the choice of not entering any occupation is denied . .. .,)28o "[O]ne who does not own sufficient property or money
must resort to some other expedient in order to gain the freedom to enjoy
either the necessities or the luxuries of life. ' 21 ' Thus, "[i]n the ordinary
case a man without money has no other recourse than to accept a job.
He must work for another as the price of obtaining freedom to eat....
[T] he requirement that he must work is a compulsory one since whether
or not he regards the work as an evil, if he does not perform it he must
incur a worse evil. '28 2 There is, therefore, a fundamental and systemic
compulsory element in the workers' need to work for others at a wage
under capitalism or, for that matter, under any modern industrial system.
Hale was familiar with the development of the wage system, including, for example, the long process of evolving a landless working class
during the demise of feudalism and the beginning of the urban and
industrial labor market on an extensive scale. 2' But more conspicuous,
because more current, and more important, because clearly deliberate,
were contemporary developments in Africa which Hale described through
excerpts in his Legal Factors.284 Through these Hale pointed to the
Incidentally, the notes also call attention to a discussion reducing to property for use vis-ivis for power from page 102.
278. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 752 (Dec. 1922).
279. Hale Papers, Folder 91-5 at 12.
280. Id. 93-1 at 30.
281. Id. at 11.
282. Id. at 12.
283. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 128, 132; Hale, Political and Economic Review,
10 A.B.A.J. 51, 52 (Jan. 1924).
284. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 129-34.
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enforced creation of a wage system and labor market as an intentional
result of African land policy imposed by colonial powers, through the
imposition of money taxes on natives coupled with the alienation of land
to Europeans, with the result "that natives, lacking the basis for an
285
independent economic existence, must accept European employment."
As for reform along egalitarian lines, "those who need native labor...
will fight to the uttermost ...

any proposal to make the native areas so

large and so fertile that the economic pressure is reduced which 28now
drives large numbers of natives into the white man's labor market.1 1
In the modern system, the main institutional instrument is the law
of property, coupled with the unequal appropriation of land and accumulation of capital. Hale quoted Justice Pitney's statement in a decision
upholding the "yellow dog" contract that "the vast majority of persons
have no other honest way to begin to acquire property, save by working
for money. ' 281 But itisthe law of property to begin with-coupled with
the unequal distribution of property ownership-which coerces the nonowner to work for wages for the owner of property (or else starve):
"The combination of the restraints contained in the law of property,
with other circumstances, is usually sufficient to make it necessary for
the worker to work. 288
Unless, then, the non-owner can produce his own food, the law
compels him to starve if he has no wages, and compels him to
go without wages unless he obeys the behests of some employer.
It is the law that coerces him into wage-work under penalty of
starvation .... It is the law of property which coerces people

into working for factory owners ...."'
To be prohibited from eating except on condition of performing
certain work is in practice equivalent to being ordered more
directly to do that work. That is precisely what our law of
property does to the propertyless man; it forbids him to do
those things without which he cannot eat, unless he can get the
consent of some owners of food or the owners of land on which
he can produce his own food, and it does not order them to give
their consent.9 0
"The legal restraints on [the workers'] conduct whereby the property
285. Id.

at 131, quoting R.L. BUELL, FORCED LABOR: ITS INTERNATIONAL REGULATION

414-15 (Foreign Policy Ass'n Info. Serv., vol. V, no. 22, Jan. 8, 1930).
286. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 129, quoting R.F.A. HoernIe, Politics in South
Africa, 13 THE NEW REPUBLIC 147 (Dec. 8, 1917). For current policies with the same or

similar purpose, see P.M. Boffey, Japan: A Crowded Nation Wants to Boost its Birthrate,
167 SCIENCE 960 (Feb. 13, 1970), and articles on South Africa in N.Y. Times, April 5, 1970,
at 12 (city ed.) and NEWSWEEK, April 27, 1970, at 40.
287. FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 10 and LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at
1, quoting Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915).
288. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 707, 708 (Nov. 1922).

289. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 473.
290. The Concentration of Wealth, supra note 165, at 279-80. See also Hale Papers,
Folder 59-1 at 2-3.
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rights of all the various property owners are protected, constitute the
indirect sanction which drives them into the employ of the particular
factor owner."1291 "The employer's power to induce people to work for
him depends largely on the fact that the law previously restricts the
liberty of these people to consume, while he has the power, through the
payment of wages, to release them to some extent from these restrictions. ' 12 2 The law of property typically 28 does not compel the worker to
work for any particular employer, but the result of the system of coercion
is "an indirect coercion to work in some one's employ," 294 which is at
the heart of the wage system. The wage system, subtly to be sure, is
thus part of the total system of governance in the real-world version of
Hale's paradigm of mutual coercion.
The right to work, then, is not complete; it is not a right held
against any other person, or imposing on anyone a duty to employ. The
worker does not have the right to work in the factory without the consent
of the owners. If the workers had such a right the system would be quite
different. Hale thus quoted President Harding to the effect that "a free
American has the right to labor without any other's leave," and commented that to so argue "is to insist on a doctrine which involves the
dangerously radical consequences of the abolition of private ownership
of productive equipment or else the equally dangerous doctrine that
everybody should be guaranteed the ownership of some such equipment."2 5 "[I]f the worker has indeed the right to work without the
consent of the owners of factories, then the owners have no power to
enforce discipline in the plants .... "I'
Hale was thus very much aware that the so-called "right to work,"
free of union compulsion, was a right that could exist only within a
broader framework of coercion, whose structure it was the object of
unionization to change and the object of the "yellow dog" contract to
maintain. Despite his own sympathies for unions, Hale was typically
quite neutral in his positive analysis. The existing law of property, he
stated, orders the workers
to work just as effectively as would any anti-strike law, the
penalty for disobedience being starvation; and the choice of
work open to him is often very small.... To deprive him of the
right to strike ... would not turn otherwise free labor into slave
291. Value and Vested Rights, supra note 87, at 525.
292. Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 627.
293. FREE Om THRo GH LAw, supra note 10, at 193-96 and Political and Economic
Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 752 (Dec. 1922), discuss situations in which the choice is narrower.
294. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 137-38.
295. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 638, 639 (Oct. 1922). The text later goes
on to say: "[11f every free American did indeed have a right to work without any other's
leave, then the owners of productive property would be in no position to own the products
and sell them at a profit." Id.
296. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 707 (Nov. 1922).
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labor; it would unless safeguarded deprive him of one means
of bettering his conditions and his pay.2" 7
Moreover there is the absolute need for a system of discipline to
promote production: "Without some kind of compulsion to produce we
might conceivably revert to barbarism... ,29' but, of course, the "compulsion [is] tempered by a degree of counter-coercion," 2 for "the workers can as a rule exert sufficient counter-coercion to limit materially
the governing power of the owners." ' But the countercoercion is still
within the existing wage system. Indeed, the system also disciplines the
property owner:
[W]hile the system of property does compel the propertyless to
work, they might be still worse off without the institution, for
it also furnishes the incentive for much useful work on the part
of owners, work which increases the supply of commodities and
lowers their prices, making even those lowest down in the social
system perhaps better off than they would be in the absence of
that incentive. 0'

"[J] ust as some people are required to work if they would obtain money,
so other people are required to pay money if they would secure the
benefits from other people's work. The employer's factory would have
no value to him unless numerous people operated it. 8' 0 2 "His factory
is valueless unless he can obtain labor. The more numerous the gateways
through which [people] can obtain money, and the more desirous the
the more wages are the
keepers of these gateways to obtain the labor,
80 3
labor.)
their
for
pay
to
likely
owners
various
But one of Hale's most pregnant themes is that the system of mutual
coercion is skewed in favor of the property owner, such that he gains
successorship to the title of the products jointly produced. The worker
is forced to abandon his potential property rights in the product in
exchange for the job and its wages; the finished product becomes the
property of the factory owner or employer. Such an arrangement is as
much taken for granted as the holding of a job as a source of a claim to
income in the modern world; both are part of the wage system. Under
different legal arrangements and/or circumstances, there could be a different pattern of mutual coercion and a different organization of the
human labor force, and possibly a different disposition of title. 0 4 But as
matters stand, "[t]he right of ownership in a manufacturing plant" in297. The Concentration of Wealth, supra note 165, at 280.
298. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 752 (Dec. 1922).
299. Id.
300. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 473.
301. The Concentration of Wealth, supra note 165, at 280.
302. Hale Papers, Folder 93-1 at 12.
303. Value and Vested Rights, supra note 87, at 525.
304. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 752 (Dec. 1922); Political and Economic Review, 10 A.B.A.J. 259 (Dec. 1924).
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cludes an Hohfeldian "power to acquire all the rights of ownership in
the product."3 ° It is conventional that "[o]nce the products of his factory are produced, .. .they [are] treated as the factory owner's prop-

erty,"3 6 for since the owner has the power to deny use of his property,
a power which the law will generally enforce "at his pleasure," the worker
cannot work in the plant "without first getting consent; and that consent
is frequently attainable only on condition of abandoning all claim to
title in the product. ' 30 7 The law treats as owner of the finished product
the property owner, because he has been able to induce all others, through
his withholding capacity,
to relinquish to him all claims to ownership of the goods in
whose production they have participated. Each of these other
participants rendered his contribution to production at the sacrifice of some part of his property rights or some part of his
liberty to make other dispositions of his time, because only in
this way could he acquire the money with which to purchase
a certain amount of freedom (which the law would other wise
deny him) to enjoy goods produced by other people. 0 8
The "worker's abandonment of any property right in the product" 80 9 is
the only way in which he can get to use the equipment of the owner,
"and frequently, in times of unemployment, that consent cannot be
obtained at all. 310
There is a system of mutual coercion independent of unequal wealth
and power; introduction of that inequality means a skewed structure of
mutual coercion and a consequent skewed allocation of resources and
distribution of income. Consideration of the principle of the organization
and use of the human labor force in a wage system underscores the
systemic genesis and quality of mutual coercion. What it further underscores is the fundamental legal bases of the system of mutual coercion.
It is the law of property, coupled with the unequal distribution of ownership, which, Hale showed, structures the organization and use of the
human labor force. We shall now consider the second part of Hale's
legal-economic analysis: his theory of the legal bases of the structure of
power.
III.

THE LEGAL BASES OF ECONOMIC COERCION

Not surprisingly, Hale believed that there are fundamental legal
bases of economic coercion, inevitable legal involvement in economic
305. Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 214.
306. Value and Vested rights, supra note 87, at 526.
307. Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 212.
308. Hale Papers, Folder 90-2 at 2.
309. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 638, 639 (Oct. 1922).
310. Id. "People who cannot find jobs have no freedom to bargain for wages, and
without wages they have very little freedom to consume." Bargaining,Duress, and Economic
Liberty, supra note 74, at 628.
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activity. It was Hale's contention not only that the economy can be
profitably examined and understood as a system of mutual coercion,
but also that the economy, whether seen as a system of mutual coercion
or not, has important legal elements, so that it is possible, and indeed
necessary, to study the legal bases of economic power. Hale argued that
the economy, fundamentally, is at least partially a function of what the
law makes it to be, that, notwithstanding the obtrusiveness of increasingly deliberate political guidance of the market economy, there has
been and is a vast and neglected realm of hitherto generally unobtrusive
legal participation, and that much of it lies behind what is nominally
seen (and studied by economists and extolled by ideologists) as simple
private economic activity. Indeed, he argued in this connection that legal
coercion is often and largely unrecognized in the status quo and that
legal participation is both ubiquitous and inevitable. Moreover, he traced
how the structure of mutual coercion is in part a function of law, including, specifically, that inequality in the asymmetrical system of mutual
coercion is a partial function of law. He thus inferred that not only are
resource allocation and income distribution a function of mutual coercion,
but also, since mutual coercion is a partial function of law, that resource
allocation and income distribution are a partial function of law, quite
aside from whatever role(s) is attributed to the market. Furthermore,
having argued that the results of the operation of the market are a partial
function of the operation of the legal system, he inquired into the problem of the economic interest groups using the legal system (government)
for the attainment of their own objectives, and elicited, from both experience and analysis a principle of the use or control of government.
In other words, if government or legal activity is ubiquitous and inevitable, i.e., if government is available for use, the critical question becomes
that of which interests will use government or will be supported by it.
Finally, Hale argued that the basic substance of legal-economic interrelations, is a matter of policy, contrary to philosophies and ideologies
and interest group rationalizations that pretend or would have it seen
as precluded or given and final-that that "infernal arbitrariness of
choice" is not only truly ineluctable, but is the basic characteristic of
legal-economic affairs. Ergo, who chooses? Stated differently but to the
same effect, the system of interrelations between legal and market
processes is an open-ended general equilibrium system: the economy is
a partial function of law and the legal process is itself a partial function
of economic use. The structure and operation of private government is
partially a function of the structure and operation of public or official
government, and, vice versa, official government is an object of use by
private government.
A.

The Economy as a Function of Law

It is an interesting phenomenon that those who are libertarians and
contemplate the market as the primary device to achieve libertarian goals,
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through reliance on the market as a substitute for and check upon government, tend to denigrate government action involving change (or
certain changes) and, more important here, to ignore the fundamental
legal-governmental involvements in the existing scheme of things, including the market. Whereas, those who are libertarian and contemplate
government as a device-perhaps the primary device-to achieve libertarian goals, through the use of government as a check on private power,
tend to see in government a panacea for problems they want corrected
and, more important here, to emphasize the fundamental legal-governmental involvements in the existing scheme of things, including the
market. What the former obscure, the latter focus upon-fundamental
and already existing legal involvement-and what the former denigrate,
the latter obscure-the use of government, ergo, the question of who is
to use government. But a purely positive analysis, if that be possible,
would have to recognize and work with the facts, and the facts, Hale's
positive analysis maintains, include fundamental legal involvement in
the system of economic coercion. (As will be seen below, Hale was quite
aware that government was not to be considered an independent or external force; that is, that the question of who uses government had to be
squarely faced. He did not see government as deus ex machina.) Coercion
and Distribution,the first really major article by Hale which developed
his legal-economic theories, did not just attempt to demonstrate that
coercion, and distribution as a function of coercion existed in a supposedly noncoercive state, but that the very structure of mutual coercion,
as well as its outcomes, are a function of government action. In it, moreover, Hale was trying to be positivistic; thus, he wrote the editor of
Political Science Quarterly: "Perhaps it may help to clarify some of the
discussion about 'coercion,' and perhaps not. It doesn't seem to me
particularly 'radical,' whatever that term may mean. At least one
could accept
all its conclusions and reconcile them with a plutocratic
11
system.M

It was an implication of laissez-faire, to which Hale was objecting,
namely, the implication that the economy could exist without government and that absent certain improper government activities there would
be laissez-faire. This implication, which was typically drawn even when
it was stipulated that government would protect property, Hale saw as
obscuring the fundamental participation by government in economic
affairs, and obscuring also the question of who would use government
for which purposes, which is also the question of whose property rights
would government secure. It was his view that laissez-faire erred in
taking into account only certain aspects of government as government,
and not others, which would, by taking the latter for granted, allow a
court to conclude that a statute was unconstitutional by "observing only
those aspects of liberty which are struck down by the statute, remaining
311. Letter from R.L. Hale to P.T. Moon, Sept. 4, 1923, in Hale Papers, Folder 86.
See also letter from R.L. Hale to L.L. Fuller, Dec. 24, 1954, at 6-9, in Hale Papers, Folder 76.
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blind to those aspects of it which are enlarged, ' 12 when in fact both
aspects of liberty are antecedently already, at least in part, a function of
government. Laissez-faire does not mean no government, but really governmental indifference to the effects of artificial (meaning artifactual)
coercive restraints partly grounded in government itself.313
1.

THE NECESSITY AND UBIQUITY OF GOVERNMENT (LEGAL)

ACTION

What Hale first insisted upon is the fact of the almost universal
failure to acknowledge the extant economic role of government, with
respect to both its ubiquity and its necessity. In the so-called free market
economy, he said, there is "more coercion, and government and law . . .
[playing] a more significant part, than is generally realized:814 Such
a situation "is not governmental laissez-faire, though conventionally
described as such." 31 In other words, while certain freedoms (volitional
freedom elements) are in fact both determined and curtailed by law,
they are not seen as such. Certain actions, such as the coercion exercised
through the law of property, are so taken for granted that we do not see
them for what they are: government per se. "We're so used to this
restraint on our liberty that we are hardly conscious of its existence.
And if it is called to our attention we complacently think it applies to
us all equally."31 But the role of government is vast even under a
theoretical laissez-faire regime, and, as will be seen below, it does not
and cannot apply to all equally. To overcome the neglect of the fact
of the actual economic role of government was long one of Hale's
motivations in his legal-economic work.
The thrust of his affirmative argument, then, is the ubiquity and
necessity of government or legal action. It was precisely this point, it
will be remembered, for which Stone and Cohen cited Hale.31 7 As Rose,
who quoted Stone on Hale, put it, Freedom Through Law was the "full
statement of this theory of law as the activating principle of our econ,,318 This emphasis is a leitmotif of all of Hale's writings on
omy ....
legal economics: "As a result of governmental and private coercion under
what is mistakenly called laissez faire, the economic liberty of some is
curtailed to the advantage of others, while the economic liberty of all is
curtailed in some degree.

8 19

"[T]he courts have been blind to the fact

that much of the private power over others is in fact delegated by the
state, and that all of it is 'sanctioned' in the sense of being permitted.
This power permeates the entire economic system .... ""'
312.
313.
314.
315.

Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, supra note 80, at 155.
Hale Papers, Folder 39-26 at 2. See also id. 90-4 at 1-2.
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 603.
Hale Papers, Folder 91-2 at b.

316. Id. 56-2 at 2.
317. See text at notes 15-17 supra.
318. Rose, supra note 15, at 958.

319. Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 626.
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Private activity thus determines largely the course of economic life. Our individual aptitudes, energies and tastes have
much to do with the economic role which each of us plays, and
with the shaping of the economic environment which surrounds
us. But they are not the sole determining factors. Even were
the government to confine its functions to those which Adam
Smith would have it perform, the economic activity of private
individuals would still be largely determined by government.
Private individuals act, in their bargaining, within the limits
set by law, as well as those set by other private individuals.
The government's function of protecting property serves to
delegate power to the owners to bargain more effectively with
others. Were the result merely to enable each to withhold the
products of his own labor, or those which other producers had
transferred to him in return for his services, thus enabling him
to acquire the equivalent in value of what he had produced,
even then it would be by virtue of government that he would
be able to acquire this equivalent. Government would be pursuing a definite economic policy of distributing wealth according
to the value of each person's activities, and rejecting alternative
policies of distributing it according to sacrifice or according to
needs. But the protection of property rights-the delegation of
the power to withhold material wealth from others-is not confined to rights in things which the owner has himself produced
or acquired by exchange from those who have produced them.
Property rights are protected in things which no one at all
has produced, such as land and natural resources, and in things
whose producers are no longer living. One who acquires property by inheritance . . . does not acquire the property in ex-

change for the products of his own activities. In extending
property rights to land and to the things whose former owners
have died, the law is pursuing a different economic policy from
that of distributing wealth to those who have produced its
equivalent in value. Whatever policies the law pursues in deciding how land shall originally pass into private ownership, or
what disposition shall be made of the property of the dead,
will have a determining effect on the future course of private
bargaining. For the law is dealing to the private players the
hands with which they are to proceed with the game of bargaining. Yet, unless all land is to be publicly owned, and all property to go to the state when the owner dies, the state must
perforce exercise this significant influence in economic affairs.
And if all land and all the property of decedents were to pass
to the state, the state would exercise a still more significant
influence. 2 1
In enforcing contract and property rights the state is restricting the liberty of those who have incurred contractual
320. Force and the State, supra note 56, at 199.
321. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 656.
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obligations and of nonowners. When the owners are in a position to require nonowners to accept conditions as the price of
obtaining permission to use the property in question, it is the
state that is enforcing compliance, by threatening to continue
to forbid the use of the property unless the owner's terms are
met. When the state threatens to withhold other privileges
unless its own terms are met, its enforcement of the terms by
this threat is sometimes recognized as state compulsion, subject
to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment-as in those
cases in which it has been stated that a state may not condition
the grant of a privilege on "the relinquishment of a constitutional right." It is just as much governmental action when the
conditions are formulated by a private owner, to whom the
state, in the routine enforcement of property rights, has delegated the power to formulate them.
Only in extreme cases, however, does the Supreme Court
recognize the role played by the state. If that role were fully
recognized, the dogma of the nondelegability of legislative power
would have to be overhauled. So, too, would the dogma of unconstitutional conditions; for owners can frequently insist that
others, as a condition of acquiring or using property, must pay
them money, or render them services, or do other acts which the
state could not constitutionally compel them to do by direct
sanctions. To hold such state implementation of property rights
unconstitutional would leave little of the whole system of bargaining on which we largely rely, both for calling forth the
efforts essential for the collective production of goods and for
each individual's acquisition of such liberty as he may attain
to consume material goods once they have been produced. 22
These long excerpts hopefully show the subtleties of Hale's argument.
The concept of "state action,"32' 8 for example, is but an emanation of
Hale's more general analysis of the legal bases of the economic system.
The line between private and public may well be nonexistent except in
the imagination nurtured by ideology, interest, and habit.
Government, or the legal process broadly contemplated as a form of
social control, is thus necessary and inevitable. "While governments can
shut their eyes to the consequences, they cannot avoid meddling with
economic matters.3 24 Whether it is through taxation2 8 or through expenditures, 2 6 government cannot avoid an economic influence. But even
more fundamental is the role of government in structuring the distribu322.
323.
324.
325.

FREFDo THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 380.
Id. at 368.
Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 638 (Oct. 1922).
Hale Papers, Folder 59-1 at 4-5; LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 426, 436, 437;
FREDOm THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 239.
326. Letter from R.L. Hale to L.L. Fuller, Dec. 24, 1954, at 9-10, in Hale Papers,
Folder 76.
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tion of private power. It is a "common mistake," wrote Hale to suppose
that the ongoing
statutory restrictions on property rights constitute the essence
of the relation of government to property and industry. Far
more fundamental is the relation which government bears to
industry even in the absence of these restrictions. The right of
property is itself a product of government activity in restraining the activities of non-owners .... 827
Such statutory restriction also means expansion of someone else's freedom; but more basic is the fact that government is not thereby intruding
into a situation in which it had hitherto been absent, but rather, it had
been involved already and is now only changing the interests which it
is supporting.32 8 As Hale saw it, "the government is accountable for the
economic relations between groups, no matter what it does. Its rules, the
rules of law, determine who owns what. ' 8 29 Of the person who pleads
that the laws of economic life-e.g., supply and demand-should be
allowed to work unhampered by government, Hale asked:
[W]hat is this law of supply and demand? Is it not a description of how prices are fixed in the process of exchange? And
what, strictly speaking, are exchanged? Legal titles to land and
chattels, as a rule. And to say I have legal title to a thing is
but a short way of saying that the law stands ready, at my
initiative, to interfere with anyone else who touches that thing,
but not with me. This means government action. How, then,
327. Id. at 79.
328. [Clonscious attempts of government to alter the economic pattern have been
thought to involve the introduction of coercion into a sphere where complete freedom prevailed before.
This illusion was further fostered by the reasoning of the English classical
economists, beginning with Adam Smith in 1776, who sought to establish the conclusion that the most desirable economic results ensured when the government took
no steps to modify the results of the bargaining process. The state, in this view,
should preserve order, protect property and enforce contracts. But, in hewing to
the line of these proper functions, it should let the economic chips fall where they
might. They could be counted on, without political guidance, to fall where they
would do the most good.
These writers did not observe that in enforcing property rights, the government
was in fact intruding into the picture by delegating to the owners power to exact
conditions for legal release of the freedom of the nonowners to use the necessities
of life. Still less did they observe that even when a man exacted conditions for
not withholding his own services, he was exacting them by compulsion, and was
thus bringing to bear a power of government derived, not in this case from the
political state, but from his own ability to withhold.
Id. 93-1 at 31. While Hale is here correctly reflecting the conventional (and ideological)
interpretation of the classical economists, it is not an accurate description of the theory of
the classicists themselves. See SAamuELs, supra note 28. Indeed, the statement quoted in the
text at note 321 supra is textual introduction to material from John Stuart Mill's perceptive
statement of the role of property and the relation of the state to property rights. See LGAL
FAcTORS, supra note 11, at 657-60. Hale introduced the Mill material by saying that "[e]ven
at the height of Adam Smith's influence, John Stuart Mill . . . was aware that the state
must perform functions, and make decisions of economic policy, other than the simple ones
contemplated by the advocates of laissez faire." Id. at 656.
329. Hale Papers, Folder 59-1 at 1.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

is it possible for the law of' supply
and demand to work "un80
hampered by Government? ".
We shall see below that the one case which Hale found to be perhaps the
31
most instructive on legal-economic interrelations, Miller v. Schoene,1
served to emphasize the basic legal involvement in the structuring of
mutual coercion through the legal selection between claimants to private
rights. Thus, the " 'normal' exercise of liberty"3 21 actually and inevitably
involves "wholesale" government participation "in the form of the protection of property [and other] rights. 33
From this analysis Hale concluded that, given the fact of the already
existing and necessary economic role of government, state activity, even
state activism, is not statism, unless that term is to be used in a grossly
misleading way. He was quite insistent that
[t] here is no a priori reason for regarding planned governmental
intervention in the economic sphere as inimical to economic
liberty, or even to that special form of it known as free enterprise. We shall have governmental intervention anyway, even
if unplanned, in the form of the enforcement of property rights
assigned to different individuals according to legal rules laid
down by the government. It is this unplanned governmental
intervention which restricts economic liberty so drastically and so
unequally at present. 84
He wrote to Lon L. Fuller:
My analysis ...

leads me to conclude that governmental coer-

cion accounts for the distribution of economic freedoms when
the government takes no steps to modify the results of the
market as well as when it takes such steps. "Statism" is involved in the system misnamed laisser faire as much as in a
system where economic inequalities are consciously mitigated. 3 '
Thus, he concluded the first chapter, "Economic Liberty and the
State," of Freedom Through Law with the argument that "[f]urther
state intervention to alter the distribution of rights and liberties, to
the advantage of those whose liberty [has been previously] most restricted as a result, in part, of state action cannot be properly described
as 'statism' in any obnoxious sense." This is the case, he maintained,
even though "[t]here may ...

be good reasons of policy against disturb-

ing" the existing distribution of liberties. " 6 As he had said in Coercion
330. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 707 (Nov. 1922).
331. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
332. Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, supra note 80, at 156.
333. Economic Theory and the Statesman, supra note 38, at 224.
334. Bargaining,Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 628.
335. Letter from R.L. Hale to L.L. Fuller, Dec. 24, 1954, at 13, in Hale Papers,
Folder 76.
336. FREEDOm TimOUcH LAW, supra note 10, at 12.
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and Distribution three decades earlier, changing the distribution of rights
and liberties
would neither add to nor subtract from the constraint which is
exercised with the aid of government. It would merely transfer
the constraining power to a different set of persons. It might
result in greater or in less actual power of free initiative all
round, but this sort of freedom is not to be confused with the
337
"freedom" which means absence of governmental constraint.
As he had written in some notes, "[t]o get perspective, we must see the
effect of these [changes] in [the] context of preexisting restraints, legal
and extralegal." 3 8 It is on reasoning such as this that he based his
argument, a blend of positive and normative reasoning, that
[t] he only appropriate safeguards against abuse of private governing power would be intervention of the recognized political
state in the economic sphere. It is intervention by the political
state that largely accounts for the governing power of private
rulers in the first place. Further intervention might curb abuses
power, if it could be so devised as not to result in worse
of their
39
3

ones.
2.

THE SYSTEM OF MUTUAL COERCION AS A FUNCTION OF LAW

Hale's next major theorem on the economy as a function of law has
been, of necessity, anticipated above quite frequently, and is directly
implicit in his argument that government is necessary and ubiquitous
because of its fundamental involvement in the adjudication and other
determination of private rights. "It assigns, as well as enforces, legal
rights."34 Inasmuch as these private legal rights constitute no small part
of the wherewithall with which people engage in mutual coercion, Hale
maintained that the actual system and structure of mutual coercion is
a direct, albeit partial, function of the legal system. It is, indeed, precisely
because the structure of mutual coercion is a function of law, that Hale
affirmed the absence of any descriptive accuracy in the laissez-faire
ideology and asserted the importance of studying directly-and not
taking for granted or obscuring-the interests and coercive capacities
supported by law. While many individuals' position in the market is
conspicuously a function of their energy and enterprise, as well as their
good fortune, for most people, most of the time, their market position of
freedom and exposure to the freedom of others depends upon the legal
weapons at their disposal. Their coercive capacity for both defensive
and offensive purposes is directly tied (however unobtrusively or in
337. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 478.
338. Hale Papers, Folder 83-5 at 3.
339. Id. 80-16 at 6.
340. Letter from R.L. Hale to L.L. Fuller, Dec. 24, 1954, at 11, in Hale Papers,
Folder 76.
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ignorance) to the legal actions which they can--or can threaten tobring successfully. 4' Productivity in the market (i.e., one's ability to
command exchange value in the market) as a function of power, for
example, is, thus, very much dependent upon one's legal status.
Throughout all of Hale's legal-economic writings, then, he was preoccupied with the ways in which the structure of mutual coercion, and
therefore the structure of volitional freedom, is a product of legal action,
both obtrusive and unobtrusive. As Emerson put it, Hale expanded upon
"the role played by government in controlling the exercise of conflicting
economic liberties through upholding or restricting the use of economic
pressures. '842 Thus, Hale insisted that "[i] n passing on all ... questions
of labor law the courts frequently determine very delicate questions as
to the extent and manner in which the distribution of economic power
may be altered through the pressure of bargaining between employers
and employees. '3 48 As with the struggle between labor and capital, so
throughout the market, always epitomized by the role of property and
contract law, "[o]ne endowed with contractual and property rights of
great magnitude has power to force others to conform to some of the
conditions he may lay down as the price of relaxing the control his rights
844
give him over their liberty.
In all such cases, particular legal rights and duties are
created at the initiative of private individuals. But they are
created (or modified or extinguished) by virtue of the power
of mutual coercion (in the form of pre-existing rights) vested
by the ordinary law in the two contracting parties .... When
the rights and privileges which one party possesses are vastly
superior in strategic importance to those possessed by the other
. .. , the other party may in effect be compelled to submit by
contract to almost any terms imposed by the stronger party.
That is, the weaker party, whose previous legal restrictions are
intolerable, may
incur new restrictions as the price of escape
8 45
from the old.
This is the case, it will be remembered, not only when markets are
so imperfect that the two parties are facing each other directly in a test
of strength (as in duopoly), but also in the competitive market where
the results of the operation of the market are a function of, and skewed
by, the different legal rights and privileges of the parties. Notice, too,
the dynamics of Hale's model: given the particular legal rights at any
point in time, the mutual coercive capacity allowed thereby enables the
341. Hale, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OP THE SOCIL SCIENCES, supra note 52, at 670-71.
342. Emerson, supra note 12, at 139. See also Rose, supra note 15, at 958-59; T. Broden,
Book Review, 28 NonE DAME L. REV. 435 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Broden].
343. Hale, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 52, at 671.
344. Hale Papers, Folder 91-7 at 11.
345. Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, supra note 34, at 452.
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coercive creation of new rights, which alter the structure of mutual coercion, which further alters the generation of new rights.
a. The System of Mutual Coercion as Asymmetrical:
Inequality as a Function of Law
But if the structure of mutual coercion, and therefore of volitional
freedom, is a function of law, it tends to follow that, since those structures are marked by inequality, then the inequality may be at least a
partial function of law. Yet this inference flies in the face of the conventional belief or principle that all enjoy legal equality or equality
before the law. Hale long maintained that the maxim of equality before
the law notwithstanding, inequality was produced by law, and not only
as an empirical fact, but also as a necessary phenomenon. Equality before
the law was to Hale simply impossible. One's contracting position is not
free and devoid of status (as in the argument contained in Maine's
logic of from status to contract), but rather is a partial function of one's
rights and duties, and, while rights impose duties, they are not equally
distributed; different individuals have different legal status by virtue of
the operation of law. The very first paragraph of Coercion and Distribution maintains that
the systems advocated by professed upholders of laissez-faire
[sic] are in reality permeated with coercive restrictions of
individual freedom, and with restrictions, moreover, out of
conformity with any formula of "equal opportunity" or of "preserving the equal rights of others." Some sort of coercive
restriction of individuals, it is believed, is absolutely unavoidable, and
cannot be made to conform to any "Spencerian
8 46
formula. 1
Hale's argument is so important and so eloquently stated as to warrant
quotation in detail. It is important, that is, not because the paradigm
of mutual coercion depends on it, but because inequality, and particularly
inequality as a function of law, is the main empirical characteristic of
the extant American, and any, economic system, and because, also, to the
extent that this inequality is necessary, the paradigm of mutual coercion
is inevitably marked by it.
Hale's argument was elaborately stated in his 1927 essay Economics
and Law:
It is often asserted that the policy back of the institution
of property (hence the policy against any but the most imperatively necessary statutory modifications thereof) is the policy
of equality before the law. If this means that all have the same
legal rights and duties it is clearly untrue in anything but name,
346. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 470.
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...for

the duty not to trespass is a duty the content of which is
different for each person. And to say that these different duties
of each person are equal is meaningless, unless it be specified in
what respect they are equal. Certainly they are not equal in
economic significance. They are at most equal in the sense that
any one who can show the existence of a right will get the same
sort of legal protection as will any one else who can show the
existence of the same sort of right in himself. But in that sense
of the word, they would remain just as equal after any proposed
statutory modification of property as they were before. In fact,
it would be difficult to conceive a legal system on which that
sort of equality could not be predicated. Even in feudal times
any one who could show that he had the rights of a lord could
get just as favorable treatment as any one else who could show
he had the same rights.
Frequently, however, it is maintained that the unequal
property rights are the outcome of the equal application of
equal rules governing the acquisition of titles. Any one may
acquire property by producing it or by voluntary contractual
transfer, it is said; to put statutory restrictions on the terms
which persons may incorporate in their contracts would be to
disturb this equality of the opportunity to acquire property
with all its incidents; it would be to revert from contract to
status as the basis of our legal relationships. But the opportunity to acquire property by production is not equal unless all
are equally at liberty to produce it; and he who owns no raw
materials or apparatus is guilty of trespass if he produces without the consent of some one who does own them. And there
never was a time when all had approximately equal property
rights in the means of production. As for the opportunity to
acquire property by contract, here again there is no equality,
since the man who starts with valuable property rights has a
greater opportunity to acquire more than does he who starts
without much property. There never was a time when all
started with the same. . . . Equality before the law, then is
not consistent with unequal property rights. And equal property rights would be almost an impossibility.... But the social
and economic policy which requires the continuance of a large
degree of the inequality inherent in our property system does
not preclude all7 modifications of that inequality. In fact, it may
4
require many.
Hale's basic point, then, is that formal legal equality must be juxtaposed
to the actual inequality in the ownership of whatever is given the legal
status of property, and that the dynamics of the system involve no time
in which such ownership was (say, originally) equally distributed. Opposition to statutory revision of property rights, he argued, "assumes
347. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 135-36.
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the preexisting common-law equality of personal liberty and property
rights. And it is this assumption which breaks down on examination.
There is no equality before the law, there never has been, and it is
difficult to conceive how there could be.13 48 "The law of property both
restricts and liberates everyone, but not to an equal degree .... )349
"The benefits conferred by these rights are not equal in any important
sense. They are equal at most in the sense that the manner of their
enforcement may be the same, if even this is true."3 0 The critical matter
is the unequal distribution of property: "Bargaining power would be
different were it not that the law endows some with rights that are more
advantageous than those with which it endows others." ' ' "The owner
of commercially valuable property gets a much greater degree of 'liberty'
than does the propertyless man whose liberty to use that property is
denied. ' 352 "The facts are that 'liberty' in the sense of legal restraint is
not accorded to all alike and cannot be as long as property is not equally
distributed-an obviously impractical condition." 358 Economic inequalities ... are embodied in unequal legal rights. 54 As was often his practice,
he stated the argument in terms of employee-employer relations:
In what respect is the "right" of the employee to terminate the
employment relationship "equal" to the "right" of the employer
to do so? Are they equal in their consequences to the other
party? Can the employee, by quitting, inflict as severe a loss
on the employer as the employer can inflict on the employee by
discharging? If not, do the respective "rights" of employer and
employee give them equal control over each other?""
In other words, the right to quit and the right to fire appear symmetrical,
but because of unequal legal assignment of property rights, their economic significance is asymmetrical. Again, the argument is elaborated
in terms of property and contract rights:
348. Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, supra note 80, at 157.
"[Elvery person is at the same time an owner of some and a non-owner of other property.
Hence the institution of ownership constitutes for everyone both a curtailment of some sort
of liberty and an enlargement of some other sort of liberty." Id. at 157. But the distribution
of ownership is unequal. "Hence, whatever protection the Constitution affords to property
serves to protect those who have property . . . though perhaps at the expense of those who
have less property." FREEDOM THROuGH LAW, supra note 10, at 196.

349. Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, supra note 80, at 157.
To say that the law must not materially restrict the normal exercise of personal
liberty or property rights except as incidental to some other and paramount object,
is, then, a contradiction in terms, if by "normal" is meant "equal," for property

rights themselves restrict the equal exercise of personal liberty, including liberty of
contract.

Id. at 158.
350. Id.

351. Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 627-28.
352. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 752 (Dec. 1922).
353. Political and Economic Review, 10 A.B.A.J. 882, 884 (Dec. 1924). See also id.
at 885.
354. FRaEoom TmoRUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 12.
355. LEoA FACTORS, supra note 11, at 633.
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[T]here is not a single income-yielding property right . . .
which can be enjoyed on equal terms by everyone. To speak of
equal rights of property is ridiculous. Is the right of property
of some unemployed tramp equal to the right of property of the
owner of the La Salle Hotel? If all have equal property rights,
why are the courts so occupied with disputes over the title to
property?
Perhaps it is meant that all have equal rights to acquire
property? But what is the nature of a "right to acquire property?" It is not an enforceable right.8 6
Thus, he spoke of the "fallacy in the assumption that all.., have equal
rights or equal practical opportunities of acquiring property." ' Hale
wrote to John P. Frank:
We don't have equal rights. Each of us has his own unique set
of property and contract rights, and they aren't equal in any
significant sense. The law permits certain acts to be done by
the owner of property, and holds the same acts illegal if done
by anyone else; and the law plays a part in assigning the unequal property rights to different persons. I don't see how this
can correctly be called equality before the law. The law simply
can't treat all equally."'
The nuances being subtle, let us examine some further statements on
this matter by Hale, even at the risk of further repetition of some points.
Notice, for example, the implications he drew from the difference
between formal equality and actual inequality, or from de jure vis-A-vis
de facto rights, in terms of abstract vis-A-vis concrete rights:
The premise of legal equality ... [is] in fact fallacious,
for legal rights, privileges and duties depend on property rights
and these depend on the law. Each person has a legal duty not
to infringe any other person's property rights, a privilege to use
what he himself owns and a right to exclude everyone else therefrom except on his own terms. These statements, however, are
empty abstractions until it is specified to what particular objects
the property rights of each attach; when it is so specified the
specious equality disappears .... The respective legal rights of
A and B are equal only in the most formal and empty sense.
. . .The ultimate economic position of each person is not so
rigidly predetermined at birth as in the feudal system, but the
law still imposes vastly unequal handicaps. 6 9
356. Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 212.
357. Id. at 213.
358. Letter from R.L. Hale to J.P. Frank, Dec. 8, 1949, at 1, in Hale Papers, Folder 42.
See also FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 15; the second chapter is entitled "The
Legal Bases of Economic Inequality."
359. Hale, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 52, at 667-68.
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In the original manuscript of this article, too long for publication in full,
the following lines continued this argument:
Many of these legal inequalities serve a useful purpose, as in
furnishing incentives to productive activity, useful even to the
least favored. But useful or not, it is difficult to see how there
can be said to be equality in that part of the law which imposes
on each the duty not to infringe the unequal property rights of
each of the others.860
Also,
when the law says it is your duty not to use "my" property, or
any other property except what is "yours," you cannot tell
what is forbidden you until you learn what the law makes
((your" property and what it makes the property "of others."
Your duty not to take "my" property, and my right not to have
you take it, are entirely meaningless unless the law has already
apportioned specific property rights to me.... Any such complete statements of the respective legal duties and rights of
different persons in respect to property would disclose the inequality with which the law applies to different persons. It is
only when the law is stated incompletely, as requiring everyone
to desist from the unauthorized use of anyone else's property,
that the illusion of equality before the law is produced. 61
Hale drew the further conclusion that since inequality is both inevitable
and a function of law, then "[n]o particular set of inequalities ... can
be said to be the necessary result of the existence of private property
and of (otherwise) free contract." ' 2 Just as there is no unique Pareto
optimum, and just as whatever Pareto optimum emerges will be a partial
function of the state of the law, 8
[a]s there is no one set of inequalities that must necessarily
flow from property and contract, it cannot be asserted dogmatically that a statutory rearrangement of the existing inequalities will necessarily involve more restriction on liberty
and more impairment of property rights than the reverse. It
may merely have the effect of weakening the liberty and property of the more favored to strengthen the liberty and property
of the less favored. 64
Thus, in Freedom Through Law's discussion of "the power to restrict
one liberty in order to expand another," Hale agreed that it is true
that certain
360. Hale Papers, Folder 48-1 at 4-5.
361. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 605.

362. Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, supra note 80, at 160.
363. Mishan, supra note 102.
364. Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, supra note 80, at 160.
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inequalities were the result of the coexistence of "the right of
private property and the right of free contract." But they were
not the "necessary" or "inevitable" results. Property acquired
by government grant or by inheritance is not acquired as a
result of freedom of contract. Had government pursued a different policy for the assignment to private ownership of natural
resources or the distribution of decedents' estates, the coexistence of private property and freedom of contact would have
resulted in quite a different pattern of economic inequalities.
Under such circumstances that different pattern would have
been quite as "inevitable" a result of private property and
freedom of contact, as the present pattern was under existing
circumstances.8 65
This is true not only of land and inheritance, but of all rights enforced
by government.
Hale's argument that inequality is a function of law goes much
deeper than the stipulation that unequal distribution of property (and
other rights) means unequal legal status. There is also the subtle, but
vastly important, asymmetry (and therefore inequality) between the
respective legal statuses accorded to those with established rights and
to those with established duties, or to those with elements of volitional
freedom and to those exposed to such elements:
There are many, however, who would alter the bargaining
process in this way or in that, in the belief that the market
itself can be changed, either directly or indirectly, in such a
way that those who are now economically weak may have more
freedom from the pressures exerted by the strong, and greater
protection for their money or other property from the bargaining power of the strong. When any such belief becomes
embodied in legislation, however, we encounter a curious paradox. The legislation gives protection to the liberty and property
of some persons against the coercive acts of others. Against
such coercion, since it is not recognized as stemming from government, the Constitution by itself affords no protection. But
this coercive power of the others is part of the liberty and
property which the Constitution does protect against governmental action, and the legislation which curtails it is undeniably
governmental action. Therefore, while those who are deprived
of liberty or property by the coercive power of other private
persons can make no appeal at all to the Constitution for protection, those who deprive them of their liberty or property can
invoke it, in the very name of liberty and property, to preserve
their power to deprive others of these same things. 66
365. FREEDOm THRouGH LAw, supra note 10, at 393. The words quoted by Hale are
from Justice Pitney's opinion in Coppage v. Kansas. See id. at 391-92.
366. Id. at 132. A similar inequality was found by Hale in the operation of common
law on labor-capital relations:
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Thus, not only does the assignment of common law rights result in
legally protected economic inequality, but also the Constitution reenforces
the protection of established rights-to the asymmetrical disadvantage
of those whose coercive capacity is thereby injured-in such a way as to
further legal and economic inequality. The distribution of coercive
capacity is skewed in favor of those whose claims against others are
given legal status first: their coercive position is protected against governmental and private infringement, while those who are thereby coercively disadvantaged are not similarly protected against them. Those
who get that protection first and those who do not have constitutionally
unequal protection of their "liberty" and their "property." Again, it is
the particular rights which count and not the "right of property" in the
abstract; property rights mean established rights, and those have a
status in law superior to those not yet recognized-legal advantage.
(The state action doctrine would, in Hale's view, enable the extension
of constitutional protection to those rights not yet recognized, because
private legal rights are a function of state action, thereby overcoming
the problem of whose rights were secured by law first. Indeed, the very
fact that they were secured by law first is the effective basis of the
invocation of constitutional protection: they are the result of state action.
But the problem would inevitably remain as to who would have which
rights, which coercive capacity, which freedom and which exposure to
the freedom of others. The state action doctrine only enables the broader
consideration of claims to relative rights.)
This is a convenient point at which to acknowledge-and all that
we can really do here is to acknowledge-the legal materials with which
Hale documented his analysis. Most of Hale's writings in legal economics
dealt with legal materials, which is to say that he based his argument
that the structure of private power is a function of law (and other arguments) on detailed examinations of common law and constitutional law
doctrines and decisions. It is the holdings in these cases which he used
to show how, whatever the legal doctrine or constitutional clause invoked
or interpreted, there is judicially determined advantage or disadvantage
in bargaining position, often under the color of legal equality. Thus,
much of Freedom Through Law and his other writings, including the
collection of materials in Legal Factors, are an attempt to substantiate
and illustrate his arguments by examining and analyzing such areas as
By refusing to apply the prima facie tort doctrine (the doctrine that intentional infliction of damage is actionable unless justified to non-feasance, by
treating the termination of an employment relationship as non-feasance, while
treating a combination to terminate it as affirmative conduct, except when the
combination is by the officers of a corporation hidden behind the corporate fiction,
the law has worked out to put more obstacles in the way of the bargaining power
of employees than of employers.
LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 96. This type of subtle intrusion of legal inequality is
documented throughout both FREEDOM TnHROUGH LAW, supra note 10, and LEGAL FACTORS,
supra note 11. See the following paragraph in the text.
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the following: prima facie tort, damnum absque injuria and tort law
generally, contract impairment, unconstitutional conditions, involuntary
servitude, public utility rates, state action, wage and hour legislation
(protective labor legislation) and labor relations legislation and law,
property rights, privileges and immunities, due process of law (substantive and procedural) and equal protection of the law, the law of combinations, harmful nonfeasance and conspiracies, duress, judicial review,
police power (including vis-h-vis eminent domain), nondelegability of
legislative power, federalism, and so on. The purpose of this essay is to
present Hale's analyses of the economy as a system of power and the
legal bases thereof. It is not possible, nor is it desirable, to survey in
detail his analyses of common and constitutional law-but his evidentiary
materials were primarily those bodies of law, and his theories and arguments were distilled, insofar as they are presented here, from his analyses
of those materials.
3.

RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION AS A
FUNCTION OF LAW

Another major theorem of Hale's analysis, also already anticipated,
is that insofar as resource allocation and income distribution are a function of mutual coercion, and inasmuch as mutual coercion is a partial
function of law, then resource allocation and income distribution are a
partial function of law. This stands in marked juxtaposition to the mainstream of orthodox economics (though not institutional economics) which,
largely taking the legal system as a given, concentrates upon the market
element in their determination. More elaborately stated, but still in
summary form, Hale's arguments are as follows: that wealth distribution
is a partial function of law; that income distribution is a partial function
of law, largely because both wealth distribution per se and the structure
of mutual coercion (which itself is a partial function of wealth distribution) are generally a partial function of law; and that the allocation of
resources is also a partial function of law, including therein the ideas
that relative costs, risk distribution and the relative realization of economic interests are all a partial function of the law. In sum, if the basic
economic problems of resource allocation and income distribution (Hale
had almost nothing to say on the third problem of the determination of
aggregate income, or macroeconomics) are resolved in a market economy
through the price mechanism, the resolutions are partially what they are
-and in Hale's view this meant in no small part, however indirectbecause of the state of the law. Although most of Hale's writings dealt
with legal materials and commentators, the neglect of the role of the
law in these mitters by orthodox economic theory, attributable to a
narrow definition of the scope of relevant variables and to the varying
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ideological component of orthodox economic theory, 0 7 was quite evident
to him.
No small amount of the foregoing has been to the effect that, in the
system of bargaining which characterizes the market economy, "all . ..
[the] pulling and hauling by various people to whom the law gives power
'
accounts for the distribution of wealth among people."868
Hale put it
more elaborately but still succinctly:
Most of our present distribution of wealth is the result of
the relative power, latent or active, of various individuals and
groups. The power itself is derived in part from the law's more
or less blind and haphazard distribution of favors and burdens,
in the shape of powers over others and obligations to others.8 6 9
Thus, as Hale wrote in a manuscript dating from 1914-1915, "[o]ur
whole distribution of wealth is quite obviously the result of our lawsnot solely of the laws, but such that if the laws were different so would
also be the distribution." 7 ' His reasoning was in large part that since
much or most of wealth has market value because of the state's assignment and enforcement of property (and other) rights, then it is perfectly
obvious that the distribution of wealth is a partial function of the law,
e.g., of property, both in general and in detail. Wealth is (or tends to be)
power; and wealth is a matter of property and other rights, which are a
function of law.8 '
367. "Thoroughgoing laissez-faire has long since been repudiated by economists, but
economic theory of the present day has developed out of the older laissez-faire theory."
Economic Theory and the Statesman, supra note 38, at 224.

368. Hale Papers 59-1 at 3-4. See also

FREEDOM THROUGH LAW,

supra note 10, at ch.

2; Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 137-39; Letter from R.L. Hale, to M. Hale,
July 29, 1913, at 5, in Hale Papers, not in folder; Political and Economic Review, 8
A.B.A.J. 638 (Oct. 1922).
369. Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, supra note 34, at 455. In his review of
Hale's FREEDOm THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, Harvey C. Mansfield wrote that, according
to Hale, "the state is the necessary partner in the establishment of every individual in his
unique and unequal estate, rich or poor, and in every decision by which he comes to terms
with those who can help him to what he wants or those who can get what they want by
driving him toward what he seeks to avoid..
" Mansfield, Book Review, 287 THE ANNALS
189 (May 1953).
370. Hale Papers, Folder 49-1 at 1.
371. Hale concluded the second chapter of Freedom Through Law, on the legal bases
of inequality, with the mandate that "[s]ince inequality in wealth results from inequalities
in the coercive bargaining power of the different members of the community and since the
bargaining power of each individual is conditioned by his legal rights and duties as defined
by the courts, it becomes pertinent to inquire into the protection which the courts afford
to one man's economic liberty against the coercive power of other individuals or of the
government-whether in proclaiming rules of the common law or in giving authoritative

interpretation to the provisions of the Constitution."

FREEDOm THROUGH LAW,

supra note

10, at 37. The second part of Freedom Through Law thus surveys and analyzes common
law adjustments of conflicting economic liberties; the third part, the protection which the
Constitution affords to economic liberty and equality; and the fourth part, political processes
for adjusting conflicting liberties. See also id., at chs. 5, 10, passim; Emerson, supra note 12,

at 139. Thirty years earlier, Hale had written: "Ownership is an indirect method whereby
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With the distribution of wealth a partial function of law and with
the structure of mutual coercion a function of law, then it also follows
that the distribution of income is a partial function of law. Income in
the market is derived from prices received from the sale of goods and
services, and "the bargaining power to exact a price for the use of
property stems from the state's restriction of the liberty of nonowners
to make unauthorized use of the property.13

72

This is true not only of

income from property, but also of income from labor. Generalizing, Hale
stated that "some men have law-given rights over others which enable
them to collect large incomes from the community, others have law-given
rights which enable them to collect little or nothing at all. ' 3 73 As has
been discussed in considerable detail earlier, one's ability to derive income in the market is a function of one's coercive capacity, and that
varies between the owner and the nonowner, between the large and the
small owner, and from circumstance to circumstance, including market
conditions. Such is the case not only in general, but in the details of the
legal-rights-based capacity to exert coercive pressure in and across particular markets, for, it is "[t]hese pressures . . . [which] enable each
person to obtain such share as he can of the goods produced by the
industrial system.1 374 It is the main argument of several of Hale's

writings that distribution is a partial function of coercion and coercion
a partial function of law. With legal inequality as inevitable, and with
property ownership actually unequal, it was not surprising to Hale that
the distribution of income is unequal.
Not only is the distribution of income, and of wealth, a partial
function of law but so are the allocation of resources and the structure
of production. Relative scarcity Hale saw to be a partial function of
relative bargaining power and, in turn, a partial function of law.875
Scarcity conditions are partially conditioned by law, such that
[w]hile the same legal and constitutional arrangements will
produce varying economic patterns if people's tastes and abilities vary, the fact remains that the powers of compulsion which
the government coerces some to yield an income to the owners." Rate Making and the
Revision of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 214.
372. FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 295. "But it is government which
makes payment of a price for an article compulsory, in precisely the same way in which it

makes payment of a tax levied on the consumer (compulsory]." Id. at 294.
373. Economic Theory and the Statesman, supra note 38, at 215. "The income derived
by the company which charges the price above cost, or for that matter the income collected
by any property owner, is not something created by that owner, but something squeezed

out of others by a law-made pressure." Id. "It is through the mechanism of the legal
restraints on the activities of non-owners that [the owner] is enabled to collect the income."
Economic Theory and the Statesman, supra note 38, at 52. See also FREEDOM THROUGH
LAW, supra note 10, at 19; Value and Vested Rights, supra note 87; Political and Economic
Review, 8 A.B.A.J. at 707, 752, 753 (1922); Hale Papers, Folders 24-5 at I & 83-4.
374. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 138.

379.

FREEDOM THROUGH LAW,

Liberty, supra note 74, at 625.

supra note 10, at 8, 9; Bargaining, Duress, and Economic
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the law grants or permits to each individual have a determining
effect likewise on the pattern, which would be different if the
legal arrangements were different, even though the tastes and
abilities of the people were the same. 76
No clearer statement of the general equilibrium type relationships between some of the variables encompassed within orthodox microeconomic
theory and the variables contemplated by Hale in his analysis of the
legal bases of economic power could be expected.8 77 Elsewhere, Hale
considered that relative business costs are a partial function of law378
(some of this insight must have been gleaned from his analysis of public
utilities), and the distribution of risk he also found dependent on the
law. 79 Indeed, his discussions of tort law are replete with implications
drawn as to how legal limits on the liberty or power to visit injury
extend throughout the realm of economic affairs, 8 ° from buyer-seller
relations in general to labor-capital conflict in particular.
Hale's argument is stated in a broader context in textual material
in the Legal Factors:
Private activity thus determines largely the course of economic life. Our individual aptitudes, energies and tastes have
much to do with the economic role which each of us plays, and
with the shaping of the economic environment which surrounds
us. But they are not the sole determining factors. Even were the
government to confine its functions to those which Adam Smith
would have it perform, the economic activity of private individuals would still be largely determined by government. Private
individuals act, in their bargaining, within the limits set by law,
as well as those set by other private individuals. 81
The market allocates resources in response to the interplay between
volitional freedoms based on relative power or mutual coercion. It is
more or less customary to think in terms of dollar votes in the market;
in this regard Hale wrote: "The owner of every dollar has, by virtue of
his law-created right of ownership, a certain amount of influence over
the channels into which industry shall flow." 38 2 Consumer sovereignty,
376. Hale Papers, Folder 93-1 at 30.
377. "[Tlhe situation is far more complicated than has generally been assumed" in
economics. Economic Theory and the Statesman, supra note 38, at 225. See Mishan, supra
note 102.
378. Value and Vested Rights, supra note 87, at 524-27; Economic Theory and the
Statesman, supra note 38, at 215-16.
379. FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 53, 100 passim; Economics and Law,
supra note 12, at 132.
380. See FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10 (especially chs. 5, 9, 10, 11); LEGAL
FACTORS, supra note 11, at 18, 621, 752; Value and Vested Rights, supra note 87, at 526;
Broden, supra note 342, at 439.
381. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 656.
382. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 490 (emphasis added). "It must be
obvious that the individuals with the most dollars exercise the most control over the
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then, is but part of the picture: Consumers are sovereign only to the
extent that the legal authority permits or enforces between them. The
Smithian analysis of the play of self-interest requires a supplementary
legal-economic analysis of the legal factors governing the relative possibilities which different individuals have to give effect to, and thereby
realize their self-interest. The realization of economic interests in the
market depends upon, in part, the relative inhibitions and promotions
produced by the law."s The market, and its allocation of resources and
distribution of income, operates within the evolving set of legal rights,
duties, privileges, immunities, etc., and in no minor way gives effect to
the power based thereon.
B. Principle of the Use of Government
A further thrust of Hale's analysis arises from his demonstration
that the issue with respect to government is not whether government
participates in the system of mutual coercion or not, but rather which
or whose interests it will support, whether the interests will be alpha's
or beta's, whether they will be broadly or narrowly based, and whether
the interests already supported or the new interests claiming legal support are favored. Given that government will inevitably and ubiquitously
play such a structuring role, Hale's next theorem, stated in the form of
a question is: Who will use government as a source, ratifier or general
supporter or reenforcer of private coercive power? In other words, every
economic system inevitably comprises the problem of control of the
government. Hale's analysis makes it abundantly clear that the state
(government or law) is not something exogenous to economic life, but
rather, that law is a dependent as well as independent variable, that the
realization of economic interests is a function of government, and that
the role of government is also a function of economic interests, that is,
of those interests which are able to get into a position to use government.
In 1914 Hale had a lengthy exchange of letters with his brotherin-law, Thomas Reed Powell, already on the faculty of political science
at Columbia University, in which they discussed, among other things,
Hale's germinating plans for a volume on the political laws of the distribution of wealth." 4 Powell perceived and articulated to Hale that its
channels. ... A less pressing need of a rich man will have more influence over the channels
than will many a more pressing need of a poor man." Id. at 491; cf. id. at 492, 493. See
also Hale Papers, Folder 59-1 at 3. On the allocation of resources as a function of private
property, see id. 39-23 at 2 & 59-1 at 6.
383. Value and Vested Rights, supra note 87, at 524; Economics and Law, supra note
12, at 131, 133-34.
384. Letter from T.R. Powell to R.L. Hale, Aug. 31, 1914, at 2, in Hale Papers, Folder
61. Earlier Powell wrote,
That is a most interesting subject for a volume which you have outlined. I
have often wondered why no one had made an examination of the common law
of property and contract from the standpoint of economics. I understand that Ely
[see note 31, supra] has in preparation a voluminous work on the subject. The
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main thrust would be "that the method of distribution is the result of
legal and political factors quite as much as the result of bargaining
power, or perhaps, to put it more accurately, that a most important
element in bargaining power is control over the politically-made laws
of distribution."38 5 This is echoed in a letter to Hale from John L.
Sweeney a quarter century later, in which Sweeney, having read a
manuscript by Hale, 8 6 discussed Hale's theory of the competition for
legal rights.3

87

And this is precisely what Hale had in mind:38 8 that there

is a competition for "control over governmental machinery; " 8 9 that this
competition took the form, in part, of a conflict between right and left
for the control of government (on which subject he quoted Conant);3'o
that what was involved was a scramble for the control of government
and of the processes of leadership selection in society, whereby superior
individuals and classes-superior in terms of the rules imposed by those
who get to control government and the leadership selection process
itself-[quoting Kenneth Burke] "[came] to the fore and molded the
economists for the most part seem to treat the rules of law which have developed
as fixed data, like the need for food and clothing.
Letter from T.R. Powell to R.L. Hale, Aug. 1, 1914, at 1, in Hale Papers, Folder 61. In
the later letter, Powell also wrote, "Perhaps your point is that the economists fail to make
clear the coercive element in the system of distribution in existence-with which criticism
of them I agree." Letter from T.R. Powell to R.L. Hale, Aug. 31, 1914, at 3, in Hale Papers,
Folder 61. Coercion and Distribution, note 21 supra, nominally a review of Carver, allowed
exposition to ideas developed at least a decade earlier.
385. Letter from T.R. Powell to R.L. Hale, Aug. 1, 1914, at 1, in Hale Papers, Folder
61 (emphasis added).
386. Hale Papers, Folder 80-4.
387. Letter from J.L. Sweeney to R.L. Hale, Nov. 25, 1940, in Hale Papers, Folder 75.
388. The argument that since mutual coercion is a function of law, differential coercive
capacity depends upon the use of the state by the one party against the other, is most
subtly expressed in the following:
Under such extreme circumstances it is literally true that the company can make
rules which the inhabitants will be forced by the governmental authorities to obey
-rules which, in their legal effects, are indistinguishable from governmental acts.
Under extreme circumstances of an opposite sort, a labor union might be able,
quite lawfully, to perform what in effect are governmental acts. It is not a case of
plural sovereignty, for the stronger party is not using his own force, but is relying
on the courts and other state agencies, first to exert pressure on the weaker to
submit "voluntarily" to his terms, and then to enforce those terms after submission.
Law Making by Unofficial Minorities, supra note 34, at 453. In a letter to the editor of the

Boston Journal, Hale wrote:
The I.W.W. is doubtless wrong in its underlying philosophy; but the reason it has
such a hold is because it can point to so many instances of lawlessness on the part
of employers in time of strikes and can insist that as the employers and those
government officials who are subservient to them do not obey the law in dealing
with strikers, there is no reason why strikers should be handicapped by obeying it.
The only way to combat this argument is by protesting vigorously against any
lawlessness being used against strikers.
Letter from R.L. Hale to Editor of the Boston Journal, May 26, 1913, at 1,in Hale Papers,
Folder 63. A third of a century later, using language voiced by Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Hale wrote that a "more complete analysis" of the interrelation between legal and economic
processes "will reveal that the power of the 'economic royalists' springs from an unequal
distribution of political power . . . ." Hale Papers, Folder 80-5 at 1.
389. Coercion and Distribution,supra note 21, at 493.
390. LEcAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 626.
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policies of the state to their liking. And this class would so guide the
educative, legislative and constabulary functions as to perpetuate their
privileges." 91 The critical problem of democratic theory is whether the
people were in fact to rule or whether an elite would do so.3 92 Thus,
speaking from the vantage point of a long-established American family,
Hale wrote: "We have classes all right (even if some individuals manage
to shift from one class to another), but we like to kid ourselves with
the thought that we of the favored class don't want anything from the
government except to be let alone." 9 ' It is the favored class, of course,
which has the primary benefits of government support, benefits which
are considered a part of the normal and proper state of affairs. Hale
quoted Morris R. Cohen:
When fervid patriots denounce free seeds to farmers as socialism and see no objection to subsidies to ship owners, when
individualism is held compatible with high protective tariffs
but not with minimum wage legislation, it is as clear as a pike
staff that the popular use of the words individualism and socialism denotes nothing beyond an emotional explosion of approval
or disapproval, depending on whose ox is gored.3 4
The sole chapter in the concluding part of Freedom Through Law
is entitled "Economic Liberty in a Democracy" and shows the impact of
many Legal Factors course outlines, almost all of which have a section
on the control of government.3 5 On the very first page of the first chapter, entitled "Economic Liberty and the State," Hale pointed to the great
391. Id. at 615.
392. FREEDO Timoucia LAW, supra note 10, at 543-44, 549; Broden, supra note 342,
at 437 n.l. Thus, Hale wrote: "Much depends upon the persons who control the government and their motives." FREEDOm THROUGii LAW, supra note 10, at 541. Some years
earlier, in an outline entitled "The Coercive Framework of Economic Society," the sixth
and last section went as follows:
VI. FACTORS MOTIVATING CONDUCT OF GOVERNING GROUPS
A. Self-interest-Corruption, Ambition etc.
B. Knowledge or Ignorance.
1. Experts in government service.
2. Familiarity with local needs or local law.
3. Familiarity with more remote factors in problems.
C. Traditions, Prejudices and Ideals.
1. Sacred writings and doctrines.
2. Discriminatory loyalties.
a. To party or political machine-gratitude.
b. To class or race.
c. To local or national interests in preference to more distant ones.
D. Ideal of Impartiality and Equality Before the Law.
1. Statements of the ideal.
2. Incompatibility with existing facts.
3. Question of desirability of the idea.
E. Non-Discriminatory Regard for Human Welfare.
F. Concern With General Quality of Civilization.
Hale Papers, Folder 39-12 at 5.
393. Hale Papers, Folder 56-2 at 1 (emphasis added).
394. Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 329 (May 1923). See also FREEDOM
TiROUGrH LAW, supra note 10, at 320.
395. Hale Papers, Folder 47.
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dilemma of the state: "[W]hile the state is capable of destroying our
liberties it is also essential to their very existence."1 6 The problem is,
in no small part, a question of who will use government: Will it serve
the already strong or will it restrain the already strong in the protection
of the weak? Hale's normative injunction was that. "[W]e must rely on
the state to restrain powerful private individuals from unduly restricting
the liberty of the weaker ones."' '
1.

POLITICIAL EXTERNALITIES

One further aspect of Hale's analysis of the use of the state involves
what we may call "political externalities"-consequences, either beneficial or adverse, visited upon people other than the political decision
makers. This concept, though he did not so label it, is directly derived
from his basic coercion analysis, discussed earlier: coercion has to do
with the impact of behavior and choices of some individuals upon others,
i.e., the creation of externalities. The structure and substance of the
externalities coercively visited in any particular case will depend upon
(a) the total structure of decision-making, i.e., who is within the jurisdiction of the acting government, as well as the structure of decisionmaking within government, i.e., who is using government, and (b) the
actual state of the law, i.e., the actions taken by the state together with
their distinctive impact. The earlier discussion of private and public
governments suggests that the scope of political externalities extends
beyond the domain of official government, and includes the externalities
generated by private governments, both generally and as concentrated
private economic power (which enables the inclusion of the conventionally understood private-sector externalities within Hale's more general
analysis).
The problem of the use of government arises, then, in two ways:
first, with respect to who within the governmental jurisdiction uses
government to who's gain or detriment within the jurisdiction in question, and, second, with respect to the visitation of coercive impact or
political externalities on those outside of the governmental jurisdiction.
Expressed differently, the problem arises, first, with respect to the impact
any decision-making organization or individual has on others, and second,
with respect to who within any decision-making organization uses it,
with impact on others in and/or out of it. In still others words, externalities are generated within any decision-making organization (e.g.,
government, private or public) by the decision-making power structure
therein, with some externalities visited upon others within the organization and some externalities visited upon others without it.
Thus the basic problem of political or constitutional theory arises:
if government should be responsive to those who are affected by it, not
396. FRE Dom T
397. Id.

OUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 3.
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just those who happen to "comprise" it (i.e., either the population under
its jurisdiction or the formal owners if a corporation or the status quo
power structure, either official or unofficial), then the fact of political
externalities implies potential extension of either representation of interests in government and/or of area of jurisdiction. This extension does
not necessarily expand the authority of the government thereof (though
the possibility of such expansionism exists) but internalizes the consideration of the political externalities which it creates, in effect (presumably) to check the authority of the hitherto status quo, imperfectly
representative, government. This logic is manifest in many reform movements; the classic historical example is political democracy, and contemporary examples include black power, student power, and the attempts
to secure consumer or "public" representation on boards of directors of
corporations. Hale's main domestic example was industrial democracy:
"[T] he power to govern a plant is the power to affect in some degree the
very well be given representation in
interests of outsiders, who cannot
39 8
the government of the plant.1
Of particular interest to Hale was the problem of international
political externalities. He pointed to international conflicts of interests"' 9
in a nation-state system in which "we have competing claims to jurisdiction, or to partial jurisdiction, by bodies none of which are perfectly
representative."400 In numerous outlines he listed the extraterritorial
effects of government boundaries, illustrating the economic significance
of political boundaries and the impingement upon outside, unrepresented,
interests. 401 He wrote:
National sovereignty means the power of any government to
impair the interests of foreigners (by changes in the tariff, in
shipping rates, in property rights, etc.), limited only by fear
that foreign governments will retaliate. The practice of coercion
and counter-coercion frequently produces unsatisfactory results,
even when it does not lead to war.40 2
Decisions about sugar tariffs, for example, involving the protection of
the American sugar beet industry against the importation of Cuban
sugar (Hale was writing this in 1922-23), involved choices made "by
a body"-the American Congress-"which very doubtfully represented
the interests of the American consumers, and which did not even purport
to represent the interests of Cubans."4 ° The international system of
coercion and counter coercion is but a more-or-less special case of the
general system of mutual coercion in human society. The coercion may
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 707, 708 (Nov. 1922).
Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 140-42.
Political and Economic Review, 10 A.B.A.J. 882, 886 (Dec. 1924).
Hale Papers, Folders 30-5 at 5-6, 36-4 at 5-6, 39-23 at 5-7, & 57-4 at 3-4.
Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 107, 108 (Feb. 1923).
Id.
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be unconditional, in which case the externally imposed adversity cannot
be prevented through payment of a price, or it may be conditional, in
which case the one party may be able to buy off the other, choosing the
"less irksome of . . . [two] restraints, . . . parting with the liberty

which is less important to it."40 4 The payment may be determined through
a market for goods and services or through a political negotiating market;
in both cases it is a function of relative coercive capacity.
As suggested above, the presence of externalities, political and otherwise, will tend to be a function of the structure of decision-making, that
is, of who is within the jurisdiction and representational scope of the
acting government or decision-making group. Here Hale specified in an
outline the problem of obstacles to control when government fails to
represent many of those affected, 05 whether formally within its jurisdiction or not. Elsewhere he thought that "true democracy as to such affairs
is unattainable until the remote time" when jurisdictions are perfectly
representative, this logically requiring-in international affairs-"an international legislative body."40 6 But, as also suggested above, and generic
to much of Hale's analysis, political externalities are a function of the
state of the law, that is, of the particular actions taken by the state
having an impact on the visitation of injury-which is to say all state
actions, since all promote the freedom (coercive capacity, ergo injuryvisiting power) of some and restrict the freedom of others. In another
outline, Hale indicated examples of costs privately imposed upon others
which depend upon the state of the law: oil and water laws, quasinuisances, high buildings and congestion, physical injuries to workmen
(workmen's compensation laws) and to outsiders, etc.40 7 In this matter
Hale anticipated by many years a recent suggestion that "externalities
ought to be defined as discrepancies between alternative legal and social
arrangements." 08
In sum, the problem of political externalities means that the question
of the use of government is extremely complex. Such is the case whether
the externalities are between decision-makers and decision-takers within
or between political units, whether the externalities are between different
states of the law, and whether the government in question is private or
public. At its base, however, it is clear that there rests the problem of
whose interests will the political authority in question support or, more
accurately, be used to support. The determination of those supported
interests pro tanto determines the structure and substance, or impact, of
externalities both within and without the decision-making organization.
404. Hale Papers, Folder 68-2 at 4.
405. Id. 58-1 at 3.
406. Letter from R.L. Hale to H. Strauss, July 24, 1939, at 1, in Hale Papers, Folder 84.
407. Hale Papers, Folder 57-2 at 2.
408. M.L. Kafoglis, Marriage Customs and Opportunity Costs, 78 J. PoL. ECON. 421,
423 (1970).
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C. The Policy Character of Legal-Economic Interrelations
What does it mean to argue that the economy has its legal bases,
and that the legal process is used by economic interests? Since these are
fundamental theses of Hale's, his answer to this question must be stated
directly. In his view, for the economy to have its legal bases means that
any choice exercised, or policy made, in the legal process has its impact
on the structure, operation and results of the market economy; and for
the legal system to be used by economic interests means that the legal
system is an instrument for the effectuation of choices exercised, or
policies made, by economic interests. The ubiquity of choice, or policy,
is correlative to the ubiquity of coercion. 0 9 What Hale's student perceived
as that "infernal arbitrariness of choice" was one of the most profound
lessons which Hale was endeavoring to instill in his students, as well as
his readers: the presence of the element of pure choice, of preference
and taste, in all economic and legal decision-making and policy. And one
suspects that Hale's reaction to his student's comment was to pause and
reflect upon those aspects of the human condition and psyche which make
it difficult for man to accept existential uncertainty and make him eager
to accept the artifactual and artificial as natural. A perceptive historian
of economic thought, who is also one of the leading theoreticians of the
place of existential uncertainty in economic affairs, has recently written
that theory, like religion, serves deep needs of the human spirit-to put
minds at rest.4 10 And it was precisely Hale's objective to shake out the
lethargy, inertia and pretense from the spirit and intellect of his students,
as Socrates before him. To Hale the law was the means and not the end;
it was not something simply to be venerated as an ultimate accomplishment, but something to be critically evaluated. Hale was not so much
questioning the status quo as he was asserting--an even more fundamental matter-the view that man made the status quo through his acts
of choice. Whereas social control-and law is, of course, a prime force
for social control-normally functions to instill a belief in the naturalness
and inevitability, as well as the propriety-the "is" quality together with
409. See Letter from W. Gellhorn to R.L. Hale, May 21, 1940, in Hale Papers, Folder
16; Letter from T.R. Powell to R.L. Hale, July 18, 1914, at 1, in Hale Papers, Folder 61.
410. All we can seek is consistency, coherence, order. The question for the scientist
is what thought-scheme will best provide him with a sense of that order and
coherence, a sense of some permanence, repetitiveness and universality in the structure or texture of the scheme of things, a sense even of that one-ness and simplicity
which, if he can assure himself of its presence, will carry consistency and order to
their highest expression. Religion, science and art have all of them this aim in
common. The difference between them lies in the different emphases in their modes
of search. . . . The chief service rendered by a theory is the setting of minds at
rest. . . . Theory serves deep needs of the human spirit: it subordinates nature to
man, imposes a beautiful simplicity on the unbearable multiplicity of fact, gives
comfort in the face of the unknown and unexperienced, stops the teasing of mystery
and doubt which, though salutary and life-preserving, is uncomfortable, so that
we seek by theory to sort out the justified from the unjustified fear. Theories
by their nature and purpose, their role of administering to a "good state of mind,"
are things to be held and cherished. Theories are altered or discarded only when
they fail us.
G.L.S. SHACKLE, TaE YEARS OF HiGH THEORY 286, 288-89 (1967).
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the "ought" quality-of the status quo, Hale was emphasizing that the
economy and the law were not given, but were rather what man, through
his multifarious institutions of choice, had made them. As already suggested, the theory of the choice, or policy, character of the legal-economic
decision-making process comprises Hale's most fundamental point: the
structure of coercion, and thus of effective choice, and of the legal rights
which support the power of coercion, are all a function of choice." The
decisions made are a function of the decision-making structure, and that
structure becomes the critical, if not always conspicuous, policy issue.
Nowhere is this choice, or policy, character more evident than in
Hale's work on public utility regulation, which it literally pervades.
While courts and commissions were seeking to avoid "confiscatory" rates,
Hale argued that the issue was not whether there would be confiscation
but how much confiscation there would be; the remaining amount, or
proportion of the existing value, he wrote, "is a question of policy to be
pricked out gradually by the decisions of the courts. 4 2 He rejected
the appraisal approach to public utility rate-making (and therefore the
valuation problem of Smyth v. Ames) as ignoring the underlying necessity of choice in regulation. 413 Reconciliation of the two principles, that
of protecting the consumer against extortionate rates and that of protecting the owners against confiscation of value, was impossible; what always
took place was judicial determination of how much confiscation (i.e.,
how much reduction of value through reduction of monopoly earnings)
should be allowed.41 4 The courts, he wrote to Louis Brandeis in 1922 have
ever been "tempted to evade the real question of public policy involved"; "'
their use of the conflicting rules simply masked the choices they were
making in setting or approving valuations for rate-making purposes.
Twenty years later he wrote Richmond Weed on precisely the same
point and, as clearly as one could possibly do so, articulated the pure
choice character of rate-making. If Godfrey's insight into Hale's theorem
of the "infernal arbitrariness of choice" requires verification, here it is:
Legislative bodies have always had a great deal of power over
private interests, subject only to the vague test of arbitrariness
applied by the courts in fields other than rate regulation. And
in some fields, the courts do not even apply that test. For
411. FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at x.
412. Letter from R.L. Hale to J. Rellstab, Oct. 15, 1921, in Hale Papers, Folder 5.
413. Letter from R.L. Hale to G. McAneny, June 8, 1921, in Hale Papers, Folder 5.
414. Letter from R.L. Hale to Justice M. Pitney, Nov. 10, 1921, in Hale Papers,
Folder 5.
415. Letter from R.L. Hale to L. Brandeis, April 3, 1922, in Hale Papers, Folder 6.
Donald R. Richberg wrote to Hale: "Of course you and I can readily agree that the
whole effort to find a value as the basis for an earning power is a solemn farce . .. .
Letter from D.R. Richberg to R.L. Hale, June 7, 1921, in Hale Papers, Folder 5. Msgr.
John A. Ryan wrote to Hale that, under the confiscation analogy of the rule of Smyth v.
Ames, "[tihe sole function of the regulating authority is to maintain the status quol"
Letter from J.A. Ryan to R.L. Hale, Oct. 6, 1944, in Hale Papers, Folder 40.
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instance, the question is not even raised in court whether a
particular increase or reduction of the protective tariff is arbitrary-yet it may affect investor interests as adversely as rate
regulation. I don't think we can have any absolute guaranty of
fair treatment, whether we leave it to the court or to other
bodies. Certainly the Supreme Court has been pretty arbitrary
in the past in reading its own economic views into the Constitution, particularly in this field. I think Smyth v. Ames has permitted utilities to be pretty arbitrary, and, on the other hand,
has failed to protect investors with reference to the amount they
actually invested (which is not measured by reproduction cost).
Somebody must in the nature of things have power to act arbitrarily-the company, the legislature, the commission or the
court. I find it hard to predict in whose hands the power is least
likely to be abused.41 6
By "arbitrary," Hale meant, essentially, the exercise of pure choicepreference and taste; i.e., decisions not unequivocally grounded.
The choice, or policy, character of public utility regulation was generalized by Hale to the whole system of volitional freedom: the choice
of liberties, of which to restrict and which to promote, becomes the
ubiquitous problem of legal (and perforce economic) policy. 417 "The
search for liberty," Hale wrote, "calls for an understanding of what
specific liberties conflict with another [sic] and calls also for a preference among conflicting liberties." 418 Such a preference is an act of
choice: "[W]hen some have economic power to coerce others, the state
is under the necessity of making a choice between . . . one class of
liberty and that of the other."4 1 Legislation protecting liberty "usually
involves making a choice between conflicting liberties, enhancing those
deemed more vital at the expense of those deemed less so. ' 42 ° And, also,
[t]he choice is not between more freedom and more restraint; it is
between different freedoms for different persons." 42' What is characteristic of public utility regulation and of liberty in general is also characteristic of the structure of inequality,4 22 of relative rights, of subsidies,
416. Letter from R.L. Hale to R. Weed, June 3, 1942, in Hale Papers, Folder 12
(emphasis added). Hale quoted from Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. Stat. 147,
161-62 (1853): "The great powers given to the legislature are liable to be abused. But this
is inseparable from the nature of human institutions. The wisdom of man has never conceived of a government with power sufficient to answer its legitimate ends, and at the
same time incapable of mischief. No political system can be made so perfect that its rulers
will always hold it to the true course. In the very best a great deal must be trusted to the
discretion of those who administer it." LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 332.
417. See Hale Papers, Folders 57-3, 57-9 at 2, 4, 6; Letter from R.L. Hale to L.L.
Fuller, Dec. 24, 1954, at 2-3, 6, in Hale Papers, Folder 76.
418. Hale Papers, Folder 80-16 at 24.
419. Id., 83-1 at 1. The language paraphrases that of Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272,
279-80 (1928), quoted in text at note 424 infra.

420. Hale Papers, Folder 91-7 at 13.
421. Id. 91-2 at c.
422. Id. 62-1 at 7.
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and of torts, namely, choice and policy. In the case of torts, for example,
some exercises of private coercion are held tortious and others not;
inherent in choice:
The courts .. .have developed .. .the prima facie tort
theory, according to which there is a prima Jacie presumption
that the intentional infliction of damage or economic loss on the
employer is illegal; but the presumption can be rebutted by
showing a justification. This usually takes the form of proving
that the defendants were attempting to promote some reasonable and not too remote interest of their own: in deciding what
and not too remote the courts must
sort of interest is reasonable
4 23
policy.
of
issue
an
face
Miller v. Schoene was undoubtedly Hale's favorite court case, because of its clear and direct statement of his thesis. The case involved
the constitutionality of a Virginia statute endeavoring to protect apple
orchard owners against the effects of a cedar rust disease which did not
adversely affect the red cedar tree (which was its temporary host) but
did destroy the fruit of the apple tree. The statute provided for the
condemnation and destruction of afflicted red cedar trees in proximity
to apple orchards. Speaking for a Court which unanimously upheld the
statute, Justice Stone, Hale's former dean, wrote:
On the evidence we may accept the conclusion of the Superior
Court of Appeals that the state was under the necessity of
making a choice between the preservation of one class of property and that of the other wherever both existed in dangerous
proximity. It would have been none the less of a choice if,
instead of enacting the present statute, the state, by doing
nothing, had permitted serious injury to the apple orchards
within its borders to go on unchecked. 24
This "necessity of making a choice" Hale found ubiquitous. "The Court
spoke in terms of protecting one form of property against another form
of property, but its reasoning is equally applicable to the protection of
one form of individual liberty against destruction at the hands of persons
423. Hale, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 52, at 669 (emphasis
added). See also Hale Papers, Folder 68-4 at 1.
424. When forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional
powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to save
another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater value to the public.
It will not do to say that the case is merely one of a conflict of two private
interests and that the misfortune of the apple growers may not be shifted to cedar
owners by ordering the destruction of their property, for it is obvious that there
may be, and that there is, a preponderant public concern in the preservation of the
one interest over the other. And where the public interest is involved preferment
of that interest over the property interest of the individual, to the extent even of
its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the
police power which affects property.
Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1928) quoted in FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra
note 10, at 399.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

exercising a conflicting liberty. '421 Moreover, "[w]ithin wide limits, a
state may choose which of various forms of liberty or property are to
' And there is no calbe preserved in preference to conflicting forms."426
culus of decision with which to resolve conflicts of interests and claims;
choices must be made.42 7 Hale's theory of the legal bases of economic
power is not only a theory of the economic consequences of legal action,
but also of the participation by, and use of, the legal process in the
making of economic choices.
IV.

HALE'S NORMATIVE ANALYSIS

Robert Hale devoted much of his intellectual life to efforts at seeing
through the complications of law and economics and their interrelations,
especially the barriers to objective analysis posed by the identification
of particular exercises of will as freedom and of others as coercion depending upon one's point of view and/or cultural heritage. He was able
to erect a model or paradigm of mutual coercion, volitional freedom,
and power which would objectively identify the panoply of forces without prejudice-or with as little prejudice as the use of language would
allow. He was thus able to construct a model of the economy as a system
of power, of the mutual, though asymmetrical, sanctioning of coercive
impact yielding effective social decision-making. He was also able to
identify fundamental legal bases or factors in economic society and
relate them to the problems of freedom, inequality, and governance in a
model which incorporates both official and unofficial-public and private
-governments. Encompassed therein are positive and normative theories
of democracy, social control and social change, a positivist theory of the
economic power structure and process, and a positivist theory of the
economic roles of public government. His work was in the traditions of
legal realism and sociological jurisprudence in law and institutionalism
in economics, and in marked juxtaposition and contradiction to (though
not mutually exclusive of) analytical jurisprudence and neo-classical
economics. From the perspective of an economist it is particularly interesting to learn that Hale was favorably compared with John R.
Commons, a co-leader, with Thorstein Veblen and Wesley C. Mitchell,
of institutional economics. Among other favorable comparisons, we might
note that Hale's analysis of freedom and coercion parallels that of Max
425. Hale Papers, Folder 93-5 at 7. See also id. 83-1 at 1 & 80-4 at 22-23; Force and
the State, supra note 56, at 200-01.
426. FREEDom THRouGr LAW, supra note 10, at 399.
427. The arrangements are susceptible of great alteration by governmental bodies,
and governments are concerning themselves more and more with them. Important
interests are affected by the shape that these arrangements shall take. It is difficult
to measure the interests, and even if they could be measured, there are no simple
rules for determining how conflicts between them should be settled.
Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 493.
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Weber, particularly in its treatment of power, formal versus actual freedom, and the role and use of the state in economic affairs.4 28
On both normative and positive grounds Hale challenged circular
acquiescence in, and failure to deeply analyze, status quo legal and
economic arrangements: economic and legal analysis studying and justifying results on the basis of arrangements, and arrangements on the basis
of results, 42 9 was not intellectually meaningful to Hale; it smacked of
rationalization. Although he was concerned, as was Roscoe Pound for
example, that legitimate expectations be legally protected, he was aware
that the real issues were as to whose or which expectations were legitimate
and of recognizing new ones, 4 0 and that these were open questions.
He must have appreciated the statement in I.L. Sharfman's congratulatory
letter on the publication of his Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of
Individual Liberty, where Sharfman stated: "The source of the entire
difficulty, I believe lies in the fact that the accepted reasoning assumes
that all existing relationships are necessarily sound and wise and hence
are presumptively entitled to the protection of law."4 8' Legal and economic analysis which simply took the status quo for granted would
tend to cast luster on that very status quo-circular acquiescence, intentional or otherwise.
In this section I want to summarize what has been generally implicit
and occasionally explicit throughout the foregoing: the elements of Hale's
normative position. It is my feeling that Hale's positive analysis, namely,
his theory of the economy as a system of power and his theory of the
legal bases thereof (the "legal factors in economic society"), stands on
its own and represents a significant contribution to a difficult and complex subject matter. Hale's normative position is in the tradition of
progressivism. It supports a widespread diffusion of power and governance, and governmental rearrangements of rights to accomplish those
goals; it seeks, in other words, a broader-based participation in capitalism and in government, that capitalism and the state should not be only
the playthings of a business elite and their supporters. Both the state
and the market should reflect the interests of the masses and not just or
primarily the classes. Hale was a product of his time, when the conflict
between labor and capital and the dominance of business interests in
428. See 2 M. WEBER, ECONOMY AND SocnETY 729-31 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds. 1968).
For comparisons of Hale with Commons, see Letter from C.E. Troxel to R.L. Hale, Oct. 6,
1944, in Hale Papers, Folder 14; Letter from H.L. Elsbree to R.L. Hale, April 14, 1942,
in Hale Papers, Folder 55. See also Letter from R.L. Hale to B.H. Levy, Aug. 2, 1949, in
Hale Papers, Folder 25; Emerson, supra note 12, at 140.
429. Economics and Law, supra note 12, at 138, 140; FREEDOM THROUGHi LAW, supra
note 10, at 393.
430. Coercion and Distribution,supra note 21, at 489; LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11,
at 760-61.
431. "If men of your type continue hammering long enough, the light may dawn even
upon the judicial mind." Letter from I.L. Sharfman to R.L. Hale, May 21, 1925, in Hale
Papers, Folder 20.
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governing circles seemed to exhaust the practical problems of legaleconomic relations.
More specifically, Hale's normative position called for the rearrangement of the structure of volitional freedom, through rearrangement of
the structure of legal rights, to secure what he called a net enlargement
of liberty, greatly modifying but by no means eliminating inequality.
His basic welfare-economic logic and general normative position resembles
that of the late English economist Arthur Cecil Pigou, the founder of a
major tradition or school of welfare economics. 32 Both Hale and Pigou
were ameliorist, but both (and especially Hale) saw the need to get
down to the revision of the fundamental legal rights serving as the basis
of economic weaponry. Further, and most important here, just as Pigou's
welfare mal-distribution (of income) theory would have maximized
utility by redistributing income to where the marginal utility of income
to each individual is equal (whether or not it would have equalized
money income), Hale would have followed the logic of net enlargement
of liberty, rearranging volitional freedoms (through rearranging relative
rights) so long as a net enlargement of total liberty ensued. That both
marginal utility and net enlargement, which is based on utility-type
valuations of relative importance, are subjective and incommensurable
is a serious operational difficulty. But the subjective character of marginal
utility has not prevented welfare economists from developing the logic
of welfare maximization using marginal utility, and Hale's analysis has
advantages that policy makers and analysts actually must (in some
manner) weigh in determining the relative importance of conflicting
liberties when they have to select between them. At any rate, Hale's
normative analysis of rearrangement along inequality-correcting lines is
articulated in terms of his principle of net enlargement, a principle which
is essentially neutral and positivist in construction and which follows
from his analysis of liberty.
Hale's relatively egalitarian posture is also manifest in his call for
the development of legal restraints on private government-as a check
on power-similar to those already developed with respect to public
government. Both the positive and normative principles involved have
already been developed. The problems of the use of the power of alpha
as a check on the power of beta, and vice versa, the possible misuse of
power by either, and the evaluation of which power player is or is likely
to require checking, are the central unsolved issues in this analysis. But
they are unsolved in all other theories as well, and it is at least to Hale's
credit that he points to the way the problem is resolved in practicethrough political assessment of the relative importance of the uses to
which the power is to be put and their opportunity costs as well as actual
abuses, in sum, the evaluative process, which becomes the critical component of the political process. The further problem, of course, is that
432. Hale's analysis, like Pigou's, may have been derived from Alfred Marshall's theory
of consumer surplus. See Hale Papers, Folder 80-14 at 4.
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evaluative decisions will be a function of the extant structure of power
and will tend to reenforce it. That is part of the general equilibrium
character of the economy and polity as power or decision-making processes. The fact of such problems is why, for example, Hale devoted time
and space in his course and his writings to the problems of "political
guidance. 4 3
What Hale wanted was reform within the market system. It should
not be inferred that public ownership might have seemed to Hale the
solution for several problems. Far from that, Hale recognized that
public ownership would only rearrange or restructure the problems of
liberty and governance, replacing old inequalities with new ones, and
creating incentive and adjustment problems as well. Indeed, public ownership was undesirable in and of itself, since he applauded private property
and the market for their actual (and even greater potential) contribution
to the spread of volitional freedom. 3 4 Also contrary to what one might
expect, Hale recognized that complete equality was both impossible and
undesirable given the world and mankind as they are and are likely to be.
Notwithstanding this cautious and conservative reformism, the thrust
of Hale's argument was the deliberative revision of established arrangements, doing away with unjust institutions4 35 and replacing them with
something better. Hale's was a Platonic emphasis on reform; thus, he
wrote:
Any system of legal rights and duties is to be judged, as
Dean Pound has pointed out, by comparing the interests promoted with those defeated by that system. A legal system which
secures a satisfactory balance of interests under one set of conditions may secure a highly unsatisfactory balance when conditions change. This may call for a readjustment of rights, duties,
privileges, etc.43 6
What his analyses did not do-and he nowhere said that they did-was
to provide a formula by which the "right" readjustments and rearrangements could be determined independently of human social choice. The
policy character of legal-economic problems and interrelations was what
he insisted upon, and he found ideologies uncongenial in no small part
because they served to obscure, distort, and bias the fact and process
of choice.
A.

Net Enlargement of Liberty in a World of
Inequality and Private Government

Perhaps the fundamental externalities are generated by and ensconced in the relative character of rights: the rights of alpha are rela433. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at ch. 9; FREEDOm T OUGH LAW, supra note 10,
at cbs. 12-17; Hale Papers, Folders 30, 39, 47, 82, 83.
434. FREEDOM THROUGH LAw, supra note 10, at ix.
435. Letter from R.L. Hale to M. Hale, July 29, 1913, at 1, in Hale Papers, not in folder.
436. Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 107 (Feb. 1923).
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tive, or reciprocal, to those of beta, and the freedom of alpha is relative,
or reciprocal, to that of beta; and for one to have or be given a right
or element of volitional freedom is for the other to have imposed on
him a duty or exposure. As a consequence, when one acts, coercive
impact is visited upon the other. Fundamental legal policy must choose
whose rights or freedom to sacrifice and whose to benefit. The choice
will be made, according to Hale, on the basis of balancing counterinterests, 4 37 selecting between liberties of lesser and greater importance, 3 '
avoiding the more serious restrictions in favor of the lesser ones,43 9
choosing the beneficial or more essential freedom over the pernicious or
less essential one, 440 picking the one regarded more, as opposed to less,
vital, 44' and so on. There must be a judgment of policy, of valuation,
of relative importance. Hale quoted Holmes' Privilege,Malice, and Intent:
The ground of decision really comes down to a proposition of
policy of rather a delicate nature concerning the merit of the
particular benefit to themselves intended by the defendants,
and suggests a doubt whether judges with different economic
sympathies might not decide such 2 a case differently when
44
brought face to face with the issue.
There is an ineluctable necessity to determine "which freedom is the
more worth preserving, ' ' 4 of so choosing between competing claimants
to freedom as to increase "the sum total of worthwhile individual liberty."4'44 This requires a marginal-analysis type judgment but is ultimately based on conceptions-subjective and not always disinterested
-of social importance, indeed, of civilization itself, and includes, as was
seen earlier, subjective conceptions of the range of injury,446 so as to
balance relative hardship as well as freedom. Hale's principle of net
enlargement of liberty asserts, then, that the lesser liberties should be
restricted in favor of the greater liberties,446 thus creating net enlargement of liberty, a maximization of liberty.
Like utility analysis in economic theory, this is largely, if not
entirely, a formal analysis. Just as utility analysis simply postulates
and takes for granted the utility valuations of consumers, Hale's netenlargement analysis postulates some social-e.g., legislative and/or
judicial--determination of lesser and greater importance in each case
(as in the conflict between red cedar and apple trees). There is still the
437. Hale Papers, Folder 24-1 at 3.
438. Id. 50-1 at 1-2.
439. Id. 58-5 at 3.
440. Id. 90-2 at 1.
441. Id. 57-9 at 5.
442. FREEDom Ti0UOH LAW, supra note 10, at 75, quoting Holmes, Privilege, Malice,
and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1894).
443. Hale Papers, Folder 91-7 at 5-6.
444. Id. 91-4 at 2.
445. LwGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 618.
446. Hale Papers, Folder 93-5 at 5.
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fundamental Benthamite problem of which is to be maximized, the number or percentage of those who are to enjoy liberty or the intensity of
liberty of those most largely benefited. 4 47 Any practical theory must
come to grips with that problem: Hale's solution is a limited but affirmative egalitarianism.
Hale's net-enlargement logic is firmly derived from his general
analysis of freedom and law. "Every law," he wrote, "deprives someone
of liberty in some degree . . . .""' But, "[a]ny legal restraint which
diminishes one person's liberty to harm another may thereby enlarge
that other's liberty."44' 9 "A law which by restricting one liberty gives
birth to a more essential one results in a net enlargement of individual
liberty."4 50 Thus,
it is a fallacy to assume that every attempt by the state to control and to revise the economic results of bargaining involves a
net curtailment of individual liberty. It may or may not do so.
If the liberty of those whom it restrains is less vital than the
liberty which those persons would themselves restrain, then
state intervention may spell a net gain in individual liberty.""
Legislation protecting some of the interests in liberty and
property against assaults by other such interests, would then
be seen in many cases to be making a net increase in the protection to the interests taken as a whole, and to be, instead of
a violation of the constitutional provisions, a fulfillment of their
spirit."'
Hale's classic presentation of his analysis was in his 1925 article,
Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, in response to
which Alvin Johnson wrote him: "I wish you were on the bench ...
4
Roscoe Pound's response was:
[Y] ou put the matter exactly. If we are going to go on a notion
of a maximum of free individual self assertion as the end of law,
we must see to it that we maintain liberty in the concrete and
that we do not sacrifice concrete liberty to the exigencies of
abstract liberty. Your proposition with respect to "a net impair45 4
ment of liberty" seems to me to put the matter exactly.
In Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty he argued
that equality before the law is impossible so long as the "law of property
both restricts and liberates everyone, but not in an equal degree; 4 5
447. The text paraphrases O.H. TAYLOR, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 134 (1960).
448. FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 239.
449. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 25.
450. FREEDOM THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at viii.
451. Id. at 4.

452. Force and the State, supra note 56, at 200.
453. Letter from A. Johnson to R.L. Hale, June 15, 1925, in Hale Papers, Folder 20.
454. Letter from R. Pound to R.L. Hale, May 18, 1925, in Hale Papers, Folder 20.

455. Labor Legislation as an Enlargement of Individual Liberty, supra note 80, at 157.
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that no particular set of inequalities is the necessary result of the institutions of private property and free contract; and that, therefore,
it cannot be asserted dogmatically that a statutory rearrangement of the existing inequalities will necessarily involve more
restrictions on liberty and more impairment of property rights
than the reverse. It may merely have the effect of weakening
the liberty and property of the more favored to strengthen the
liberty and property of the less favored. 5
This neutral principle of net enlargement, because it opens the door to
rearrangement, is anathema to anyone who believes that the only property interests with which the law ought to concern itself are the already
protected ones, whose premise is that given expression by Sharfman,
quoted in the text, supra at note 431. But Hale felt that property and
liberty had to be interpreted in terms of the entire system of property
interests and of liberty, which includes those whose interests were disadvantaged by virtue of their having little or no property and little or
no volitional freedom.
At about the same time that Hale wrote the article on labor legislation he also wrote the following for his short-lived column in the American
457
Bar Association Journal:
The effect of the complex of legal restraints which go under the
name of "property rights" may be to compel certain majority
groups to obey the behests of certain minority groups, either as
to working or as to payments made for food, clothing and
shelter. Much of the legislation which reaches the Supreme
Court under the due process clause is legislation designed to
promote "liberty" quite as much as to curtail it. It is aimed to
make a majority more free from the control of these conditions
by a minority; and in so doing it subjects the minority somewhat more to control by the majority who benefit by the legislation; for in all economic arrangements there is a certain
amount of mutual control and submission. As a rule, even where
the aim is successful, the minority still retains more "liberty"
than the majority-both in the sense of more factual control
over their own lives, and in the sense of less legal restrictions
on their conduct, for there usually remains to each member of
the minority in question a larger field within which he is not
thwarted by property duties than there is to each member of the
majority; and the minority still as a rule retains, man for man,
greater property rights than does the majority. Before the
legislation "property rights" were equal only in the sense that
all owners of property had the same procedural methods for
enforcing their unequal substantive rights, and in the sense that
all had a "right to acquire" property. The effect of the legisla456. Id. at 160.
457. On the reception of his column see Hale Papers, Folders 7, 74.
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tion, if successful, would be to condition somewhat the protection of some of the more important property rights, thus partly
compensating by one sort of inequality for a greater inequality
in the substantive rights, and to equalize somewhat the possibility of deriving any concrete benefit from the equal but
highly abstract "rights to acquire." The legislation, if really
calculated to accomplish its purpose, deprives some persons of
their interests in liberty and property not on behalf of some
totally different and less vital interest of the majority, but on
behalf of the promotion of the same kind of interest in substantial liberty and property in the persons of those who very likely
have previously, and even subsequently, less legal protection of
these interests that do the minority. 5
The way in which society maximizes freedom is through the logic
of net enlargement, based upon judgments of relative importance as
between the competing freedoms. In social decision-making, the logic of
net enlargement is what best describes the determination of relative
rights, even when it is abused because it is invoked to rationalize a choice
based upon interest. But whatever the mode of determining relative
importance, the policy choice is the major element. And, the determination being complex, the choice is not always egalitarian: "In cases of
conflict, it is not necessarily better that the interests of a majority be
promoted than those of a minority. It depends on the importance of the
respective interests. 4 59 What is involved is "a qualitative, not a mere
quantitative judgment. 4 60 "Opinions will differ as to the relative importance of the different conflicting liberties concerned; "4 6 but the law must
"subordinate the interests of some individuals to what are regarded as
the more important interests of other individuals. 4 62 It is a question of
which individuals or which interests-whose interests-are to be promoted, and of who determines it. In some cases, legislation may extend
economic liberty on the extensive, as opposed to the intensive, margin:
"By reducing some of the liberty which the economically strong possess
in superfluity, it adds to the economic liberty of those who most need
4
it..
. But while it typically is a matter of balancing and selecting
between the liberties of different individuals or classes of individuals,"'
it is also a matter of balancing and selecting between the different
liberties of the same individual. 5
Incidentally, Hale was aware that the normal exercise of the police
power (and other powers, with the exception of eminent domain) in458. Political and Economic Review, 10 A.B.A.J. 882, 885 (Dec. 1924).
459. Id. at 884.
460. Letter from R.L. Hale to L.L. Fuller, Dec. 24, 1954, at 3, in Hale Papers, Folder
76; cf. id. at 13.
461. Hale Papers, Folder 80-16 at 24.
462. Id. 93-5 at 2.
463. Id. 90-2 at 5.
464. FREEDoM Tmouon LAW, supra note 10, at 381, 537, and cb. 12.
465. Id. at 389.
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volves the creation and destruction, or modification, of property rights
without compensation. He was thus aware of the broad problem of compensation for vested rights lost through social legislation.466 This is a
topic ranging outside the limits of this discussion, but it is relevant to
call attention to his view that, "[w] e have as yet devised no practicable
system for compensating those whose special interests in scarcity will
be sacrificed to the general interest in abundance. Unless and until we
can do so, we shall probably have strong political obstacles to an economy
of abundance."46
The principle of net enlargement is a neutral principle; it quite
formally tries to structurally depict the evaluative decision, with the
substantive determination in each case considered a function of the choosing parties' assessment of relative importance. It should be clear, however, that the pronounced thrust of Hale's own normative position is
relative egalitarianism. He was in favor of legal support for a wider,
rather than a narrower, range of interests, for (to use the title of the last
chapter of Freedom Through Law) economic liberty in a democracy,
meaning by democracy an economy and a state-a social systemresponsive to the needs and wishes of the masses as well as the classes.
In notes commenting upon Lincoln's first inaugural address, Hale wrote
that "[t]he equality which we value demands that our government and
its laws serve the interests of all classes of persons, rather than subordinating the liberties of some to the interests of others."46 He maintained
that political processes-the political processes out of which legal rights
develop-must be used to furnish the appropriate means for extending
rights of economic significance to individuals and groups and to areas
where they have hitherto been lacking so as "to make liberty more widespread."4 69 He believed "that many forms of social legislation interfere
with individual liberty only for the preservation of a more important
form of individual liberty,"47 but that "the outcome . .. [is] not . ..
more governmental interference than [there is] now with individual
liberty; it ... [is only] a change in the form of our present incidence
of paternalism.1 471 He stated that "we should have more liberty where
it is most needed:" 7 "The greatest problem facing those who appreciate
the blessings of individual liberty and private property is the problem
of utilizing the political state to make these blessings accessible to those
now barred from them. 4 78 Government intervention already "restricts
466. Value and Vested Rights, supra note 87, at 523-24, 528-29.
467. FREEDOm THROUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 8.
468. Hale Papers, Folder 58-4 at 3.

469. Id. 91-7 at 13.
470. Id. 93-5 at 7-8.
471. Id. 56-2 at 4.
472. Id.
473. Id. 80-4 at 1-2. "Totalitarianism does not solve the problem. Democracy has not
yet solved it, for we have made but a beginning in subordinating private economic governing power to the democratic control of the political state." ld.
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economic liberty so drastically and so unequally at present,"' " that,
"[rlecognition of the essentially political character of private governing
power would simply lead us to recognize that shifts in its incidence
could be made by law without necessarily violating our canons of individual liberty or equality before the law. '4 75 This could be done by
modifying the system of private property so that individuals would
"more equally" bear the work and share the fruits. 47' The pattern of
restriction and expansion of liberties-of volitional freedoms-already
a function of law, can be made more tolerably equal than at present.
Individual liberty can be promoted by law along the extensive margin,
albeit at some cost to the intensive margin, the justification being the
superfluity of relative freedom already enjoyed by the advantaged, and
without the basic role of government being changed. "The economically
powerful" are far more advantageously situated than the economically
weak, and their power and liberty "conflicts with the liberties of those
whom they control."4 77 Given their relative advantage, restrictions on
their "less vital liberties" should be developed to release the "more vital
liberties" of the disadvantaged "from the trammels imposed by others. 4 78
Hale thus concluded Freedom Through Law with

[t]he hope . . . that public officials, with the approval of the
voters, may manage to devise methods to distribute wealth more
widely without checking its production or so regimenting its
producers as to discourage their productive activities. In this
way it is believed that under our system of government, the
liberty of individuals can be greatly expanded where its expansion is most called for.47
The state, in other words, should be used to redress and restructure the
economic inequalities which "are embodied in legal rights which the
government enforce [s].1''4s Institutionally produced and abetted inequality is unjust and should be corrected; the state should not be "dealing unequal hands to the players." ' '
But Hale was aware that "[c]omplete equality of opportunity, like
complete liberty for everyone, cannot be attained. Specific inequalities
of opportunity can be removed, with the result as a rule of creating
others."4 2 Not only is inequality inevitable, but many inequalities are
474. Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, supra note 74, at 628.

475. Hale Papers, Folder 58-5 at 5.
476. Hale, Some Phases of the Minimum Wage: Discussion, 7 Am. EcoN. REV. 279,
280 (1917) [hereinafter cited as Some Phases of the Minimum Wage].
477. Hale Papers, Folder 80-4 at 3-4.
478. Id. at 3.
479. FREEDOM THROUcH LAW, supra note 10, at 550.
480. Id. at 11.
481. Id. at 12.
482. LEGAL FACTORS, supra note 11, at 615.
If "equality of opportunity" is to be our goal, we have to select the particular
opportunity that we desire to equalize. And some inequalities of opportunity we
may wish to preserve. . . It may be that a system which confers greater economic
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justified; he emphasized his appreciation of how strong a defense can
be made, though perhaps not a conclusive defense, of the continuance
of most of the inequalities once they are frankly recognized. 8 His main
caveat was the question of incentives, which he felt limits the capacity
to promote greater equality by the method of legal rearrangement of
liberties. The rule should be in favor of equality except where inequality
is in the interest of the poor: "To the extent that the governing power
of the strong in fact promotes the welfare of the weak, to that extent
the inequality would seem justified even to one who is as solicitous of the
welfare of the weak as he is of the strong.1 41 4 "Invisible governing in
the economic world, by private citizens, may be far better than no
governing at all, even for those near the bottom of the scale."4' 85
To require the rich to burn up their surplus wealth would bring
about greater equality, at the expense of the liberty of the rich,
and without a compensating enhancement of the liberty of the
poor. Likewise, even liberating the poor from control by the
rich may, in some circumstances, indirectly diminish the liberty
of the poor even more than it enhances it. For instance, if the
effect of lessening the control would be to lessen the incentive
of able men to engage in production of wealth to such a degree
that famine resulted, then the liberty of the poor to eat would
be curtailed to a more significant degree than their liberty to
disregard orders is enlarged.486
But not all inequalities are defensible in terms of the incentive argument:
"[T]he fact remains that differences in industry and thrift and differences in ability do not by any means account for the more important
economic inequalities. ' 487 Rights to natural resources in particular have
erected formidible positions of advantage.
Nevertheless, the promotion of the extensive margin of liberty must
be limited by the threat of disincentives. "[T]here is a large element of
truth in the proposition that many of the inequalities of income serve the
useful function of stimulating production in such a way as to benefit
others as well as the producers. '4 88 Only "[i]n so far as legislation of
this type does not materially reduce the incentive to produce," does it
opportunities on those capable of rendering greater services in production, confers
benefits on those less capable, by reason of the greater total output of wealth in
which the less capable may share, though unequally. . . . But the case against any
particular economic inequality is not conclusively demonstrated by showing it to
be the outcome of inequality of opportunity. Nor are economic inequalities to be
defended on the ground that they result from equality of opportunity; for this
they do not.
Id. at 616.
483. Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 329, 330 (May 1923).
484. Hale Papers, Folder 93-5 at 10.
485. Id. 80-16 at 10.
486. Id. 80-1 at 5.
487. Id. 93-6 at 55.

488. Coercion and Distribution, supra note 21, at 482.
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extend economic liberty."' "A certain degree of inequality of property
rights seems essential if the pecuniary incentives to production are to
be maintained."490 Thus,
in many cases, to withdraw . . . large incomes might so lessen
the incentive to investment and production that, with the consequent lessening of the common stock of produce, the workman's share might be less even than before. Economic study is
revealing more and more cases, however, where such would not
be the case, and judicious experimenting will doubtless reveal
still more. This is true to a considerable extent of incomes from
inherited property, from monopolies and from increments of
land value. The government, by seizing a large share of such
incomes, could increase the opportunities of the poor without
checking any of the selfish incentive to production held out
to the rich.4 91
"[I]f the wages are pushed beyond a certain limit, the impairment
of the incentive of the capitalists may before very long react unfavorably
on the laborers themselves. ' 492 Indeed, he argued that the fallacy of the
wages fund doctrine
is the same as that underlying communism. It ignores the fact
that some incomes above the average serve as incentives to the
production of more total wealth; hence the reduction of such
incomes, while it would give the poorer classes a greater proportion of the total income than now, would in all probability give
them 49smaller
absolute amounts, because of the reduction of the
3
total.
Caution is to be the watchword, then; the incentive argument is powerful; while not conclusive, ignoring it is dangerous. In Freedom Through
Law Hale gave perhaps the best statement of his general position:
Even legislation which tends to equalize wealth may diminish
the economic liberty of those who have least if it is so unwisely
489. Hale Papers, Folder 90-2 at 5.
Any legislative modification of property rights in the direction of equalization is
not, then, so much a curb on liberty, as it is a removal of a curb, unless it interferes
with the incentive to production. If it does not, then it promotes the liberty of
the non-owners in precisely the same sense as that in which it limits the freedom
of the owners-in the sense, that is, of freedom from those obstructions to the
power of choice and to the power of self-assertion which accompany a limitation
of income.
Economic Considerations,supra note 201, at 53.
490. Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 39 (Jan. 1923).
[W]hile the system of property does compel the propertyless to work, they might
be still worse off without the institution, for it also furnishes the incentive for
much useful work on the part of owners, work which increases the supply of commodities and lowers their prices, making even those lowest down in the social system perhaps better off than they would be in the absence of that incentive.
Some Phases of the Minimum Wage, supra note 476, at 280.
491. Hale Papers, Folder 80-11 at 2.
492. Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 179.
493. Political and Economic Review, 8 A.B.A.J. 752, 753 (Dec. 1922).
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drawn that it decreases greatly the total output of society. All
legislation which effects economic changes will be restrictive of
some liberties. If it accentuates economic inequality it will,
unless it causes a sufficient increase of the total output of
society, reduce the liberty of the least fortunate while enhancing
that of the more fortunate. If it mitigates inequality it will
reduce the liberty of the more fortunate, and it may, by reducing production, diminish the liberty of all. If wisely drawn, on
the other hand, it may greatly increase 4 the
liberty of those
94
whose freedom is now the most restricted.
Inequality, then, is inevitable and necessary, and partially a function
of the law, but, with a cautious eye on the structure of incentives, the
pattern of inequality can be made more tolerable and more just. Although
he offered no programme and no formula for inequality-moderating legal
innovations and rearrangements, Hale, as we have seen, did stress the
importance of using public, or official, government as a check on private
government, particularly concentrations of private power many of which
existed with government support if not largesse. As the title and subtitle
of his magnum opus put it, freedom is achieved through law, through
public control of private governing power. One can no more eliminate
coercion than inequality: the economy is a system of power and therefore
of mutual coercion. Hale's normative position is rather this: the political
process must develop legal restraints or checks upon the power of private
governments similar to those already developed as checks upon the power
of official government. Since our volitional freedom is in some sense as
much a function of private-government coercion as of official-government
coercion, any system which incorporates checks upon the latter and fails
to develop checks against the former allows those without means to be
exposed to the domination of private power, even when that power is
indiscriminately exercised through the impersonal market. "To put legal
limits on the liberty of those who have superior private governing
power.., would not only bring about great equality of governing power;
it might also result in a net enhancement of liberty." '95 It is difficult to
be conclusive about this, but it appears that Hale's concern about greater
equality, or restructuring the pattern of inequality, has as its main thrust
not equality per se but the protection against otherwise unchecked
private governing power. Hale's concern is more against concentrated
power than in favor of economic equality; though it is the case that in
his model, since the pattern of volitional freedoms is a function of mutual
coercion which in turn is a function of power, it would follow that
moderating the extremes of power concentrations would tend to bring
about a great parity of power and, thereby, of volitional freedom. A
rough parity, perhaps, but not equality, was his goal. Perhaps the heart
494. FREEDom THRoUGH LAW, supra note 10, at 542-43.
495. Hale Papers, Folder 80-1 at 4.
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of his message is contained in a statement which Hale quoted from the
installation address of Dwight David Eisenhower as president of Columbia
University:
As General Eisenhower said . . . , a danger to freedom arises
"from too great a concentration of power in the hands of any
individual or group: The power of concentrated finance, the
power of selfish pressure groups, the power of any class organized in opposition to the whole.... Any one of these, if allowed
to dominate, is fully [as] capable of destroying individual freedom as is excessive power concentrated in the political head of
'
the state."496
What Hale's prescription largely calls for, it seems, is the correction of
the gross disparities of power, both within the market and without it,
in the form of rights and wealth acquired through legal inequality and
otherwise, which he felt would create more acceptable, though still unequal, arrays of opportunities and a wider distribution of benefits. Competition is a check on private power, but since it operates within the
larger power structure it is not enough. But Hale would have neither
replaced competition with totalitarian control nor created a tyranny
of enforced equality. Yet he would have used the state to bring about
net enlargements of freedom by checking private power and rearranging
legal rights-as by the social legislation which he saw passed during his
lifetime-all the time moving toward a strengthening of the extensive
margin of freedom, but with cautious regard that sacrifice of the intensive
margin not lead to retrogressive disincentive effects or further, though
different, tyrannies. He saw no revolution or radical change in the use
of the law. "Some protections against governing power of private persons
have been developed in this country.' 49 7 "The ordinary law of the state,
as distinguished from constitutional law, affords an individual protection
against many adverse acts of other individuals."49 What he supported
was further use of the state-particularly through legislation-to further
promote the extensive margin of liberty, to change the interests supported
by the state. What he would not have done would be to have allowed
those who already had achieved positions of advantage with the aid of
the state to prevent a similar use of law to assist the presently disadvantaged. All this is anathema to those who fail to see the workings of
the state in the status quo private power structure and to those who
see revision or state activism in the interests of the disadvantaged as
"socialism." But it was Hale's normative position, and, while it remains
distinctly separable from his (and its supporting) positive analysis, it
does characterize the thrust of most traditional American reform movements from the end of the Civil War to mid-twentieth century civil rights
496. FREEDOx TROwuo LAW, supra note 10, at 4.
497. Hale Papers, Folder 80-8 at 8.
498. Id. 93-6 at 1.
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efforts. It is a philosophy not of class eradication but of expansion. What
was said of Commons is also true of Hale:
Commons is thus the father of a labor struggle theory
which is not a class struggle theory in the Marxian sense. It is
not a struggle by the rising group to liquidate the old class or
to raze the social structure which the latter controlled, but
essaying instead to add to the old edifice new and spacious
wings to serve as the dwelling places of the customs of the rising
class.499
In terms of his own analysis, Hale argued that
democracy offers the best hope for a solution. The solution does
not necessarily call for the elimination of private economic
power, only for its being made responsible to the political state,
which in turn is responsible, under a democracy, to the majority
of those whom it governs. Protection of weak and unpopular
minorities may call for some constitutional limitations on the
democratic power of the majority. But if these limitations are
interpreted by courts which identify curtailment of a minority's
economic governing power with oppression of that minority,
then the problem of making liberty and property more accessible to the majority will remain unsolved. The democratic
political state will be rendered impotent to afford to the many
freedom from the unlimited governing power of the few."'O
This statement reflects the constitutional issues of economic policy of his
times, but it is of profound importance in understanding Hale that he
defines as his problem that "of making liberty and property more accessible to the majority . ..."

In all these matters Hale was trying to get a handle on and satisfactorily resolve some fundamental problems, particularly those of liberty
versus equality and equality versus hierarchy. From the conservative
and/or elitist viewpoint he was radical and subversive. From the viewpoint of the far left he was going only halfway, unwilling to leave the
system. More important, Hale believed the promise of the American
dream, and his thought came up against the intractable problems burdening the American, and all other experiences.
499. S. Perlman, in THE DEVELOPMENT OFfECONOmiC ThOUoHT 411 (H.W. Spiegel ed.,
1952).
500. Hale Papers, Folder 80-4 at 2. "It is not the automatic working of the Constitution, but only affirmative intervention of the government in economic affairs, that can
secure to the underprivileged any reasonable degree of liberty from those restraints which
they find the most oppressive." Id. at 23.
We do not get this sort of discussion, however, if we ignore all the invisible but
effective restraints on freedom; if we assume, with Herbert Hoover, that "economic
liberty" is endangered only by legal limitation of the power of the strong to control
the activities of the weak; if we characterize every presidential argument for a
more equal distribution of liberty as an attempt to stir class against class.
Id. at 24. The language of many of these quotations from Hale reflects the mode of
reasoning and argument of earlier times, which is what partially makes them so interesting.
I have particular reference to discussion in terms of the "strong" and the "weak."
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B. Deliberative Legal-Economic Policy
I have already demonstrated, as one of Hale's most fundamental
themes, the policy character of legal-economic interrelations. It is only
because of the choice and artifactual nature of law and economics that
that "infernal arbitrariness of choice" (to again quote Hale's student)
arises at all. But what made choice distinctive in Hale's teaching and
writing was his insistence that problems of legal-economic policy ought
to be confronted directly and deliberatively and not left to the hidden
judgmental determinations of invisible private governments or, for that
matter, inconspicuous official governmental determination, which would
then masquerade as the product of either custom, the system, the market,
or inevitable social forces. This is surely a critical position by Hale, for
it remains to this day an unsettled question as to how much policy
consciousness and how many open-ended choices a (large) society can
handle during any period of time and, further, is consistent with stability
or order. Conservatives stress the danger to order from too much policy
consciousness, the inability of an organic society to absorb too many
major changes; liberals stress the danger to order from not undertaking
continuing self-vitalizing critique and needed reforms, and emphasize
also the system's ability to handle and adapt to basic institutional revisions; and radicals tend to stress the need for change and to either
dismiss the threat to order or accept it as a necessary, if not desirable,
price of change. It is an indication of Hale's conservatism that he felt
that the types of change which he contemplated were only a continuation
and extension of the status quo, and as such would not, and perhaps
could not, result in disorder. In any event, his main point was the
deliberative confrontation with problems of choice.
In a manuscript written during World War I, Hale pointed to
Taussig's Principles as an example of how "[e] conomics ...has begun
to question the institution of property at every point . . . ;" and how

sociological jurisprudence, "led by Dean Pound, has come to see the need
of judging rules of law by their sociological, if not yet by their economic,
consequences. But much still remains to be done," he wrote, "in subjecting every detail of our legal system, as well as every proposed correction
thereof, to a searching and constructive economic criticism." '' A decade
and a half later, in a letter to Elliott Cheatham discussing his course
Legal Factors, Hale wrote:
The chief object I see in the course is to make lawyers
aware of the legal conditioning of our economic society; when
aware of this, the next step is to make them realize that the
question of the maintenance or the alteration of our institutions
must be discussed on its pragmatic merits, not dismissed on
the ground that they are the inevitable outcome of a free
society; then they must be acquainted with some of the types
501. Id. 80-10 at 7.
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of judgments that must be passed-judgments first as to the
efficacy of particular means to desired ends and as to other
judgpossible results of adopting those means, then, second,
02
ments as to what ends are desirable-value judgments.
And almost two decades later, at a University of Chicago conference
in 1951, he queried: "We have unconscious control already, and the
question is, should we make it more conscious? "110Thus, in his 1922
classic article Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept,
he argued that "[i] f property is not revised methodically by its friends,
it is likely to be revised unmethodically by its enemies, with disastrous
results." He called for the courts to "repudiate the metaphysics" which
had misled the commissions and mired the courts in utility regulation,
and for a candid examination of the functions of ownership, not only in
the public utility area, but in private property generally, with the ultimate purpose "to work out a body of law for the revision of property
rights where they need revision, and for their preservation where they
need preserving . ..." "The result might be radical," he cautioned; but
"if so it would be because on a piecemeal and candid review, many of the
incidents of property would prove themselves to be without justification."5 4 Hale's attitude was explicitly one of openness toward all such
questions, 0 5 and his emphasis upon deliberative evaluation and open rearrangement echoed the teaching of Taussig, whose words Hale quoted
in this connection:
The dogma of an unrestricted right of property, and the
belief in the expediency of the exercise of that right without a
jot or tittle of abatement have been shaken beyond repair. The
rights of property must prove themselves on examination in
each particular case, and submit to modification where a balance
of gain for the public can be reasonably expected. 506
"The days of dumb acquiescence in privilege are gone. Privilege and
station can show a reason for their existence only through service. ' '50
Thomas Reed Powell understood Hale's point of view perfectly well when
he wrote Hale in 1914 that judges:
of course attribute a certain rightness to the general system
502. Letter from R.L. Hale to E.E. Cheatham, Nov. 2, 1933, at 1, in Hale Papers,
Folder 57. Hale's policy strategy is similar to that of Knight in the latter's review of
Freedom Through Law. Knight, Book Review, 39 VA. L. REv. 871, 871-72 (1953); see note
137 supra.

503. Hale Papers, Folder 59-1 at 4. "There may be cases where it is better not to have

anybody use his own judgment as to whether the results will be good or bad .... But, after
all, in most things where the government's activity is going to have an effect, it seems wiser
to take some account of the probable results." Id.
504. Rate Making and the Revision of the Property Concept, supra note 4, at 216.
505. Letter from R.L. Hale to L.L. Fuller, Dec. 24, 1954, at 14, in Hale Papers,
Folder 76.
506. Political and Economic Review, 10 A.B.A.J. 51 (Jan. 1924).
507! Political and Economic Review, 9 A.B.A.J. 329, 330 (May 1923).
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which they see in operation. I hardly think we can expect them
to be revolutionists. My objection to many panaceaists is that
they fail to give due regard to the existing system as a fact to
be reckoned with. My objection to their opponents is that they
fail to recognize how far that system is the product of human
will and how far it is within human control. That's why I shall
welcome your magnum opus on "The Political Laws of the Distribution of Wealth." 0 8
Before that magnum opus came, and it took four decades, Hale developed his analysis not only in his series of legal-economic articles, but
in the field of public utility law, and it was with respect to Hale's work in
that field that Douglas Maggs wrote Hale: "[Y] ou will succeed eventually in forcing out into the open the hidden and therefore half-baked
policy decisions which dictate results in this field."" 9 In the eventual
magnum opus Hale proceeded to demonstrate the decisions of economic
policy or economic structure which are typically unobtrusively made in
common and constitutional law. In Freedom Through Law Hale practiced
the deliberative policy analysis which he had taught generations of
Columbia law students. His refusal to accept the status quo on its own
terms alone led him to analyze the forces out of which it developed and
not merely take them for granted non-deliberatively. Hale's positive
analysis, however well it may stand independently, was nourished by
that message; his normative posture was the motivating force behind his
positive analysis. Yet it is a tribute to the power and capacity of his
deliberative policy analysis that his theories of the economy as a system
of power and the legal bases thereof stand independent of his values,
for Hale considered his legal-economic analysis an attempt at providing
just such a basis for open deliberative evaluation.
508. Letter from T.R. Powell to R.L. Hale, Aug. 31, 1914, at 2, in Hale Papers,
Folder 61.
509. Letter from D. Maggs to R.L. Hale, June 4, 1940, in Hale Papers, Folder 16.

